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Abstract
is thesis is essentially a portfolio of four disjoint yet thematically related articles
that deal with some semantic aspect or another of natural language conditionals.
e thesis opens with a brief introductory chapter that oﬀers a short yet opin-
ionated historical overview and a theoretical background of several important se-
mantic issues of conditionals.
e second chapter then deals with the issue of truth values and conditions
of indicative conditionals. So-called Gibbard Phenomenon cases have been used to
argue that indicative conditionals construed in terms of the Ramsey Test cannot
have truth values. Since that conclusion is somewhat incredible, several alternative
options are explored. Finally, a contextualised revision of the Ramsey Test is oﬀered
which successfully avoids the threats of the Gibbard Phenomenon.
e third chapter deals with the question of where to draw the so-called indica-
tive/subjunctive line. Natural language conditionals are commonly believed to be
of two semantically distinct types: indicative and subjunctive. Although this distinc-
tion is central to many semantic analyses of natural conditionals, there seems to be
no consensus on the details of its nature. While trying to uncover the grounds for
the distinction, we will argue our way through several plausible proposals found in
the literature. Upon discovering that none of these proposals seem entirely suited,
we will reconsider our position and make several helpful observations into the na-
ture of conditional sentences. And ënally, in light of our observations, we shall
propose and argue for plausible grounds for the indicative/subjunctive distinction.
e fouth chapter oﬀers semantics formodal and amodal natural language con-
v
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ditionals based on the distinction proposed in the previous chapter. First, the na-
ture of modal and amodal suppositions will be explored. Armed with an analysis
of modal and amodal suppositions, the corresponding conditionals will be exam-
ined further. Consequently, the syntax of conditionals in English will be uncovered
for the purpose of providing input for our semantics. And ënally, compositional
semantics in generative grammar will be oﬀered for modal and amodal conditionals.
e ëfth and ënal chapter defendsModus Ponens from alleged counterexamples.
In particular, the chapter oﬀers a solution to McGee’s infamous counterexamples.
First, several solutions oﬀered to the counterexamples hitherto are all argued to
be inadequate. After a couple of observations on the counterexamples’ nature, a
solution is oﬀered and demonstrated. e solution suggests that the semantics of
embedded natural language conditionals is more sophisticated than their surface
syntax indicates. e heart of the solution is a translation function from the surface
form of natural language conditionals to their logical form.
Finally, the thesis ends with a conclusion that brieìy summarises the main con-
clusions drawn in its preceding chapters.
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ǫ Introduction
Ċ.Ċ Preamble: Conditionals
is thesis is about so-called conditionals. In particular, this thesis will deal with
several central semantic issues concerning natural language conditionals.ǫ However,
before we can say anything interesting about conditionals, we ought probably to
demarcate our subject matter to a certain degree.
Interestingly though, such demarcation is harder than one would think. As a
partly linguistic phenomenon, we do certainly have a certain grip on their linguis-
tic properties. Syntactically, conditionals have traditionally been considered to be a
class of sentences which combine two constitutive sentences or clauses in a particular
way. In the literature, the two constitutive sentences have been thoroughly distin-
guished from one another—as opposed to, say, the constituents of conjunctions
ǫFor excellent and somewhat more extensive introductions to the semantics of natural language
conditionals, see Edgington (ǫǳǳǯ), Bennett (ǬǪǪǭ) and von Fintel (ms.).
ǫ
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and disjunctions—and have usually been called antecedent (or protasis) and conse-
quent (or apodosis) respectively. In most natural languages, conditionals are usually
marked by a certain word—like ‘if ’ in English, ‘si’ in French, Spanish and Latin, ‘se’
in Italian and Portuguese, ‘hvis’ in Danish and Norwegian, ‘om’ in Swedish, ‘ef ’ in
Icelandic, ‘wenn’ in German, ‘als’ in Dutch and so on and on—which attaches, as it
were, to the antecedent and moreover indicates the conditionality of the sentence.
Similarly, the consequent is sometimes marked by a particular word—like ‘then’ in
English, . . . and so on and on—although, as we shall see in due course, such conse-
quence markers are far more dispensable than antecedent markers.Ǭ Together, those
markers combine and provide a canonical conditional structure along the following
lines in, say, English: if . . . , then . . . .ǭ
More concretely, the following sentence is a paradigmatic example of a condi-
tional in English:
(ǫ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then someone else did.
is sentence contains the crucial words ‘if ’ and ‘then’ and it seems moreover to
combine two constitutive sentences in a particular way. On the surface, it seems
that this conditional is indeed composed of two sentences: an antecedent, which is
the following sentence:
(Ǭ) Shakespeare did not write Hamlet.
And a consequent, which is the following sentence:
(ǭ) Someone else wrote Hamlet.
So much for the rudimentary syntactic properties of conditionals. To our frus-
tration, once we pay more attention to the conditionals, we soon realise that their
surface syntax can be much more varied than (ǫ) might ever give us a reason to
ǬOn the syntax and semantics of ‘then’, see Iatridou (ǫǳǳǭ). On the indispensability of ‘then’,
see Davis (ǫǳǲǭ) and Geis (ǫǳǲǯ).
ǭInterestingly though, some languages do not have such a conditional structure and express
conditionals by pragmatic means only. An alleged example is the language Guugu Yimithirr, see
Levinson (ǬǪǪǪ, p. ǫǬǯ).
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expect. Arguably, all of the following sentences express the same conditional as (ǫ)
in many contexts:Ǯ
(Ǯ) a) Someone else wrote Hamlet if Shakespeare did not.
b) Did Shakespeare not write Hamlet, someone else did.
c) Either Shakespeare wrote Hamlet or someone else did.
d) Someone else wrote Hamlet provided that Shakespeare did not.
e) Assuming that Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, someone else did.
If we agree that (Ǯa)–(Ǯe) do in fact express the same conditional as (ǫ), we are
in a peculiar situation: demarcating conditionals by their syntactic features does
not seem to get us very far aëeld. In fact, we might even question whether con-
ditionals have any suﬃcient or necessary syntactic conditions.ǯ True enough, we
could designate a class of sentences according to certain syntactic features and call
them ‘conditionals’. Say, all sentences which have the same surface form as (Ǯa)
and related subject-auxiliary inversions and topic and focus phrases such as (ǫ) and
(Ǯb). However, that way, we are inevitably bound to miss some sentences which
intuitively express conditionals.ǰ In essence, it seems that conditionals are not a
syntactic category at all.
Rather, we might suspect, conditionals comprise a semantic category. Indeed,
we are willing to accept that (ǫ) and (Ǯa)–(Ǯe) are conditionals only because those
sentences express something of the same kind. So, we could now ask, what do condi-
tionals express? Or more precisely, what are the semantic properties of conditionals?
As somewhat competent language users, we all know roughly what someone means
when they utter a sentence such as (ǫ). Furthermore, we do quite often have clear
intuitions about their truth values. And moreover, we also know quite well which
ǮIn particular, (Ǯc) can only be said to expresses the same conditional as (ǫ) in contexts where
we are certain that either the antecedent or the consequent obtains but we do not know which; see
Stalnaker (ǫǳǱǯ/ǫǳǳǳ).
ǯIn particular, if there are languages wherein conditionals have no syntactic markers; see again
footnote ǭ.
ǰEven if we only restrict ourselves to English, some conditionals can be both expressed as con-
junctions and disjunctions, which comprise a diﬀerent syntactic category altogether, and by means
of numerous circumlocutions such as (Ǯe) and (Ǯe).
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sentences express conditionals and which do not. Intuitively, conditionals report
situations of some description which are actualised on the condition that some other
situation obtains. Conversely, conditionals express situations of some description
and tell us what other situations do also obtain. e situations in question need
not be actual and therein lies the importance of conditionals: conditionals allow us
to express something about counterfactual situations which may never even obtain.
In fact, this very feature reìects an essential aspect of human language and thought
which has been called ‘displacement’ in certain circles.Ǳ And although the oft ex-
pressed sentiment that conditionals are an essential and basic part of our mental
make-up is all but obvious, we can only emphasise it once again.ǲ
Despite all that, when it comes to spelling out what exactly we mean by sen-
tences such as (ǫ), we soon feel humbled and unquestionably out of our depth. Sure,
we may come up with a number of diﬀerent ways in which we can express whatever
we do express by (ǫ), but if we try to give a systematic account of what we mean
by such sentences in general, we soon become bewildered. If conditionals had no
serious relevance to our lives in general, that would all be ëne and well. However,
since the concept of conditionality is arguably quite central to an understanding
of our thought, language and actions, we cannot easily ignore it. Moreover, since
conditionals often play pivotal roles in our arguments, a correct account of their
meaning is of considerable signiëcance from both philosophical and logical points
of view. An appropriate semantic and meta-semantic understanding of condition-
als is therefore of signiëcance for subjects as diverse as, say, philosophy of language,
philosophy of logic, philosophical and mathematical logic, semantics, pragmatics,
cognitive science, cognitive and developmental psychology, artiëcial intelligence,
automated reasoning, decision theory, game theory and operation analysis. Quite
unsurprisingly then, there has been much ado made about conditionals and their
semantics through the years.
ǱSee Hockett (ǫǳǰǪ), Hockett and Altmann (ǫǳǰǲ) and von Fintel and Heim (ǬǪǪǱ, xǫ.ǫ).
ǲFor a particularly articulate and eloquent expression, see Edgington (ǫǳǳǯ, p. Ǭǭǯ).
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Ċ.Č Giving Meaning to Conditionals
We have concerned ourselves with conditionals for a long time. In fact, condi-
tionals are arguably one of the oldest subject of semantics: almost two and a half
millennia ago, the poet Callimachus allegedly remarked that ‘even the crows on the
rooftops are cawing about which conditionals are true’.ǳ Somewhat later, Cicero in
his Academica remarks on the bewildering number of diverse accounts of condition-
als and complainingly cites Diodorus Siculus, Philo of Alexandria and Chrysippus
of Soli.ǫǪ As one would predict, after all those years, there is a staggering number
of vastly diﬀerent theories of conditional semantics in the literature. In many cases,
of course, the diﬀerence between these semantic accounts is quite soft and subtle.
However, when we consider the proposed accounts more carefully, we soon notice
that we are actually up against several clusters of drastically diﬀerent theories which
are internally quite similar one another.
In order to gain a better grasp of the subject of this thesis, we will now take a
closer look at two quite distinct strands of semantic accounts of conditionals which
may be found in the literature. Since we will repeatedly encounter those accounts
in one guise or another in due course, it will be helpful to have them spelled out
now in some detail.ǫǫ However, before we turn to these accounts, a brief remark is
in place on the grim fact that natural language conditionals do actually appear to
be of two distinct semantic categories rather than just one.
In light of this apparent distinction, the challenge of giving an appropriate se-
mantic account of conditionals becomes twice as hard: in addition to giving an
account of conditionals of the category of (ǫ), we are also up against a new category
ǳSee Mates (ǫǳǰǯ) (according to Adams (ǬǪǪǯ, p. ǫ)) and Sextus Empiricus’ Adversus Gram-
maticos ǭǪǳ, reporting Callimachus’ Epigrammatum Fragmenta ǭǳǭ (according to both Young (ǫǳǲǳ,
p. Ǭǳ) and von Fintel (ms., p. Ǭ)).
ǫǪAccording to von Fintel (ms., p. Ǭ).
ǫǫOther accounts, some upon which we will also touch later, include: no-truth-value accounts
(see Adams (ǫǳǰǯ, ǫǳǱǯ), Gibbard (ǫǳǲǫ) and Edgington (ǫǳǲǯ/ǫǳǳǫ, ǫǳǳǯ)), modal-restrictor
accounts (see Lewis (ǫǳǱǯ) and Kratzer (ǫǳǲǰ, forthcoming)), deënite-description accounts (see
Schein (ǬǪǪǭ), Schlenker (ǬǪǪǮ) and Bhatt and Pancheva (ǬǪǪǰ)), dynamic strict-conditional ac-
counts (see von Fintel (ǬǪǪǫ) and Gillies (ǬǪǪǱ)) and contextually restricted strict-conditional ac-
counts (see Gillies (ǬǪǪǳ, ǬǪǫǪ)).
ė Introduction
altogether. Of course, the two categories might be related in some aspect which
would allow for a uniëed account. Nonetheless, even if that were the case, it will
be considerably harder to conjure up such a universal account. So, enough already,
let us turn to this distinction now.
On the one hand, let us recall our paradigm conditional from before:
(ǫ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then someone else did.
Intuitively, this conditional is true: Hamlet exists and since things like that do not
write themselves, someone else must have written it if Shakespeare did not.
On the other hand, if we muck around with the tenses and aspect of (ǫ), we get
a peculiar result. Indeed, consider the following conditional:
(ǯ) If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then someone else would have.ǫǬ
Intuitively, this conditional is false: Hamlet is a work of considerable genius which
arguably few apart from Shakespeare could have mustered. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, even if history had yielded other authors suﬃciently gifted, the sheer possi-
bility of composing a play exactly likeHamlet is too far-fetched. And for that reason,
most of us agree that no one would ever have written Hamlet had Shakespeare not.
While conditionals like (ǫ) have traditionally been called ‘indicative condition-
als’, conditionals like (ǯ) are called ‘subjunctive conditionals’. Although we cannot
easily do without the indicative/subjunctive distinction, there is no general consen-
sus about its exact nature or its boundaries. In due course, we shall take a closer
look at the distinction but for now, it will suﬃce for us to remain aware of its exis-
tence. In particular, the distinction is important for the two accounts we shall now
consider.
ǫǬ(ǫ) and (ǯ) are of course only a variant of the classic Oswald-Kennendy examples from Adams
(ǫǳǱǪ).
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Ċ.Č.Ċ Material Implication Accounts
Allegedly, material implication accounts date back at least to the Stoics.ǫǭ Amaterial
implication, which we shall denote by ‘’ hereafter, is a two place truth function (or
logical connective if you will) which is deëned to be true if and only if its antecedent
is false or its consequent is true. Conversely, we may also (and equivalently) deëne
material implication with the following truth table:
'  '  
ǫ ǫ ǫ
ǫ Ǫ Ǫ
Ǫ ǫ ǫ
Ǫ Ǫ ǫ
According to an undiluted material implication account, natural language con-
ditionals, such as (ǫ) and (ǯ), are true if and only if the corresponding material
implication is true. In other words, a natural language conditional of the form pif
', then q is true if and only if the corresponding material implication p'  q is
true. Understandably, we might now ask, why should we ever go for this particular
distribution of truth values? Indeed, anyone who has ever sat through an introduc-
tory logic class has probably entertained this question in bewilderment. e most
honest answer is that out of the sixteen possible distributions of truth values avail-
able for two place truth functions, this particular distribution oﬀers the closest ët to
our intuitions. So, roughly, on the assumption that natural language conditionals
are extensionally truth functional, this is as good as it ever gets.ǫǮ
Although an undilutedmaterial implication account seems to get the truth value
of (ǫ) correctly, (ǯ) already runs counter to the proposal: since Shakespeare and no
one else wrote Hamlet, both the antecedent and consequent are false, in which case
the corresponding material implication is true. However, since we already claimed
that (ǯ) is intuitively false, the account seems to disagree with our data.
ǫǭFor instance, the aforementioned Stoic Chrysippus of Soli held a material implication view of
conditionals; see Sharples (ǫǳǳǰ, p. Ǭǯ).
ǫǮSee for instance Edgington (ǫǳǳǯ, xǬ.Ǭ).
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is is merely a symptom of a more serious problem: under the material im-
plication analysis, far more arguments are validated than the corresponding natural
language conditionals seem to tolerate. e so-called positive and negative para-
doxes of material implication are probably the most notorious examples: the posi-
tive paradox exploits the fact that ' implies p  'q classically. On the assump-
tion of the material implication analysis then, any natural language conditional with
a true consequent is true. Conversely, the negative paradox exploits the fact that '
implies p:'  q classically. On the assumption of the material implication anal-
ysis then, any natural language conditional with a false antecedent is true. Although
(ǯ) is an example of this, we can without a doubt conjure up far more outlandish
conditionals which will be true according to the material implication account but
still strike us as intuitively false.ǫǯ
For those reasons, no one seriously supports an undiluted material implication
account nowadays. Nevertheless, one may ënd serious accounts in the literature
which give a pragmatically enriched material implication semantics to a certain class
of conditionals. Of those accounts, the most elaborate is undoubtably Jackson’s
account.ǫǰ On Jackson’s account, indicative conditionals agree with material impli-
cation in terms of truth conditions, but disagree in terms of their use conditions.
Let us now brieìy consider the rough details of Jackson’s thesis.
As way of a prolog, let us ërst mention that Adams proposed an intuitive thesis
according to which the so-called assertibility of a conditional p' ! q is the
conditional probability of its consequent  given its antecedent ', Pr(j').ǫǱ
Quite often, the assertibility of sentences does, all things considered, seem to go
by their subjective probability: the more likely we ënd the truth of some sentence
ǫǯOther classically valid inferences which also seem dubious for natural language conditionals
include '  : `   :' (contraposition), '  ;    ` '   (transitivity), '   `
('^ )   (antecedent strengthening), ('^ )   ` (('^:)   )_ ((:'^ )   )
and :('^)^ ('   )^ (  ) ` ('  )_ (  ). For concrete examples and further
discussion, see for instance Priest (ǬǪǪǲ, xǫ), Priest (ǬǪǪǳ, xǬ.ǯ) and Bennett (ǬǪǪǭ, xxǬ–ǭ).
ǫǰSee in particular Jackson (ǫǳǱǳ/ǫǳǳǫ, ǫǳǲǱ). For other recent defences of a material implica-
tion analysis, see Smith (ǫǳǲǭ), Smith and Smith (ǫǳǲǲ), Grice (ǫǳǲǳa), Rieger (ǬǪǪǰ) and Allott
and Uchida (ǬǪǪǳa, ǬǪǪǳb).
ǫǱSee Adams (ǫǳǰǯ, ǫǳǰǰ) and to some extent Adams (ǫǳǱǯ).
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', the more appropriate it becomes for us to assert '. For that very reason, we
might suspect that the assertibility of conditional sentences does also go by their
subjective probability. Once upon a time, at any rate, Stalnaker took that view quite
seriously.ǫǲ According to Stalnaker’s thesis, the probability of a conditional p' !
q is merely the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent:
Pr('! ) = Pr(j'). To considerable surprise, however, Lewis proved that on
the supposition of Stalnaker’ thesis, any language which has a universal probability
conditional will be a trivial language.ǫǳ Importantly, Lewis’ results tell us that the
truth conditions of conditionals cannot reasonably be spelled out in any terms akin
to Stalnaker’s thesis.
Despite this failure of Stalnaker’s proposal, Jackson refuses to jettison Adams’
thesis. After all, he claims, the intuitiveness of the thesis suggests that Adams might
have been onto something important although it could not have been along the
particular lines Stalnaker proposed. Jackson therefore conjures up an elaborate ac-
count of the assertibility of indicative conditionals, which is consonant with Adams’
thesis yet independent from Stalnaker’s proposal.
In order to understand Jackson’s account, let us ërst consider the following pair
of sentences:
(ǰ) Hamlet is determined to avenge his father’s death and balks upon ënding
King Claudius in prayer.
(Ǳ) Hamlet is determined to avenge his father’s death but balks upon ënding
King Claudius in prayer.
While the two sentences intuitively agree in truth-conditions—they are true only if
both conjuncts are true—there is still a stark diﬀerence in their meaning: while the
former tells us that Hamlet is ready to avenge his father’s death and that he ënds
Claudius in prayer, the latter also expresses something more. Namely, (Ǳ) expresses
ǫǲSee Stalnaker (ǫǳǱǪ); see also Jeﬀrey (ǫǳǰǮ).
ǫǳLewis (ǫǳǱǰ/ǫǳǳǫ). See also Lewis (ǫǳǲǰ/ǫǳǳǫ), Hájek (ǫǳǲǳ, ǫǳǳǮ) and Hájek and Hall
(ǫǳǳǮ).
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a contrast between the two conjuncts which (ǰ) does not: in spite of young Ham-
let’s raging intentions, he nonetheless hesitates upon ënding his father’s murderer
praying.
We cannot possibly grasp the diﬀerence between (ǰ) and (Ǳ) in terms of truth
conditions alone. Rather, we must also understand when it is permissible to as-
sert conjunctions with ‘but’ instead of ‘and’ and when it is not.ǬǪ According to a
widespread view, the substantive diﬀerence between (ǰ) and (Ǳ) is that (Ǳ) implies
something which (ǰ) does not: namely, there is something quite extraordinary and
improbable about the second conjunct given the ërst. More abstractly, (Ǳ) carries
an implicature which (ǰ) does not—or more precisely, ‘but’ carries a conventional
implicature which (Ǳ) does not.Ǭǫ
According to Jackson, we are up against something quite similar in the case of
indicative conditionals: indicative conditionals agree with material implication in
their truth conditions but disagree in their assertibility conditions. So, what are
the assertibility conditions of indicative conditionals? As we said before, Jackson
suggests that Adams’ thesis provides the answer to that question: the assertibility
of an indicative conditional p' ! q is merely the conditional probability of
its consequent  given its antecedent '. However, in order to account for this
equivalence, Jackson introduces the notion of robustness.
So, what is robustness then? Given two sentences,  and , which are similarly
assertible, there may be some new information expressed by the sentence  whose
impact upon  can diﬀer markedly from its impact upon  in terms of subjective
probability. e introduction of  may, for instance, decrease Pr() while either
increasing Pr() or leaving it as it were. In such cases, we say that  is robust with
respect to  while  is not. For instance, consider and contrast the following two
sentences:
(ǲ) Hamlet is determined to avenge his father’s death
(ǳ) Hamlet balks at killing King Claudius in prayer.
ǬǪSee Dummett (ǫǳǱǭ/ǫǳǲǫ, pp. ǲǯ–ǲǰ).
ǬǫSee Grice (ǫǳǱǯ/ǫǳǲǳ) and Sperber and Wilson (ǫǳǲǰ).
Ċ.Č Giving Meaning to Conditionals ĊĊ
Let us assume that we assign a similar subjective probability to those sentences.
Moreover, however, suppose we were to learn that:
(ǫǪ) Hamlet believes that if he were to kill King Claudius in prayer, that would
ease his soul’s passage to heaven.
Normally, our subjective probability of (ǲ) would then decrease considerably while
our subjective probability of (ǳ) would either remain the same or increase. In our
earlier terms, (ǳ) is robust with respect to (ǫǪ) while (ǲ) is not. And since we are
already dealing with probabilities, we may state this more generally: the robustness
of a given sentence  with respect to some other sentence  is the conditional
probability of  given  or, if you will, Pr(j).
is brings us back to indicative conditionals. On Jackson’s account, an indica-
tive conditional carries the conventional implicature that the corresponding mate-
rial implication is robust with respect to its antecedent. erefore, the more robust
that a material implication becomes with respect to its antecedent, the greater the
assertibility of the corresponding indicative conditional will be. In other words, the
assertability of an indicative conditional p'! q is measured by the robustness of
its corresponding material implication with respect to its antecedent, which again,
as we said before, is simply Pr('  j'). Moreover, since Pr('  j') may
be simpliëed to Pr(j'), the assertability of an indicative conditional p' ! q
is simply Pr(j'). And thus, all things considered, the closer Pr(j') gets to ǫ,
the more appropriate it becomes to assert p'! q.
Finally, with this account of assertability in place, Jackson can maintain that
inferences such as, say, the paradoxes of material implication are in fact valid: any
indicative conditional with a false antecedent or true consequent is true although it
might lack in assertability. And moreover, the squeamishness we feel when we are
faced by suﬃciently absurd conditionals with, say, false antecedents has nothing to
do with their truth, but rather their lack of assertability. Importantly, Jackson can
therefore maintain that indicative conditionals do have the truth conditions of a
material implication despite alleged counterexamples.
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In due course, we will return to Jackson’s account and oﬀer something to say
against it. However, let us now turn to a diﬀerent class of accounts altogether.
Ċ.Č.Č Possible World Accounts
Although Jackson holds a material implication account of indicative conditionals,
he believes that a possible world account of some description is appropriate for sub-
junctive conditionals. e two most inìuential possible world semantic accounts
for conditionals were oﬀered by Stalnaker and Lewis.ǬǬ Since there are many sim-
ilarities between the two accounts, let us ërst spell out the most important details
of Stalnaker’s account and then turn to some of the more interesting diﬀerences
between his and Lewis’ accounts.
Stalnaker’s account is motivated by the apparent failure of undiluted material
implication to account for natural languages conditionals. Stalnaker starts out by
emphasising Ramsey’s insight as to how we evaluate conditionals: namely, that
we add their antecedent temporarily to our stock of knowledge and then consider
whether the consequent thereby becomes true or not.Ǭǭ To accommodate Ramsey’s
insight, Stalnaker proposes to use possible worlds as representatives of our stock of
knowledge. On Stalnaker’s account then, we evaluate conditionals by considering
the possible world in which the antecedent is true but diﬀers otherwise minimally
from the actual world. And if the consequent is then true in that world, we say that
the conditional is true but otherwise false.
For his purposes, Stalnaker extends Kripke’s possible world framework. First,
Stalnaker restricts the accessibility relation within his modal frames to reìexivity,
symmetry and transitivity (which yields the system Sǯ). In addition, however, Stal-
naker also introduces a so-called selection function which he deënes along the fol-
lowing lines:
f(';w) = the world w0 most similar to w in which ' is true.
ǬǬSee in particular Stalnaker (ǫǳǰǲ) and Lewis (ǫǳǱǭ).
ǬǭRamsey (ǫǳǭǫ, p. ǬǮǱ). We shall return to the issue of the so-called Ramsey Test at far greater
length in later chapters.
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We shall say more about similarity in a short while, but let us ërst notice two
important details of this selection function. First, in the case where ' is true in w,
f(';w) is merely w. In other words, if ' is true in w, w is the most similar or
closest '-world to itself. Second, if there are no possible worlds in which ' is true,
f(';w) is . According to Stalnaker,  is the so-called absurd world in which all
formulae are true.
Having established his basic framework, Stalnaker then deënes the truth con-
ditions of conditionals as follows:
w j= ' >  iﬀ f(';w) j= .
In other words, p' > q is true in world w if and only if  is true in w’s most
similar '-world.
A brief comment on the importance of the absurd world  is in place at this
point. Although Stalnaker does not explicitly say so,  is a piece of semantic ma-
chinery posited as means for several diﬀerent ends: in particular, to allow for the
validation of vacuously true conditionals (whose antecedent is impossible) and to
allow for a deënition of alethic possibility and necessity in terms of conditionals:
j= 2' iﬀ j= :' > '.
j= 3' iﬀ j= :(' > :').
Finally, before turning to Lewis’ account, let us make a brief remark on the
notion of similarity. According to Stalnaker, similarity is determined by the context
of utterance. In other words, w’s most similar '-world f(';w) is determined
by certain elements of the context in which the conditional p' > q is uttered.
Clearly then, f(';w) can change from context to context, even such that in some
appropriate contexts, the selection function yields values which suﬃce to provide
truth conditions for indicative conditionals and in other contexts, truth conditions
for the corresponding subjunctive conditionals.
Now, let us turn Lewis’ account. Let us ërst note that while Stalnaker takes his
semantics to be adequate for both indicative and subjunctive conditionals, Lewis
only ever intended his semantics as an account for subjunctive conditionals; for
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indicative conditionals, Lewis did adhere to a material implication analysis along
the lines of Jackson’s account. Although the accounts diﬀer on quite few points, we
will restrict ourselves to two points which carry a special weight.
First, the accounts diverge on a crucial structural assumption: while Stalnaker
assumes that there is always a unique most similar world, Lewis rejects that assump-
tion. Nevertheless, Stalnaker and Lewis both agree that if w is a '-world, then w’s
most similar ' world is w alone. However, if w itself is not a '-world, there can
be a number of '-worlds which are all most and equally similar to w according to
Lewis, while according to Stalnaker, there is only ever one. In other words, Stal-
naker takes the similarity ordering of possible worlds to be a total ordering with a
minimal element (which is the world of evaluation) and a maximal element , while
Lewis takes the ordering to be partial ordering with so-called similarity spheres of
equal similarity, but also with a minimal element and a maximal element .
Second, there is another crucial structural diﬀerence between Stalnaker’s and
Lewis’ systems. While Stalnaker builds his system upon a so-called limit assump-
tion, Lewis rejects that assumption. Quite roughly, the limit assumption states that
there will always be a most similar world. According to the limit assumption, the
similarity ordering of worlds is discrete. Once that assumption is suspended, how-
ever, the similarity ordering is potentially continuous. In other words, on Lewis’
account, there might not be any most similar '-world to w because for any given
similar '-world w0, there will always be another more similar '-world w00. Lewis’
motivation for rejection of the limit assumption is rather intuitive. Suppose we were
interested in the similarity ordering induced by the proposition ‘Shakespeare was
born sooner (than he actually was)’ and that time was in fact continuous: although
we might come up with a quite similar world w0 in which Shakespeare was born an
instant earlier that he was in the actual world w, there will always be another even
closer world w00 in which he was born later than in w0 but still sooner than in w0
(assuming a suﬃcient precisiëcation of the predicate ‘was born’).
Needless to say, these structural diﬀerences yield diﬀerent logics. Most fa-
mously, since there will always be a unique closest '-world on Stalnaker’s account,
p' > q will be either true or false at any w, as  either obtains at f(';w) or
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not. Stalnaker’s semantics therefore validate the so-called law of conditional ex-
cluded middle ():ǬǮ
j= (' > ) _ (' > :).
From  we can infer that if p' > q is false, p' > :q is true, and conversely.
In Lewis’ case,  does not hold universally for there might well be, for some given
' and w, more than one most similar '-worlds, some in which  is true and some
in which  is false.
So, why would Lewis lessen Stalnaker’s total order constraint and thereby reject
? Lewis argues that  is an implausible principle because of conditionals such
as the following:Ǭǯ
(ǫǫ) If Hamlet and Don Quixote had been characters in the same work of
ëction, then they would have been characters in Shakespeare’s Hamlet.
Intuitively, this conditional is false: there is nothing that suggests that Hamlet and
Don Quixote must have been characters of Shakespeare’ Hamlet had they been
characters of the same work of ëction. However, if (ǫǫ) is false,  tells us that
the following conditionals must be true:
(ǫǬ) If Hamlet and Don Quixote had been characters in the same work of
ëction, then they would not have been characters in Shakespeare’s Hamlet.
However, intuitively, this conditional strikes us as false as (ǫǫ): there is nothing that
suggests that Hamlet and Don Quixote could not have been characters in Shake-
speare’Hamlet had they been characters of the same work of ëction. In fact, we have
a good reason to suspect that there some most similar worlds in which Hamlet and
Don Quixote are characters in the same work ëction in which they are characters of
ǬǮHowever, according to Stalnaker, there might be several equally appropriate selection functions
available in any given context. According to some admissible selections functions, the closest '-
world might be a -world, while according to others, the closest '-world might be a :-world.
In those cases, the truth-value of p' > q in the given context would be a product of a super-
evaluation of all the admissible selection functions. For further information, see Stalnaker (ǫǳǲǫ).
ǬǯLewis (ǫǳǱǭ, pp. Ǳǳ–ǲǫ).
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Shakespeare’s Hamlet and also, say, in which they are characters of Cervantes’ Don
Quixote.
Although much more can be said about other diﬀerences between the two sys-
tems, let us rest our case here and move on to several outstanding semantic issues
of natural language conditionals.
Ċ.č Semantic Issues of Natural Language Conditionals
As we said at the onset, this thesis deals with several important semantic issues of
natural language conditionals. We will now brieìy introduce each of the issues
which we shall concern ourselves with in the following four chapters.
Ċ.č.Ċ Conditionals& Truth Values
An important semantic issue of natural language conditionals concerns whether
they have truth conditions or not. In particular, there are suasive arguments in the
literature to the eﬀect that indicative conditionals cannot have truth values.
Since that conclusion is somewhat bewildering, we shall examine the argument
closer in a chapter of its own. We will consider several ways in which we can respond
to the argument and eventually present a contextually sensitive semantic framework
which allows us to escape the argument and hold onto truth conditions for indica-
tive conditionals.
Ċ.č.Č e Indicative/Subjunctive Distinction
e indicative/subjunctive distinction is very widespread in the literature. Nonethe-
less, there seems to be no general consensus over its details. In particular, although
nearly everyone accepts the distinction, there is no real agreement about where to
draw the indicative/subjunctive line. An adequate answer to that question has sig-
niëcant importance to the semantics of natural language conditionals since an un-
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derstanding of the nature of the indicative/subjunctive distinction will doubtlessly
tell us something about what lies on either side of the line.
We will therefore devote an entire chapter to giving an answer to the question of
where to draw the line. We will go through several proposals which may be found
in the literature and argue that they are all inadequate on diﬀerent accounts. We
will then oﬀer our own proposal according to which the distinction has to do with
the sort of suppositions conditionals are uttered to express.
Ċ.č.č Semantics for Conditionals
Based on the distinction we proposed in the previous chapter, we will oﬀer fully de-
veloped semantics in a chapter of its own. We will start oﬀ by an examination of two
diﬀerent sort of suppositions and then show how they each correspond to diﬀerent
sorts of conditionals. We will then oﬀer semantics for both sorts of conditionals
based on the sort of suppositions which they are uttered to express. Consequently,
we shall oﬀer an analysis of the syntax of conditionals in English which we shall
then use as an input into generative grammar semantics. Finally, we shall provide a
fully compositional semantics for conditionals in generative grammar based on the
suppositional analysis we gave before.
Ċ.č.ď Inference Rules for Conditionals
Since conditionals often play an important role in our reasoning, the logic of condi-
tionals is of considerable importance from philosophical and logical points of view.
Arguably, inference rules do confer some degree of meaning to logical connectives.
And if we agree that natural language conditionals are some sort of logical con-
nectives, the relevant inference rules are of semantic importance. Modus (Ponendo)
Ponens () tells us that a conditional and its antecedent jointly imply its conse-
quent. Quite intuitively,  seems like a reasonable elimination rule for natural
language conditionals. Nevertheless, there are very convincing counterexamples to
 which suggest that this apparent intuitiveness is spurious.
Since that strikes us as somewhat incredible, we will devote an entire chapter to
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those counterexamples and attempt to save the honour of . We will ërst con-
sider several solutions which have hitherto been oﬀered to the counterexamples and
argue that they are all inadequate. We will then oﬀer our own solution which entails
that the semantics of embedded natural language conditionals is more sophisticated
than their surface syntax indicates.
Ǭ And if not True or False?
So-called Gibbard Phenomenon cases have been used to argue that indica-
tive conditionals construed in terms of the Ramsey Test cannot have truth
values. Since that conclusion is somewhat incredible, several alternative
options are explored. First, the assumption that indicative conditionals
require semantics in terms of the Ramsey Test is suspended and material
implication semantics oﬀered in its place. Although a proposal of that sort
oﬀers a way out, it is argued to be wanting on diﬀerent grounds. Sec-
ond, one of the premises of the Gibbard Phenomenon argument is ques-
tioned and temporally suspended. Although that move turns out to be
viable in principle, it has some rather questionable consequences on ac-
count of which a more context sensitive solution seems to be called for.
ird, another attempt to escape the Ramsey Test is made by suggesting
a relation between indicative conditionals and epistemic modals. How-
ever, the epistemic modal analysis is argued to come short on account of an
over-generation. Finally, a contextualised revision of the Ramsey Test is of-
fered which sails successfully past the threats of the Gibbard Phenomenon.
Consequently, several technical details of the solution are addressed in ap-
pendixes.
Č.Ċ Preamble: e Gibbard Phenomenon
Rumour has it that certain natural language conditionals are altogether devoid of
truth values. Nay, contrary to expectations, the conditionals in question are nei-
ther expressed in imperative nor interrogative moods. As it happens, those peculiar
ǫǳ
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conditionals are not even cast in the somewhat mysterious subjunctive mood. No,
in fact, these conditionals are supposed to ënd their expression in the only mood in
which we ever consistently give expressions to matters of fact: the indicative mood.
To avoid confusion, let us emphasise that there is quite more to the rumour than
that some indicative conditional are neither true nor false, while others might well
be either. at, arguably, would not be an entirely unacceptable position. Rather,
the claim that we are up against is that indicative conditionals are never either true
or false. Truth and falsity, as it were, are not properties to be had by indicative
conditionals. And so, since indicative conditionals do not possess truth values, an
issue of truth conditions does not even arise.
Understandably, this rumour might strike us as somewhat incredible.ǫ In fact,
beside the nagging intuition, we have several immediate and naïve reasons to balk
at any such claim. One reason is that in general, perhaps with the odd exception
of moral or aesthetic value judgements, we take sentences whose verbs are in the
indicative mood to possess truth values of some sort. erefore, supposing we al-
ready have a sentence which possesses a truth value, it would be mysterious that an
aﬃxation of a mere adverbial phrase would deprive the sentence of truth values al-
together. Another reason is that indicative conditionals seem to behave in reasoning
much like other sentences: we may use them as our premises, we may reach them
as our conclusion and we may even question the validity and soundness of our
arguments on the basis of them. And ënally, we would inevitably ënd ourselves
compelled to wonder: if neither truth nor falsity becomes indicative conditionals,
then what does?
We might therefore reasonably ask ourselves, is there any ground for this ex-
traordinary rumour? To our astonishment, yes, there is arguably a quite good
ground to it. As a matter of fact, the best argument for the claim that indicative
conditionals lack truth value involve the so-called Gibbard Phenomenon. Let us
begin by rehearsing a case which instantiates this phenomenon.Ǭ
ǫSee for instance Lycan (ǬǪǪǫ) and Bennett (ǬǪǪǭ).
ǬCases of this kind ware ërst identiëed by Gibbard (ǫǳǲǫ, pp. ǬǬǰ–ǬǭǬ). More convincing
cases may be found in Warmbrod (ǫǳǲǫ, ǫǳǲǭ). e case that follows is an adaptation of a more
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Suppose that Hamlet and Horatio have slyly engaged themselves in espionage
to uncover Claudius’ malicious subterfuge. From a nook of Elsinore Castle, Hamlet
spies Claudius conspiring with Laertes, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. Although
the scene is only partially visible to young Hamlet from his hiding place, he clearly
sees Laertes leaving the room and then overhears Claudius instructing someone to
assassinate him. Hamlet does, of course, not know whom Claudius commanded to
commit the deed but he knows, without any serious doubt, that it must have been
either Rosencrantz or Guildenstern. It seems, therefore, that Hamlet is justiëed
both in believing and even asserting that:
(ǫ) If Rosencrantz was not instructed to assassinate Hamlet, Guildenstern was.
Meanwhile, hidden in another cranny of Elsinore Castle, Horatio witnesses the
same scene from a diﬀerent, yet equally limited perspective. Contrary to Ham-
let, Horatio observes Guildenstern leaving the room and then overhears in turn
Claudius’ instruction to someone for Hamlet’s assassination. And so, much like in
Hamlet’s case, it seems that Horatio is justiëed both in believing and asserting that:
(Ǭ) If Rosencrantz was not instructed to assassinate Hamlet, Laertes was.
(Since we will be concerned with the same example awhile, let us reserve the
propositional letters g, l, and r to denote the following propositions: g for ‘Guilden-
stern was instructed to assassinate Hamlet’, l for ‘Laertes was instructed to assassi-
nate Hamlet’ and r for ‘Rosencrantz was instructed to assassinate Hamlet’.)
But now we seem to be in a peculiar bind. Namely, Hamlet and Hortio both
seem to be right in their beliefs: they did both correctly observe the scene from
their diﬀerent—albeit limited—view points. However, how can (ǫ) and (Ǭ) ever be
simultaneously true? Indeed, while (ǫ) appears to be of the form p:r ! gq, (Ǭ)
appears to be of the form p:r ! lq. Moreover, since l (non-vacuously) entails the
negation of g in this particular case, p:r ! lq entails p:r ! :gq. Furthermore,
given our most intuitive understanding of so-called indicative conditionals, p:r !
recent version from Edgington (ǫǳǳǱ, pp. ǫǪǰ–ǫǪǱ).
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gq and p:r ! :gq cannot possibly be true together: p:r ! gq and p:r !
:gq are contraries. And so, since p:r ! gq and p:r ! :gq are contraries, (ǫ)
and (Ǭ) are contraries. is has the look and feel of a real predicament. Yes, in fact,
this is an instance of the notorious Gibbard Phenomenon.
Č.Č Coming to Terms with the Gibbard Phenomenon
What are we supposed to infer fromGibbard Phenomenon cases? Some have argued
that cases of that sort show us that conditionals such as (ǫ) and (Ǭ) must lack truth
values altogether under pain of a contradiction.ǭ e argument may be roughly
summarised along the following lines:
First, if two statements are compatible, it can be correct to accept both
simultaneously. For consistentA, and anyB, no one accepts both “If
A, B” and “If A, :B” simultaneously (except perhaps by oversight):
rather, to accept “If A, B” is to reject “If A, :B”. erefore, “If
A, B” and “If A, :B”, cannot both be true. But second, we can
ënd cases like this: one person,X , accepts “If A, B”, for completely
adequate reasons, while another, Y , accepts “IfA,:B” for completely
adequate reasons. In a good Gibbard case, there is perfect symmetry
between X ’s reasons and Y ’s: no case can be made for saying one is
right and the other wrong. Neither makes any mistake: no case can be
made for saying both their judgements are false. So: their judgements
can’t both be true, and can’t both be false, nor can it be that just one
of them is false. Truth and falsity are not suitable terms of assessment,
in such cases.Ǯ
Although Edgington’s passage gives us a clear picture of the argument, one of
its assumptions is worth a special emphasis. According to the argument, for any
ǭIn particular Edgington (ǫǳǲǯ/ǫǳǳǫ, ǫǳǳǯ, ǫǳǳǱ). Similar claim regarding subjunctive con-
ditionals is made in Edgington (ǬǪǪǲ). See also Adams (ǫǳǱǯ), Bennett (ǬǪǪǭ) and Gibbard and
Harper (ǫǳǲǫ).
ǮEdgington (ǫǳǳǱ, p. ǫǪǱ).
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consistent ', p' ! q and p' ! :q constitute a contradiction.ǯ at claim
is made because indicative conditionals are assumed to deserve semantics roughly
in terms of what has become to be known as the Ramsey Test. e Ramsey Test is
inspired by the following, oft-quoted passage:
If two people are arguing ‘If p, will q?’ and are both in doubt as to
p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and
arguing on that basis that q; so that in a sense ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p,  q’
are contradictories.ǰ
Although Ramsey’s words do not oﬀer us detailed instructions, they describe
a procedure—commonly known as the Ramsey Test—for evaluating p' ! q
somewhere along the following lines: First, add ' hypothetically to our ‘stock of
knowledge’, then adjust any other beliefs we hold accordingly to maintain consis-
tency, and then ënally assess the truth of  in the light thereof. In other words,
the Ramsey Test predicts that the truth conditions of an indicative conditional are
roughly as follows:
Indicative Conditional (Ramsey Test Analysis)
p'! q is true iﬀ  comes out as true after adding ' hypothetically
to a stock of knowledge and adjusting for consistence accordingly.
Notice that much more could and probably should be said about the nature of
so-called stocks of knowledge and the mechanics of adjustments but we will let that
pass for the time being.Ǳ Furthermore, notice too that although ‘stock of knowledge’
is a helpful metaphor, we should be careful not to get carried away. Indeed, whether
a stock of knowledge is supposed to consist of knowledge alone or whether it may
also contain beliefs or something even weaker is subject to serious discussion. In
the literature, one sometimes encounters other helpful metaphors—web of beliefs,
epistemic, doxastic or information states and knowledge or belief bodies, bases and
ǯHereafter we will use lowercase Greek letters (', ,  , . . . ) as meta-variables which range over
(well formed) formulae. In contrast, lowercase Roman letters (p, q, r, . . . , g and l) are used for
either propositional constants or variables unless speciëed otherwise.
ǰRamsey (ǫǳǭǫ, p. ǬǮǱ).
Ǳe issue will be revisited in xǬ.ǰ and Appendix A.
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boxes—which are often supposed to have a function akin to stocks of knowledge.
However, to allow us to start with a clean slate, free of the connotations associated
with any of those terms, let us hereafter use the neutral term ‘information network’
for our purposes. Needless to say, that term is no less of a metaphor than any of the
other. Nonetheless, our metaphor suggest that the information in question, be it
knowledge, beliefs or whatnot, has some sort of structure and coherence to it, both
of which we assume as fundamental features of our information networks.
Perhaps even more importantly, it is also worth emphasising three important
and closely related facts which pertain to the Ramsey Test. First, unless  is already
in our information network and the introduction ' has no eﬀect thereupon, there
must be some sort of a relation—which we allegedly unravel through a process of
consistency maintenance—between ' and  in order for us to evaluate p'! q
positively. Second, if' already constitutes our information network, our judgement
of p' ! q depends entirely on whether  already does so too. Finally, if  is
already part of our information network and the addition of ' has no eﬀect on ’s
standing with our information network, p' ! q will be positively evaluated, as
it were, vacuously.
Intuitively, the Ramsey Test has certain plausibility. In fact, given but a minute
thought about indicative conditionals, we soon come to the conclusion that there
is a certain doxastic, if not epistemic, ìavour to them. In particular, it is that very
ìavour which the test is supposed to capture. In fact, that claim is probably too
weak: when we encounter an indicative conditional, we evaluate its plausibility
precisely by hypothetically adding its antecedent to our information network and
arguing thereupon whether the consequent obtains or not. In other words, the
Ramsey Test seems to be integral to the meaning of indicative conditionals.
Now, if we were to agree that the Ramsey Test is essential to the semantics
of indicative conditionals, we would have to address the following conundrum:
how can (ǫ) and (Ǭ) ever be true together? Indeed, if the Ramsey Test is right, (ǫ)
and (Ǭ) cannot possibly be true together! Moreover, for similar reasons, (ǫ) and
(Ǭ) cannot both be false either. In fact, towards the same conclusion, a further
argument might be made: since neither Hamlet nor Horatio commit any fallacy in
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their reasoning, we cannot claim that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are false. Finally, since Hamlet
and Horatio arrive at their conclusions by entirely equivalent means, it would be
completely arbitrary and devoid of any justiëcation to take one be true and the
other to be false. erefore, the argument intermediately concludes, (ǫ) and (Ǭ)
are neither true nor false. And moreover, perhaps either because any indicative
conditional can be made subject to the Gibbard Phenomenon or simply because
excluding a particular class of indicative conditionals from truth values while not
another would be somewhat whimsical, indicative conditionals in general can have
no truth values. Alas, this is the argument from the Gibbard Phenomenon.
We might of course balk and claim that to reject truth values for indicative con-
ditionals might seem somewhat rash response to the Gibbard Phenomenon. Surely,
some other options must be available. For instance, one viable option seems to be to
accept that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are in fact true despite appearances to the contrary. Another
option would be to suggest diﬀerent sort of semantics for indicative conditionals.
Indeed, although the Ramsey Test might have an intuitive plausibility, perhaps the
Gibbard Phenomenon merely shows us that any such semantics cannot be main-
tained. And yet another strategy would be to contextualise the truth conditions
of indicative conditionals such that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) would both be true although only
within their respective contexts.ǲ Before considering those possibilities in turn, let
us digress awhile and consider a somewhat maverick yet quite respectable semantic
account of indicative conditionals which seems to promise an easy way out of our
bind.
Č.č Interlude: Material Implication
An apparent way out of our bind would be to claim that natural language indicative
conditionals have truth conditions akin to the material implication:
ǲSee, for instance, Gibbard (ǫǳǲǫ), Jackson (ǫǳǳǪ) and Stalnaker (ǫǳǲǮ).
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Indicative Conditional (Material Implication Analysis)
p'! q is true iﬀ p'  q is true.
Indeed, if we take (ǫ) and (Ǭ) to be of the forms p'  q and p'   q respec-
tively, the paradox dissolves. As long as ' is false, p'  q and p'  :q are
both true. In fact, that prediction is well in tune with our expectations: while Ham-
let witnessed Laertes leaving the scene, Horatio saw Guildenstern abstract himself,
leaving Rosencrantz alone to receive Claudius’ malicious instructions: p:rq must
be false if p:r  gq and p:r  lq are true.
Moreover, upon this construal of natural language indicative conditionals, (ǫ)
and (Ǭ) would agree in their truth conditions with pr_gq and pr_ lq respectively.
On the supposition that the truth conditions of natural language disjunctions co-
incide in some cases with classical extensional disjunction, that seems quite in har-
mony with our natural understanding of (ǫ) and (Ǭ): Hamlet and Horatio could
as well have expressed their respective thoughts as ‘either Rosencrantz or Guilden-
stern were instructed to assassinate Hamlet’ and ‘either Rosencrantz or Laertes were
instructed to assassinate Hamlet’. For this reason, we might be further tempted to
claim that indicative conditionals deserve semantics in terms of the material impli-
cation.
at would be too rash. For various reason, the material implication alone can-
not reasonably account for indicative conditionals. For instance, the two so-called
paradoxes of material implication provide us with an ample argument.ǳ e class
of the so-called negative paradoxes of material implication exploit that ' classically
implies p:'  q. And since the meta-variable  may be substituted with any
well-formed formula, there is literally no end to uncomfortable conditionals we
might generate. For instance, suppose that Claudius did in (ëctional) fact instruct
Rosencrantz to assassinate Hamlet. According to the material implication analysis,
we would then be entitled to infer the following two jointly contradictory condi-
tionals:
(ǭ) If Rosencrantz was not instructed to assassinate Hamlet, someone else was.
ǳFor several other arguments, see for instance Priest (ǬǪǪǫ, xǫ) and Priest (ǬǪǪǳ, xǬ.ǯ).
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(Ǯ) If Rosencrantz was not instructed to assassinate Hamlet, no one else was.
Worse yet, we are entitled to infer any conditional whatsoever which has the same
antecedent as (ǭ) and (Ǯ), no matter how absurd or far-fetched its consequent may
seem, whether in isolation or in the context of the antecedent.
Conversely, the class of the so-called positive paradoxes of material implication
exploit that ' also classically implies p  'q. Again, since the meta-variable 
may be substituted with any well-formed formula, we may infer, say, the following
conditional:
(ǯ) If no one was instructed to assassinate Hamlet, Rosencrantz was instructed
to assassinate Hamlet.
Worse yet, again, we are in fact entitled to infer an inënite number of conditionals
that share their consequent with (ǯ), no matter how ridiculous or preposterous their
antecedent may otherwise seem.
Intuitively, however, that is quite incredible: (ǭ) and (Ǯ) contradict one another
and (ǯ) strikes us as equally absurd because it contradicts itself. Indeed, our natural
reaction to those conditionals is quite contrary to that which the material impli-
cation account suggests: our intuition is that that those conditionals are false or
neither true nor false at best. So, despite its success with the Gibbard Phenomenon,
the material implication account seems to make grossly inappropriate predictions
in other cases.
But as we well know, we would be fools to dismiss the material implication
account without a further consideration. Serious attempts to preserve the view from
the paradoxes of material implication and various other counterexamples that have
been made. According to the most elaborate attempt, indicative natural language
conditionals accord with the material implication in their semantic aspect yet diﬀer
in pragmatic qualities.ǫǪ us, in fashion akin to the behaviour of ‘and’ and ‘but’
in colloquial English, the indicative conditional and the material implication are
supposed to agree in truth conditions but disagree in use conditions.
ǫǪSee Grice (ǫǳǱǯ/ǫǳǲǳ, ǫǳǲǳa) and Jackson (ǫǳǱǳ/ǫǳǳǫ, ǫǳǲǱ).
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According to the account, the so-called assertibility of a non-conditional sen-
tence ' is determined by its probability Pr('). However, in the case of an indica-
tive conditional p' ! q, the assertibility is determined by the probability of its
consequent given its antecedent, Pr(j'), such that the closer Pr(j') is to ǫ,
the more appropriate it would be to assert p'! q all other things considered.ǫǫ
A further condition for assertion, which moreover excludes awkward cases involv-
ing necessary true antecedents and consequents, would be that Pr(j') must be
strictly greater than Pr(). And so, since the mixed conditionals above are ar-
guably bereft of assertibility, they strike us as false although merely inappropriate
yet true. In other words, according to this account, (ǭ), (Ǯ) and (ǯ) are in fact true
but they give us the contrary impression because of their lack of assertibility.
at sort of move would be desirable if only viable. Even if we agree, for the sake
of the argument, that (ǭ), (Ǯ) and (ǯ) want in assertibility, wemay well come up with
intuitively false natural language indicative conditionals which are true according
to the material implication account yet suﬀer no deëciency of assertibility as earlier
contrued. We all know that p'  q is true iﬀ ' is false or  is true. In particular,
as we saw from the negative paradox of material implication, whenever ' is false,
p'  q is true. p'  q would thus be true even in cases where ' and  are
substituted for some contingently false propositions. In particular, p'  qwould
be true even when ' and  are false and Pr(j') is both greater than Pr()
and suﬃciently close to ǫ. Needless to say, our crux is to ënd a false indicative
conditional satisfying those criteria.
Following is a counterexample of the appropriate sort which has gone unnoticed
in the literature until now. Suppose that Hamlet and Horatio have gotten together
for a game of dice. Hamlet has just cast a (fair six-sided) die which subsequently
landed with the number three facing up. According to the material implication
account, the following conditional is true since its antecedent and consequent are
both false:
ǫǫSee in particular Jackson (ǫǳǱǳ/ǫǳǳǫ, ǫǳǲǱ). To avoid misunderstanding, it is worth to point
out that there is no probability analysis of this sort in Grice (ǫǳǲǳa) although a material implication
account is espoused.
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(ǰ) If Hamlet rolled an even number, he rolled either two or four.
Furthermore, since the probability of the consequent given the antecedent is 2
3
—and
moreover, the probability that Hamlet rolled two or four is strictly less than the
probability of that given that Hamlet rolled an even number—we may suspect that
the conditional is quite assertible. However, our natural language intuition tells us
that the conditional is false because Hamlet might very well have rolled the number
six if he rolled an even number. In other words, we have an intuitively false in-
dicative conditional which the material implication account claims to be true and
which suﬀers no deëcit of assertibility as construed by Jackson. Bad news?
No, the proponent of the material implication account might well respond that
a conditional probability of 2
3
is not suﬃcient for assertion and that that is the actual
reason for our squeamishness. In that case, we may simply suppose that Hamlet
and Horatio are playing with a fair n-sided die (where n is some even number
greater than Ǭ). Still, according to the material implication account, the following
conditional would be true since both its constituents are false:
(Ǳ) If Hamlet rolled an even number, he rolled either two or . . . or n-Ǭ.
Hamlet, recall, rolled three, which is neither an even number nor in particular
among the numbers two, . . . , and n-Ǭ. However, the probability that Hamlet rolled
two or . . . or n-Ǭ given that he rolled an even number is n 2
n
. In that case, the con-
ditional probability gets ever closer to ǫ as n grows toward1. Yet, no matter how
large nmay become, we still have a sinking feeling about (Ǳ) because even if Hamlet
rolled an even number, there is always ever so slight possibility that he rolled the
number n. In other words, our intuitions and the semantic predictions of the mate-
rial implication account seem to come apart in the case of (Ǳ). is time, however,
our intuitions about truth value cannot be explained by limited assertibility.
is result is open to at least two diﬀerent interpretations. On the one hand,
we could infer that the counterexample shows that probability and assertibility are
not as closely knit as the account proposes. In that case, the account fails to oﬀer an
explanation as to why certain conditionals like (Ǳ) lack assertibility. On the other
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hand, we could claim that probability does in fact coincide with assertibility and
infer that conditionals such as (Ǳ) do actually show that the truth conditions of
indicative conditionals and material implications do actually come apart. And so,
the material implication account of conditionals is not suited for a semantic theory
of indicative conditionals. Either way, the account seems to be in a bind.
Perhaps, a reply open to the proponent of the account is to claim that although
high probability is not suﬃcient for assertibility, low probability is suﬃcient for
unassertibility. However, without adding further epicycles to the account, we must
conclude that the semantics of indicative conditionals will not be accounted for in
terms of the material implication. In other words, the way out promised by the
material implication account has turned out to be spurious.
However, if we were now to revert to semantics which involve the Ramsey Test,
we are again haunted by the Gibbard Phenomenon. e following should therefore
be clear: if we want to hold on to the Ramsey Test, something else has to give. An
unhappy resort would be to rid indicative conditionals of truth values altogether.ǫǬ
Another option would be to argue that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are not true despite appearances
to the contrary. Let us consider that possibility next.
Č.ď Opposing the Obvious
Although no one has made serious attempts to that eﬀect before, we might argue
that sentence pairs such as (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are not true in spite of appearances to the
contrary. Although we said earlier that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are contraries, they do not strike
us intuitively as subcontraries: indeed, given our intuitive understanding of natural
language indicative conditionals, (ǫ) and (Ǭ) may logically be false together. To see
why, simply assume that Horatio held (Ǭ) and Hamlet (ǫ): our immediate reaction
is that they are both mistaken. However, before giving any argument to the eﬀect
that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are false, we must ërst oﬀer an explanation as to why those condi-
ǫǬAgain, see in particular Edgington (ǫǳǲǯ/ǫǳǳǫ, ǫǳǳǯ, ǫǳǳǱ).
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tionals do strike us as blatantly true. One such error theory might be constituted
by the fact that the information networks involved are incomplete with regard to
the relevant facts. In particular, in any genuine Gibbard Phenomenon case, the
two conditionals may seem reasonable, assertable, true and whatnot to the agents
involved. However, to anyone in possession of a relevantly complete information
network, the conditionals in question would appear as they really are.
Turning back to Hamlet and Horatio. From their respective points of view,
given the information they have gathered from their nook and cranny of Elsinore
Castle, their beliefs and assertions of (ǫ) and (Ǭ) certainly seem justiëed and war-
ranted. However, if they had had all the relevant information at hand—in particu-
lar, that both Guildenstern and Laertes left the room before Claudius gave expres-
sion to his malevolent command—we would expect them to revise their beliefs and
even retract their assertions.
Importantly, anyone who would have witnessed the scene from a more om-
niscient point of view would have seen Guildenstern leaving through one door
and Laertes through another before Claudius instructed Rosencrantz to assassinate
young Hamlet. However, since Hamlet and Horatio were neither in view of all of
the relevant events, they are both, as it were, epistemically impoverished. Interest-
ingly enough, despite their impoverishment, they are both in position to justiëably
believe (ǫ) and (Ǭ) respectively. For that reason, we are probably inclined to ac-
cept (ǫ) and (Ǭ) as true. However, as we well know, rational agents may well hold
justiëed yet false beliefs.
Let us consider what is likely to conspire when Hamlet and Hortatio reunite.
In all likelihood, poor terriëed Horatio would forewarn Hamlet of his imminent
assassination, advise him to remain wary of Rosencrantz and Laertes and then add
something along the lines of (Ǭ). As we know, the rumour of his looming death is no
news to Hamlet. However, since Hamlet, from his nook, himself witnessed Laertes
leaving the scene, he would be somewhat perplexed by Horatio’s advise: Laertes
could not possibly have been instructed to assassinate Hamlet. Were Hamlet to ex-
plain that to Horatio, the fact would eventually dawn upon these lads that Claudius
could only have instructed Rosencrantz to assassinate Hamlet. At the point, two
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things are likely to have transpired. First, Hamlet and Horatio would have sus-
pended their beliefs of (ǫ) and (Ǭ) respectively. Second, Hamlet’s and Horatio’s
information networks would encompass the fact that Claudius gave the instruction
to Rosencrantz and not to Guildenstern or Laertes.
erefore, once Hamlet and Horatio have gathered all the information relevant
to the case at hand, it seems that they would suspend their earlier beliefs of (ǫ) and
(Ǭ). And so, we could conclude: (ǫ) and (Ǭ) were never true to begin with, they only
gave the wrong impression that they were because they could be correctly reasoned
from incomplete information networks.
However, there is a minor wrinkle: if (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are not true, what are they
then? False? If the Ramsey Test, as construed earlier, suﬃces to ground semantics
for indicative conditionals, how could (ǫ) and (Ǭ) ever be false together? Upon
adding a conditional’s antecedent to a relevantly complete information network,
the consequent will turn out to be true, false or neither. Indeed, according to the
Ramsey Test, when we consider a conditional p'! q, we add ' to our informa-
tion network and adjust to maintain consistency. If such operation entails a change
of , the value of p' ! q would reìect that. Otherwise, if the operation does
not reach all the way to , p' ! q would take whichever value  had already:
true if  was in the information network, false if p:q was there and neither if
there was no information about  beforehand. Importantly, there is no possible
consistent information network against which p' ! q and p' ! :q would
be either both true or both false. At best, if the introduction of ' forces  to be
neither true nor false, or if  was not in the information network to begin with and
the introduction of ' had no eﬀect thereupon, then p' ! q and p' ! :q
would arguably both be neither true nor false.
If we insist on maintaining that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are false, a way around that problem
would be to pay a closer heed to Ramsey’s directions: ‘If two people are arguing
“If p, will q?” and are both in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to
their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis that q’.ǫǭ If both agents are in
ǫǭRamsey (ǫǳǭǫ, p. ǬǮǱ, my emphasis).
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doubt as to ' when considering p'! q, the Ramsey Test applies. What then if
there is no doubt as to '? Here is a suggestion: if ' is already in our information
network, let p' ! q receive whichever truth value  has; otherwise, if p:'q is
in our information network, let p'! q be false. In particular, once Hamlet and
Horatio had realised that Claudius instructed Rosencrantz to assassinate Hamlet,
(ǫ) and (Ǭ) would come out as false.
Whether this proposal squares well with linguistic data is amoot point. Nonethe-
less, the proposal has a certain intuitive plausibility as indicative conditionals whose
antecedent we already take to be false strike some of us as inappropriate.ǫǮ However,
whether that intuition is prevalent is a matter of dispute because we seem to be well
disposed to evaluate indicative conditionals whose antecedents are either believed
or even known to be false. e class of so-called Dutchman conditionals might
arguably provide an example. Another class of potential examples might be indica-
tive conditionals which are uttered to express (assumed) laws of one sort or another,
say, logical, mathematical, metaphysical, physical and whatnot: for instance, even
to the opponent of intuitionistic logic, it would be true that if intuitionistic logic is
correct, the law of excluded middle fails, and false that if intuitionistic logic is cor-
rect, the law of excluded middle holds. A third class of examples might be argued to
consist of indicative conditionals which we take to be true despite false antecedents
and apply for the sake of persuasion by proofs by contradiction: say, I might know
that ' is true and wish to persuade you of that fact; in that case, an option for me
might be to argue for p:' ! q and p:q and thus convince you that p:'q
leads to contradiction and that'must be true. Cases of those sorts seems to suggest
that we cannot reasonably maintain that indicatives whose antecedents are false in
our information networks are themselves false.
Furthermore, we cannot either maintain that indicative conditionals whose an-
tecedent we know to be false are themselves neither true nor false. Indeed, intu-
itively, some such conditionals are quite simply true. It seems, therefore, that the
proposed revision of the Ramsey Test is not going to help us at all, whether we
ǫǮSee for instance Gillies (ǬǪǪǳ, ǬǪǫǪ).
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claim that p' ! q is false or neither true nor false against an information net-
work which contains p:'q.
So, it therefore seems that we cannot reasonably maintain that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are
both false. A more promising proposal could be to claim that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are neither
true nor false together. As a matter of fact, that sits quite well with our initial
understanding of the Ramsey Test whereby we evaluate indicative conditionals by
inserting their antecedents into our information networks irrespective of whether
the antecedent or its negation are there already.
Let us illustrate. For our present purposes, it will suﬃce to represent infor-
mation networks as a set of propositions which might and which might not be
closed under some basic logical operations. us, once Hamlet and Horatio have
conferred, their relevantly complete information network may be represented by
the set f:g;:l; r; : : :g (where g, l and r denote the same propositions as before).
Moreover, we may also reasonably suspect that their information network contains
something to the eﬀect that Claudius did instruct exactly one of the three scoundrels
to assassinate Hamlet, say, something along the lines of p(g _ l _ r)^:(g^l^r)q
or equivalent.ǫǯ In order to represent that unwieldy formula more articulately, let
us reserve the propositional letter u to express the uniqueness claim.
When Hamlet and Horatio then come to evaluate the conditional p:r ! gq,
the following will probably transpire. First, they add p:rq to their information
network, which in turns becomes f:g;:l;:r; u; : : :g. Second, since p:gq, p:lq
and p:rq together with the belief that Claudius instructed at least one of the three
rascals to assassinate Hamlet constitute an inconsistency, some adjustment must
be made to restore an equilibrium. ree options are available: reject p:gq, re-
ject p:lq or reject the belief that Claudious indeed instructed someone. Since we
may assume that they are less willing to suspend the belief that Claudius gave the
instructions for Hamlet’s assassination, they are left to choose between meddling
with p:gq or p:lq. However, since those two pieces of information are on par,
as it were, it would be irresponsible to temper with one and hold on to the other.
ǫǯWhere ‘_’ denotes the exclusive disjunction: ' _ , :('  ), ('_)^:('^).
Č.ď Opposing the Obvious čĖ
Moreover, since negating both p:gq and p:lq would be inconsistent with their
belief that Claudius did instruct at most one of the three rouges to assassinate Ham-
let, only one option remains: p:gq and p:lq must be purged together from their
information network which would then become f:r; u; : : :g. And so, since nei-
ther g nor its negation are in their information network, (ǫ) is neither true nor false,
and since neither l nor its negation there either, (Ǭ) is neither true nor false too.
erefore, it seems we can after all get around the Gibbard Phenomenon by
claiming that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) were never true to begin with. e conditionals merely
gave the impression that they were true because of incomplete information net-
works. However, we might now claim, they were neither true nor false in the ërst
place. And more importantly, we now seem to be in a position to claim that in-
dicative conditionals have truth values after all.
Although this account seems viable in principle, it strikes us as somewhat coun-
terintuitive once we give it more thought: if we were to ënd ourselves with either
Hamlet or Horatio in their nook or cranny, we would be utterly unable too to re-
frain from (ǫ) and (Ǭ) respectively. Moreover, was anyone to persuade us otherwise
without introducing some new information, we would only be able to respond with
a traditional shrug of shoulders and a customary incredulous stare. Indeed, if we
were hidden with Hamlet in his nook and someone were to tell us that (ǫ) was
neither true nor false, we could only respond that she was wrong because (ǫ) was
obviously true: we had just seen Laertes leave the room with our own two eyes,
leaving only Rosencrantz and Guildenstern suspect. And we might in fact go on,
claiming that for all that we know, Claudius might have instructed Rosencrantz and
Claudius might have instructed Guildenstern: indeed, we might claim, had he not
instructed one, he must have instructed the other.
Moreover, consider what would happen if our interlocutor were to tell us that
Guildenstern had left the room too. Insofar as we are rational, we would immedi-
ately concede that Claudius must then have instructed Rosencrantz to assassinate
Hamlet. However, if we were then asked why we had then claimed (ǫ) earlier, we
could only respond that we did so because (ǫ) was compatible with everything we
took to be true at the time. Knowing what we know now, of course, we would be
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reluctant to assert (ǫ) but that does not undermine the appropriateness of our earlier
claim at the time we made it. In fact, if we were asked whether we had been wrong
before, we would probably claim that we were not: pressed further, we would prob-
ably emphasise that we had not said that Claudius had instructed Guildenstern to
assassinate Hamlet but merely that if he did not instruct Rosencrantz to assassinate
Hamlet, he must have instructed Guildenstern.
Taken together, those facts might be understood as suggesting that there is more
in the context than meets the eye.ǫǰ In particular, (ǫ) seems to be true in the context
of Hamlet in his nook, (Ǭ) in the context of Horatio in his cranny and (ǫ) and (Ǭ)
seem neither true nor false in the context when the two have united. ere seems
therefore as if there has been an obvious shift in context from when Hamlet and
Horatio came to believe (ǫ) and (Ǭ) to when they have conferred and concluded that
Claudiusmust have instructed Rosencrantz to assassinateHamlet. In other words, it
does seem as if (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are sensitive to their contexts in some important aspect.
In fact, a certain aﬃnity between indicative conditionals and so-called epistemic
modals seems to be emerging.
Č.Ė Indicative Conditionals& Epistemic Modals
Epistemic modals, in English, are either subject raising verbs such as ‘might’ and
‘must’ or modal adverbs such as ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’ which we use to express
what we take to be either possible or necessary relative to what is known, believed,
supposed, imagined or whatnot in a context. For the sake of simplicity, we will
only focus on modal verbs here and leave the modal adverbs aside. Nonetheless, we
should remain aware that everything we say about modal verbs carries over to their
adverbial counterparts.
Now, what is known, believed, supposed, imagined or whatnot in a context
is, of course, nothing above or beyond the aforementioned information networks.
ǫǰSee, again, Gibbard (ǫǳǲǫ), Jackson (ǫǳǳǪ) and Stalnaker (ǫǳǲǮ).
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Although we will restrict our discussion to knowledge from now on, everything
we say will equally apply to diﬀerent types of information. For our purposes, we
may now think of an information network as the set of possible worlds which are
compatible with what we know. An epistemic modal would then be taken to range
over those possible worlds much as ërst order quantiëers range over individuals.
No one would seriously deny that there non-epistemic uses of ‘might’, ‘must’ and
the alike. We will therefore reserve ‘mighte’ and ‘muste’ to denote epistemic uses
of modal verbs. at should certainly not be taken to imply that there are separate
lexical items for diﬀerent ìavours of modality: according to a widespread and widely
accepted theory of modals, modal verbs and adverbs merely carry a modal force and
the context is left to determine over which sorts of possibilities the modals range
over.ǫǱ
Back to Hamlet. From his nook of Elsinore Castle, Hamlet seems well war-
ranted to claim that:
(ǲ) Rosencrantz mighte have been instructed to assassinate Hamlet.
(Rosencrantzi mighte [ti have been instructed to assassinate Hamlet].)
We are inclined to understandHamlet as claiming that for all that he knows, Claudius
might have instructed Rosencrantz to assassinate Hamlet. Moreover, we are proba-
bly well disposed to regard (ǲ) as true because for all that Hamlet knows, Claudius
might indeed have given the instruction to Rosencrantz. In our current terminol-
ogy, although there are some worlds compatible with Hamlet’s knowledge in which
Claudius did not give the instruction to Rosencrantz, there are certain worlds in
which he did.
In order to facilitate our formalisation of epistemic modals, let us introduce the
following notation:
3e' := mighte '
2e' := muste '
ǫǱSee Kratzer (ǫǳǱǱ, ǫǳǲǫ, ǫǳǳǫ).
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We may, for instance, thereby express (ǲ) as p3erq. Now, we need not take a
ërm stand on which logic is appropriate for those epistemic modal operators. e
nature of the information involved will certainly be of utmost importance in that
respect. Since we want provide maximum ìexibility by allowing for diﬀerent sorts
of information in diﬀerent contexts, the accessibility relation required need neither
be reìexive, symmetric, transitive nor extendable which implies that the logic of2e
and3e cannot be any stronger than K. However, we may certainly assume standard
duality of the modal operators: 3e'  :2e:' and 2e'  :3e:'.
We said before that epistemic modals are context sensitive. In particular, we
said that epistemic modals were sensitive to information networks of some sort or
another. Whether the information network in question in a particular context is
that of an utterer, assessor or someone else is subject to debate.ǫǲ For our purposes,
that issue does not make a fundamental diﬀerence as long as we agree that the truth
conditions of epistemic modals are sensitive to some information network.
For all practical purposes, we may think of contexts as n-tuples of contextual
parameters. It does not matter what we take the other parameters of the context
to represent but we require that one parameter represent the relevant information
network. Let a context C therefore be represented by an n-tuple h: : : ; Ki where
K is the set of possible worlds compatible with what is known in the context and
thus represents the information network of that context.
Having laid the groundwork, we may now give the following truth conditions
for the epistemic modals p3e'q and p2e'q:
Epistemic Modals
Let C be a context constituted by an information network K. e
truth conditions the epistemic modals p3e'q and p2e'q in C are
as follows:ǫǳ
C j= 3e' iﬀ 9w 2 K , ' is true in w.
C j= 2e' iﬀ 8w 2 K , ' is true in w.
ǫǲSee, for instance, Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson (ǬǪǪǯ), von Fintel and Gillies (ǬǪǪǱ,
ǬǪǪǲ), MacFarlane (ǬǪǪǳ) and Yalcin (ǬǪǪǱ).
ǫǳWhere pC j= 'q represents that ' is true in context C.
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In other words, p3e'q is only true in a context where some worlds in the associ-
ated information network—which are the worlds that are compatible with what is
known—are such that ' is true in them. And similarly, p2e'q is true in a context
where all worlds in the associated information network are such that ' is true in
them.
Let us consider what this tells us about our Gibbard Phenomenon case. Let
Cǫ represent the context in which Hamlet comes to believe (ǫ), let CǬ represent
the context in which Horatio comes to believe (Ǭ) and let Cǭ represent the context
which is induced after by their exchange of information once reunited. Moreover,
letKǫ,KǬ andKǭ represent the corresponding information networks. We would
expect those contexts and information networks to let themselves to representation
somewhere along the following lines:
Cǫ = h: : : ; Kǫi
CǬ = h: : : ; KǬi
Cǭ = h: : : ; Kǭi = h: : : ; Kǫ \KǬi
Kǫ = fw j :l; u; : : : are true in wg
KǬ = fw j :g; u; : : : are true in wg
Kǭ =Kǫ \KǬ = fw j :g;:l; u; : : : are true in wg
Given our analysis of epistemic modals, we have the following fairly obvious
results. InCǫ, p3egq and p3erq are true while p3elq is false: let us express those
results asCǫ j= 3eg,Cǫ j= 3er andCǫ j= :3el respectively. InCǬ, p3erq and
p3elq are true while p3egq is false: CǬ j= 3el, CǬ j= 3er and CǬ j= :3eg.
And ënally, in Cǭ, p3erq is true and p3egq and p3elq are false: Cǭ j= 3er,
Cǭ j= :3eg and Cǭ j= :3el. Furthermore, since for all three contexts p2euq is
true, p2e(g_r)q is true inCǫ, p2e(l_r)q is true inCǬ and p2erq is true inCǭ:
Cǫ j= 2e(g _ r), CǬ j= 2e(l _ r) and Cǭ j= 2er. Given but a brief reìection
on the case, we realise that those results are well in tune with our expectations.
Moreover, if we focus our attention on Cǫ and CǬ, we soon realise that if we
were to restrict the information networks in some fashion or another, we would have
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further interesting results. In particular, if we concentrate on those worlds in Kǫ
where p:rq is true and discard the rest, we discover that g is true in all those worlds.
And similarly, if we consider the worlds in KǬ where p:rq is true and ignore the
rest, we discover that l is true in all those worlds. In other words, p2e(:r  g)q
is true in Cǫ and p2e(:r  l)q is true in CǬ: Cǫ j= 2e(:r  g) and CǬ j=
2e(:r  l). And conversely, p2e(:r  l)q is false in Cǫ and p2e(:r  g)q is
false in CǬ: Cǫ j= :2e(:r  l) and CǬ j= :2e(:r  g).
is is where the plot thickens. According to a widespread view of conditionals
among linguists, inspired by David Lewis and championed by Angelika Kratzer,
a conditional clause (antecedent or protasis) is nothing more than mere restrictor
of modals and adverbs of quantiëcation.ǬǪ Depending on the nature of the modal
in question, the conditional clause restricts quantiëcation over some set of possi-
ble worlds. More carefully put, conditional sentences are in fact restricted modal
sentences. And in those cases where the context determines epistemic modality,
conditional sentences express restricted epistemic modals.
Now, if an indicative conditional p'! q expresses nothingmore than amere
necessity of  on the restriction of ', we must discern a pattern emerging: if p'!
q expresses p2eq once we have restricted the relevant information network to
only epistemically possible worlds in which ' is true, the truth conditions of p'!
q coincide with those of p2e('  )q:
Indicative Conditional (Epistemic Modal Analysis)
C j= '!  iﬀ C j= 2e('  ).
And that must be good because we claimed, recall, that p2e(r  g)q was true and
that p2e(r  l)q was false in Cǫ, and because we claimed that p2e(r  g)q
was false and that p2e(r  l)q was true in CǬ. According to the epistemic modal
analysis, we would therefore have that Cǫ j= r ! g, Cǫ j= :(r ! l), CǬ j=
r ! l and CǬ j= :(r ! g). Reasonably, we might therefore ask ourselves now
whether we have escaped the Gibbard Phenomenon.
ǬǪSee, in particular, Lewis (ǫǳǱǯ) and Kratzer (ǫǳǲǰ, forthcoming). See also, for instance, von
Fintel (ǫǳǳǲa) and, for a nice overview, von Fintel and Heim (ǬǪǪǱ, xǭ–ǯ).
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No, we should not congratulate ourselves just yet. Sadly, the epistemic modal
analysis falls afoul of our intuitions in Cǭ. In particular, the analysis predicts (ǫ)
and (Ǭ) to be true contrary to our intuitions. To make the point more clearly, let
us consider this issue in more detail. Recall that we claimed that Kǭ is the set
fw j :g;:l; u; : : : are true in wg and thus that Cǭ j= 2er. Now, since r will
be true in all worlds in Kǭ, restricting Kǭ to the worlds in where r is false will
yield the empty set. at is a serious problem because any indicative conditional
with p:rq as an antecedent will come out as vacuously true. In particular, (ǫ) and
(Ǭ) will come out as vacuously true. In other words, any context C which satisëes
p2erq, will be a context which satisëes p2e(:r  ')q for any ' and thus in
particular for g and l. us, as the epistemic modal analysis equates p2e('  )q
and p' ! q, (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are true in Cǭ. is is a serious issue for the epistemic
modal analysis.Ǭǫ
Worse yet, we also have a mirror issue: since r will be true in all worlds in
Kǭ, we may restrict Kǭ in any manner we may see ët and r will still be true in
every world in that subset of Kǭ. In particular, conditionals such as (ǯ), ‘if no
one was instructed to assassinate Hamlet, Rosencrantz was instructed to assassinate
Hamlet’, will come out as true. In other words, if a context satisëes p2eq, then
p2e('  )q and thereby p' ! q will be true for any '. As many such
conditionals strike us as extremely counterintuitive, the epistemic modal analysis
seems further troubled.
It goes without saying that those issues are somewhat reminiscent of the para-
doxes of material implication. In fact, it does appear as if we have a sort of revenge
problem upon us.ǬǬ And thus, unless we are willing to add some well chosen epicy-
cles to the epistemic modal analysis, we must conclude that the analysis should be
abandoned.
ǬǫHowever, see Gillies (ǬǪǪǳ, ǬǪǫǪ).
ǬǬAdding insult to injury, there is a further yet somewhat related issue identiëed by Zvolenszky
(ǬǪǪǬ). Roughly, the problem is that for any ' and C, C j= 2e('  ') and so C j= ' ! '.
erefore, since the account claims that conditionals are covert epistemic modals, we have that an
context makes pif ', then muste 'q. Arguably, in the cases of epistemic modals this is not quite as
embarrassing as in cases of other modals. Note however that Gillies (ǬǪǪǳ, ǬǪǫǪ) does not see this
as a serious problem.
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Merely to emphasise, the most serious problem with the epistemic modal anal-
ysis of indicative conditionals is that unwanted results ensue from antecedents that
are known to be false. A way out would be to claim that such conditionals are in fact
not epistemic but rather metaphysical or whatnot. In other words, any conditional
that has an antecedent which not compatible to the information network of the
context in question is not to be understood as ranging over epistemically possible
worlds but rather, say, metaphysically possible worlds.
at move seems faced by two obvious problems. First, there is a vast plethora
of conditionals which feel indicative enough which yet have an antecedent known
to be false. For instance, suppose we know which day of the week it actually is
and utter, truthfully it seems, the following seven conditionals: ‘if today is Monday,
tomorrow is Tuesday’, . . . , and ‘if today is Sunday, tomorrow is Monday’. Given
the similarity of the seven thoughts expressed, It would seem odd that only one of
the conditionals in question was indicative while the rest was not. Odder yet, which
conditional happens to be the privileged indicative conditional would depend on
the day of the week—a fair arrangement, to be sure, but hardly cogent.
Second, if conditionals with antecedents known to be false are to be taken to be,
say, metaphysical, what are we to say about conditionals with metaphysically impos-
sible antecedents? Well, if they require similar semantics as indicative conditionals,
two options seem open: either claim that they are vacuously true or repeat our pre-
vious move and claim that they are not metaphysical and thus that they require yet
another modal base to operate upon. Both options seem equally unattractive. e
former option is untenable for the simple reason that we take some conditionals
with metaphysically impossible antecedents to be false. For instance, we take it to
be false that ‘if  is a rational number, the circle cannot be squared’ while true that
‘if  is a rational number, the circle can be squared’. e latter option is untenable
because we cannot indeënitely ënd ourselves new modal bases to which we may
escape.
ose reìections do in fact suggest a more profound problem relating to all
modal analysis of conditionals. at is not to imply that we cannot get past those
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issues by more complex modal machinery.Ǭǭ However, those issues might be taken
to suggest that the modal turn was misguided from the beginning and that we
should never have strayed away from the Ramsey Test. Let us therefore consider
now whether what we have gathered so far about context sensitivity may not help
us oﬀer an appropriate revision of the Ramsey Test.
Č.ė e Ramsey Test in Context
We have seen that indicative conditionals are context sensitive in an important as-
pect. In a similar sense as paradigm context sensitive expressions such as ‘I’, ‘here’
and ‘now’ diﬀer in their denotation in correlation with their utterer, location of
utterance and time of utterance, indicative conditionals seem to be tied to the in-
formation networks of their context. In particular, while (ǫ) and (Ǭ) may be true
according to some information networks, they may well be false or neither true nor
false according to other. So, if we care to hold on to the Ramsey Test, we must
now ask ourselves, how can we make the test suﬃciently sensitive to the context in
question?
As before, wemay think of contexts asn-tuples of contextual parameters whereof
one represents the contextually relevant information networkK .ǬǮ To make things
easier for ourselves later on, letK now be the set of propositions which are known
in a particular context. Of course, that sort of model is in no sense a radical depar-
ture from our earlier representation of an information network as sets of possible
worlds; we may deëne either representation uninterestingly in terms of the other:
Kp :=
T
Kw and Kw := fw j Kp  wg (on the obvious assumption we take
possible worlds to be sets of propositions).
According to that construal, the relevant contexts and information networks are
somewhere along the following familiar lines:
ǬǭSee, for instance, Mares (ǬǪǪǮ) and Priest (ǬǪǪǳ).
ǬǮAgain, see footnote ǫǲ.
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Cǫ = h: : : ; Kǫi
CǬ = h: : : ; KǬi
Cǭ = h: : : ; Kǭi = h: : : ; Kǫ [KǬi
Kǫ = f:l; g _ r; u; : : :g
KǬ = f:g; l _ r; u; : : :g
Kǭ =Kǫ [KǬ = f:g;:l; g _ r; l _ r; u; : : :g
Moreover, let pxyq denote the function which adds a proposition y to an in-
formation network x, adjusts to maintain consistency and then returns the resulting
information network. In other words, the value of pK  'q is a new information
network K 0 which results from updating K with '. Intuitively, we may think of
this function as a form of learning. To illustrate, recall that once Hamlet and Hora-
tio have reunited and conferred, the contextually relevant information network may
be represented as f:g;:l; r; u; : : :g. If we were to update that particular informa-
tion network with p:rq, say because we were interested in evaluating p:r ! gq,
we would expect the result to be f:g;:l; r; u : : :g  :r = f:r; u; : : :g for the
reasons we stated before.Ǭǯ For the time being, we may let the exact details of this
function remain undeëned and treat it as primitive although we will return to the
issue later.Ǭǰ
With these elements in their place, we now seem to be equipped to propose a
naïve contextualised revision of the Ramsey Test.ǬǱ In tune with our earlier discus-
sion, it would seem reasonable to assume that an indicative conditional p'! q
may have (exactly) one of three possible truth values: true, false or neither true nor
false. Under that assumption, we may therefore spell out the Ramsey Test as follows:
Indicative Conditional (Naïve Contextualised Ramsey Test)
Let C be a context constituted by an information network K. e
truth conditions of an indicative conditional p' ! q in C are as
follows:
ǬǯSee xǬ.Ǯ.
ǬǰSee Appendix A.
ǬǱFor an alternative approach, see Appendix B.
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C j= '!  iﬀ  2 (K  '),
C j= :('! ) iﬀ : 2 (K  '),
C j=/ '!  and C j=/ : ('! ) iﬀ ;: /2 (K  ').
(In other words, the ërst clause says that p' ! q is true in C if  2 (K  '),
the second clause says that p'! q is false in C if : 2 (K '), and the ënal
clause says that p' ! q is neither true nor false in C otherwise.) If the third
truth value strikes anyone as excessive, we may simply get away with the following
clause: C j= '!  if  2 (K  '), and C j= :('! ) otherwise.
e issue of how indicative conditionals which have the third truth value are
supposed to combine truth functionally with other parts of language, we shall leave
unresolved here. Several obvious options are available such as trivalent logics like
Kǭ, Łǭ,LP andRMǭ. However, which one, if any, of those logics is appropriate is
a moot point and not particularly interesting to us at present. We should certainly
be aware of the issue but we will not address it in further detail here.
Now, given a certain superëcial similarity, it is worth emphasising the crucial
diﬀerence between the contextualised Ramsey Test and the epistemic modal analy-
sis: only the Ramsey Test analysis seems equipped to deal with conditionals whose
antecedents are false in the context in question. In other words, there does not seem
to be any sense in which one account could be reduced to the other. In particular,
the success of one account is certainly not a vindication of the other and, conversely,
the failure of one is not any kind of viliëcation of the other.
Let us consider how the Naïve Contextualised Ramsey Test fares with our data.
We may presumably still agree that (ǫ) is true and (Ǭ) is false in Cǫ, that (ǫ) is
false and (Ǭ) is true in CǬ and that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are neither true nor false in Cǭ.
Our question is thus whether our current version of Ramsey Test does predict those
intuitions. To answer that question, let us now hold (ǫ) and (Ǭ) up against our
contexts one by one.
In contextCǫ, which is constituted ofKǫ = f:l; g_r; u; : : :g, (ǫ) is predicted
to be true: p:r ! gq is true inCǫ because g 2 (Kǫ:r). We expect the update
of Kǫ with p:rq to result in fg;:l;:r; u; : : :g because Claudius did instruct
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someone to assassinate Hamlet and thus if not Rosencrantz or Laertes, then clearly
Guildenstern. Conversely, our Ramsey Test predicts that (Ǭ) is false inCǫ: p:r !
lq is false in Cǫ as :l 2 (Kǫ  :r) for the same reasons as before.
Next, when it comes to context CǬ, which is constituted of KǬ = f:g; l _
r; u; : : :g, our prediction is that (ǫ) is false: p:r ! gq is false in CǬ because
:g 2 (KǬ  :r). As before, we expect the update ofKǬ with p:rq to result in
f:g; l; u;:r; : : :g because Claudius did instruct someone to assassinate Hamlet
and thus if not Rosencrantz or Guildenstern, then obviously Laertes. And con-
versely, we predict that (Ǭ) is true in CǬ: p:r ! lq is true as l 2 (KǬ  :r) for
the same reasons.
Finally, when it comes toCǭ, which is constituted ofKǭ =Kǫ[KǬ = f:g;:l;
u; : : :g, we predict (ǫ) to be neither true nor false: p:r ! gq is neither true nor
false in Cǭ because g /2 (Kǭ  :r) and :g /2 (Kǭ  :r). is time, indeed,
for the reasons we gave earlier, we expect the update ofKǭ with p:rq to result in
f:r; u; : : :g.Ǭǲ And again conversely, we predict (Ǭ) to be neither true nor false in
Cǭ: l /2 (Kǭ  :r) and :l /2 (Kǭ  :r) for similar reasons.
e predictions of our revised Ramsey Test therefore seem to ët our intuitions
quite well. But not perfectly. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as we foreshadowed earlier,
the Ramsey Test is haunted with its own analogue of the paradoxes of material
implication that its naïve contextualised counterpart inherits.Ǭǳ On the one hand,
if ' is already in our information network, p'! q will be true in the context as
long as  is there too. And on the other hand, if  is in our information network
and the addition of ' has no eﬀect upon ’s standing, p'! q will be true, quite
vacuously, in that particular context. To say the least, those results are somewhat
counterintuitive.
On the one hand, for instance, pr ! 'q is true inCǭ for any ' already inKǭ:
supposing that Hamlet and Horatio both know that one and one do make two, we
will predict the following conditional to be true in the context:
ǬǲSee xǬ.Ǯ.
ǬǳSee xǬ.Ǭ.
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(ǳ) If Rosencrantz was instructed to assassinate Hamlet, one and one make two.
Surely, that cannot be right: as it happens, our immediate reaction is that this con-
ditional is neither true nor false. e reason, presumably, is that the antecedent and
the consequent are altogether irrelevant to one another. Indeed, we expect there to
be some sort of connection between the two, otherwise we begin to feel squeamish
about the conditional to some extent. And the same goes for similar condition-
als whose consequent is false and irrelevant to a true antecedent: our gut reaction
would be that they are not false but rather neither true nor false.
On the other hand, for instance, p' ! rq is true in Cǭ for any ' which has
no eﬀect on r inKǭ: a conditional such as as the following would thereby be true
in Cǭ:
(ǫǪ) If one and one do not make two, Rosencrantz was instructed to assassinate
Hamlet.
Again, that cannot be right: our immediate reaction is that (ǫǪ) is neither true nor
false. e reason for our squeamishness about (ǫǪ) in Cǭ is probably the same as
before: for truth or falsity, we expect there to be some sort of connection or relevance
between the antecedent and the consequent.
Now, of course, although we cannot generate as embarrassing cases as we could
with the bare paradoxes of material implication, we can nonetheless come up with
a great number of conditionals in virtually any context which the Naïve Contextu-
alised Ramsey Test predicts to be true or false although we feel intuitively uneasy
about them. Considering the two sorts of unhappy cases we can generate under
the analysis, the following pattern emerges: the truth of an indicative conditional
is somehow correlated to the relevance of its constitutive parts. In other words, we
tend to lose nerve against conditionals whose antecedent and consequent have no
connection of any sort. Arguably, this condition seems diminished in cases of con-
ditionals which either have words like ‘still’ in their consequents and ‘even’ in their
antecedent—say, something along the lines of pif ', then still q or peven if ',
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then q—or contextually imply something of similar kind. However, in cases of
plain conditionals, truth or falsity in the absence of such relevance seems suspect.
How are we to cope with that fact? Are we supposed to reject the Ramsey
Test altogether on those ground? Well, no, we can save the Ramsey Test by at
least two distinct means: on the one hand, we might attempt to give a pragmatic
account which would explain the uneasiness involved with those irrelevant condi-
tionals and then claim that the truth conditions are in fact those which the Ramsey
Test predicts, and, on the other hand, we might revise the Ramsey Test further
to accommodate our intuitions better. Arguably, we should perhaps leave the rest
up to pragmatics: we are, normally, willing to do the same for conjunctions and
disjunctions, why not for conditionals too? If we were to agree to leave the rest
up to pragmatics, our Naïve Contextualised Ramsey Test would be the end of our
semantic story. However, if only for the sake of curiosity, instead of considering
the pragmatic option, let us now explore the prospect of revising the Ramsey Test
further.
Our guiding principle would be that for a conditional to be true, there must be
some sort of connection of relevance between its antecedent and consequent. How
do we propose to achieve that? Well, roughly, it seems that when we consider a con-
ditional, p' ! q, we may simple forget all we knew about its consequent and
then add its antecedent to our information network, adjust to maintain consistency
and then consider whether the consequent or its negation has re-emerged. If the
consequent or its negation were to re-emerge, we would take the conditional as ei-
ther true or false respectively, otherwise neither true nor false. In other words, if the
consequence or its negation were not to reappear upon the adding the antecedent
to the information network, the conditional is irrelevant, as it were, and therefore
neither true nor false.
To implement this idea, we need a complement to our learning function. Let
px yq denote the function which subtracts a proposition y or its negation from
a information network x and then returns the resulting information network. In
other words, the value of pK  'q is a new consistent information network K 0
which results from subtracting ' or its negation fromK . Intuitively, we may think
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of this function as a form of forgetting. Now, for instance, suppose we were to
subtract g from Kǭ, say because we were interested in evaluating p:r ! gq,
the result of the subtraction would simply be f:g;:l; u : : :g  g = f:l; u; : : :g.
Again, we may let the exact details of this function remain undeëned and treat it as
primitive although we will return to the issue in a while.ǭǪ
Where does that leave us? Fortunately, thus construed, forgetting seems to work
small wonders for us: in the cases of (ǳ) and (ǫǪ), putting the consequents out of
our minds before learning the antecedents, ëguratively speaking, rules out the em-
barrassing cases of vacuous truth and falsity. Indeed, in most contexts, there seems
no way to reach the consequents of (ǳ) and (ǫǪ) on the mere supposition of their
antecedents. In other words, for conditionals such as (ǳ) and (ǫǪ) to come out as
true or false, the contexts in question must be such that their information networks
provide relevance of some sort between the antecedent and the consequent.
Let us therefore propose the following revision of the Ramsey Test:
Indicative Conditional (Contextualised Ramsey Test Analysis)
Let C be a context constituted by an information network K . e
truth conditions of an indicative conditional p' ! q in C are as
follows:
C j= '!  iﬀ  2 ((K  ) '),
C j= :('! ) iﬀ : 2 ((K  ) '),
C j=/ '!  and C j=/ : ('! ) iﬀ ;: /2 ((K)').
(In other words, the ërst clause says that p'! q is true inC if  2 ((K)
'), the second clause says that p'! q is false inC if: 2 ((K)'), and
the ënal clause says that p'! q is neither true nor false in C otherwise.) Again,
if the third truth value strikes anyone as excessive, we may simply get away with the
following clause: C j= ' !  if  2 ((K  )  '), and C j= :(' ! )
otherwise.
Moreover, as we hinted at already, with a proposal of this ilk, we are also
equipped to give an account of conditionals which either have words like ‘still’ in
ǭǪSee Appendix A.
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their consequents and ‘even’ in their antecedent or contextually imply something
of similar kind: we simply leave out forgetting the consequents and revert to our
naïve truth conditions in those cases.
Let us now ënally consider how the our Contextualised Ramsey Test fares with
our data. Again, let us therefore move through the contexts one by one and assess
the truth values our theory predicts for (ǫ) and (Ǭ).
In contextCǫ, which, recall, is constituted ofKǫ = f:l; g_r; u; : : :g, (ǫ) is still
predicted to be true: p:r ! gq is true in Cǫ because g 2 ((Kǫ g):r). We
expect the subtraction of g fromKǫ to result in f:l; g _ r; u; : : :g, whose update
again with p:rq results in fg;:l;:r; g _ r; u; : : :g. Conversely, we predict that
(Ǭ) is false in Cǫ: p:r ! lq is false in Cǫ as :l 2 ((Kǫ  g)  :r). at fact
might be less obvious: although we expectKǫ l to be devoid of p:lq, pg_ rq is
still inKǫ and the forgetting of p:lq would certainly not touch upon that. In that
case, when subsequently updating with p:rq, we may again infer g from pg _ rq
and p:rq, from which in turn we may infer p:lq together with u.
When it comes to context CǬ, our prediction is that (ǫ) is false and (Ǭ) is true.
Since the reason for that prediction are analogous to those for which we predicted
(ǫ) to be true and (Ǭ) to be false in Cǫ, we will not bother to repeat ourselves.
Finally, when it comes toCǭ, which is constituted ofKǭ =Kǫ[KǬ = f:g;:l;
g_ r; l_ r; u; : : :g, our Contextualised Ramsey Test predicts (ǫ) to be neither true
nor false: p:r ! gq is neither true nor false in Cǭ because g /2 ((Kǭ g):r)
and:g /2 ((Kǭg):r). In this case, the subtraction of pgq fromKǭ will result
in f:l; r; g _ r; l _ r; u; : : :g. Moreover, for similar reason as before, the update
of p:rq to f:l; r; g _ r; l _ r; u; : : :g will result in f:r; u; : : :g.ǭǫ And again
conversely, we predict (Ǭ) to be neither true nor false in Cǭ: l /2 ((Kǭ  l):r)
and :l /2 ((Kǭ  l) :r).
It does therefore seem as if our contextualised counterpart of the Ramsey Test
allows us to escape the Gibbard Phenomenon. at must certainly come as a com-
fort to us: contrary to the rumour, indicative conditionals may well possess truth
ǭǫSee xǬ.Ǯ.
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values. We have, it does certainly seem, solved the problem which we set ourselves
up against.
Č.Ę Conclusion: Ramsey Test& Truth Values
We began our excursion by considering so-called Gibbard Phenomenon cases. In
particular, we asked ourselves whether such cases impel us to infer that indicative
conditional cannot have truth values on pain of contradiction. We considered sev-
eral possibilities and ënally argued ourselves into a position where we may well hold
on to a contextualised counterpart of the Ramsey Test and still sail successfully past
the terrors of the Gibbard Phenomenon.
Our lingering question throughout this chapter has been this: if indicative con-
ditionals cannot be true or false, what are they then? Our inability to give an answer
has been our motivation for oﬀering account by which we can hold on to our preva-
lent intuitions about indicative conditionals and, on the one hand, truth and falsity,
and, on the other hand, the Ramsey Test. If the truth value opponent still wishes to
persist, an answer must ërst be given to our burning question: if not true or false?
Appendix A: Maintaining Information Networks
So far, several claims have been made about information networks and their inner
workings.ǭǬ In order to get the semantics of indicative conditionals right, we have
assumed two main operations through which we may manipulate information net-
works: learning and forgetting. So far, we only have given vague sketches but we
shall describe them in more detail now.
ǭǬSee, in particular, xǬ.ǰ.
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Information Networks
Let us begin by clarifying to a certain extent what we mean when we talk about
information networks. Very roughly speaking, an information network is a mere
collection of propositions. e propositions involved need not be atomic proposi-
tions as we may reasonably hold for some p, say, pp _ :pq without holding either
disjunct. Moreover, we may assume that information networks are consistent—for
any p, if p is in a particular information network, p’s negation is not—although in-
formation networks need not be complete—there might well be some p such that
neither p nor its negation are in a particular information network. Finally, we may
take information networks to impose some sort of order on its elements which re-
ìect, say, our credence in cases of beliefs or our degrees of certainty or defeatability
in cases of knowledge. In that sense, we may say that some propositions are closer
to the centre of the network than others and thus more resilient to revision.
We leave the issue of information networks’ content intentionally ambiguous.
is is merely to allow for maximum plasticity of the account. In particular, in
certain cases, networks might be required to consist of only knowledge, while in
others, networks may need to consist of beliefs and in yet other cases, no constraint
might be laid upon the information. In other words, an information network,
we take it, is only a generic data structure which may serve a number of diﬀerent
applications, which may or may not impose their own restrictions on the nature of
the information involved. Now, in the case of indicative conditionals, a strong case
might be made for the claim that the information involved must be knowledge:
in particular, a strong argument might be made from the observation that if the
information involved is not factive,Modus Ponens will fail for the conditional given
by the Contextualised Ramsey Test. us, arguably, the information networks in
which we are currently interested are all knowledge networks although everything
we will say about information networks, applies to networks of information weaker
than knowledge too.
ere is a further issue of closure of information networks which we shall not
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touch upon in any depth here.ǭǭ Clearly, a complete closure would cause problems
as, say, forgetting becomes very hard in many cases: closure would ensure that cer-
tain propositions could never be forgotten in isolation as they would emerge as soon
again on account of closure. Moreover, a complete lack of closure would get us into
trouble too, say, as learning new information would be far too feeble: when we add
a proposition to an information network, we would like to get at least some of its
entailments for free. A possible strategy would be to close any and only changes
made by consistency maintenance under a set of some logical operations. We will
however leave the details of this issue unresolved at present and focus instead on the
operations under discussion.
Whether this characterisation of information networks is psychologically real-
istic is subject to a debate. For instance, the claim of consistency might well be con-
tested since it does sometimes seem as if we hold contrary beliefs. Obviously, in the
case of knowledge (and other networks of factive information), this issue does not
carry any weight. For another instance, the issue of restricted closure might strike
one as dubious as we may well, say, believe some fairly simple propositions with-
out believing all their consequences. Perhaps, realistically, information networks
are thus only ët to model ideal agents of some sort or another. We will however
not address those issues any further now but merely accept our characterisation as
adequate for our present purposes.
Forgetting: Subtracting Information
Forgetting is unsurprisingly easy. In fact, we must simply rid our information net-
work of whatever we want to forget and leave it at that. Since the removal of a
proposition from a consistent information network will not induce inconsistency,
some sort of consistency maintenance upon forgetting would be absolutely redun-
dant. We may therefore simply deëne the procedure of forgetting in the following
terms:
Forgetting
ǭǭSee Appendix B.
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Let x  y be a function which takes two arguments, an information
network x and a proposition y, and returns an information network.
e value of x y is as follows:
x y := the information network which results by removing y
or its negation from x.
As we shall see quite soon, the nature of the function pxyq depends upon the
exact nature of information networks. If we merely take information networks to
be sets of propositions, the value of pxyq is simply xnfy;:yg. Conversely, if we
take an information network to be an n-tuple of propositions, the value of pxyq
is the (either n or n-ǫ) tuple which results from removing y or its negation from
x. As a matter of fact, as we go on, we will realise that we need more complex
data structure to model information networks properly. However, for the models
we shall oﬀer for information networks, the operation of forgetting should be fairly
obvious and will therefore not be left as subject to a further discussion.
Learning: Inserting& Updating Information
We deëned px yq as the function which adds a proposition y to an information
network x, adjusts to maintain consistency and then returns the resulting infor-
mation network. Obviously, the middle part of this operation—the consistence
maintenance—is its real crux.
Clearly, to add a proposition ' to an information networkK and then merely
maintain for consistency is is not going to get us very far oﬀ the ground: theminimal
adjustment required to restore an equilibrium would simply be to throw ' out of
K again. Instead, we need somehow to ensure that ' remains immune to revision.
e whole information network must, as it were, be adjusted around '.
A way in which we might implement the maintenance operation would thus
be the following: let the consistency maintenance be a function which takes an
information network and a proposition as its arguments and returns an appropri-
ately updated information network. More formally, let px 
 yq therefore denote
the function which rebuilds an information network x around a proposition y and
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then returns the resulting information network. If we deëne the consistency main-
tenance function in this way, we actually only ever need to perform maintenance
to update any given information network: since the maintenance of x around y, as
it were, will both leave y in the new network and throw out its negation, if at all in
x, we have in fact updated while maintaining consistency.
For that reason, we may say that px yq is nothing more than px
 yq. We
may thus trivially spell out the so-called learning function in the following terms:
Learning
Let x  y be a function which takes two arguments, an information
network x and a proposition y, and returns an information network.
e value of x y is as follows:
x y:=x
 y
Clearly, our real challenge involves specifying the consistency maintenance op-
eration. Let us therefore gather our courage and turn our attention to the details of
consistency maintenance functions.
e Crux: Maintaining for Consistency
Partly for the sake of clarity and partly for the sake of our own limitations, we
shall proceed as follows: we will begin by deëning a naïve consistency maintenance
function and then work our way gradually through several iterations to more and
more sophisticated functions.
Our ërst function works under the assumption that we may simply run through
our information network and knock out any proposition which contradicts which-
ever proposition we take to be sacrosanct. We may deëne our ërst function in the
following terms:
Consistency Maintenance (Naïve Toyeory)
Let x
 y be a function which takes two arguments, a set of proposi-
tions x and a proposition y, and returns a set of propositions. Let z
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denote an arbitrary member of x. e value of x
 y is as follows:
x
 y:=
8>><>>:
fyg if x=?
((xnfzg)
 y) [ fzg if y and z are consistent
((xnfzg)
 y) [ f:zg otherwise
Intuitively, the function decomposes a given information network and then
reconstructs a new network with the existing pieces or their negation, whichever
agrees with the proposition that we hold immune to revision. To gain a better
intuitive grasp of the operation, we may perhaps think of it as analogous to when
we take a fairly complex object apart and then reassemble it in reverse order in
accordance with its parts agreement to some designated part. For a helpful concrete
analogy, we may think of items of clothing: we may, say, shed our entire attire and
then put the individual articles of clothing back on if they agree in some sense with
some chosen garment.
roughout, we should remain aware that it is open to discussion whether we re-
place any proposition which happens to be inconsistent with our sacrosanct propo-
sition with its negation or else leave it out all together. From a psychological per-
spective, it might perhaps strike us as more realistic to replace such propositions
with their negations. For that reason, we choose to implement our functions so
that they replace inconstancies with their negations. In case that strikes someone
as contentious, the functions may be changed in a fairly straightforward manner
such that any contradicting propositions are left out altogether. We will not take a
further stand on this issue here and merely consider it as ìagged.
Our current function is, without any surprise, far too naïve: there is no guaran-
tee that the resulting information network will be consistent. Although all its ele-
ments are individually consistent with our sacrosanct proposition, the information
network might be inconsistent as a whole. For instance, p:'_q and p:qmay
both be individually consistent with ' although mutually inconsistent. In other
words, as long as our information network contains elements of these form—and
countless other—our Naïve Toyeory will yield an inconsistent network. Clearly,
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any consistency maintainer which fails to maintain consistency is not quite made
for its purpose. So, we must try a little bit harder.
Obviously, we must be on the guard against mutual inconsistencies. How?
Well, we could proceed as before but instead of comparing every element of the
information network to our designated proposition, we may compare every element
to our intermediate information network. To achieve means to that end, we may
deëne our function in the following terms:
Consistency Maintenance (Simple Toy eory)
Let x
 y be a function which takes two arguments, a set of proposi-
tions x and a proposition y, and returns a set of propositions. Let z
denote an arbitrary member of x. e value of x
 y is as follows:
x
 y:=
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
fyg if x=?
((xnfzg)
 y) [ fzg if (xnfzg)
 y and z
are consistent
((xnfzg)
 y) [ f:zg if (xnfzg)
 y and :z
are consistent
(xnfzg)
 y otherwise
Intuitively, this function decomposes a given information network and then
reconstructs a new network with the existing pieces, their negation or neither,
whichever agrees with the information network we have built up so far in our pro-
cess. Again, to gain a better intuitive grasp of this operation, we may perhaps think
of it as analogous to when we take a fairly complex object apart and then reassemble
it in accordance to its part’s ët with the amalgam at that point. We may, say, shed
our attire and then put the individual articles of clothing back on if they agree in
some sense with what have put on so far.
is function is bound to give us a consistent information network as we do not
add anything to it at any stage which disagrees with its current content. In other
words, this function avoids the most obvious shortcoming of the ërst function. So,
if we are after consistency alone, we could stop our quest here.
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Insofar as we are after something more, however, we must go on as our current
function has drawbacks of its own: there seems to be far more structure to informa-
tion networks than we have supposed so far. Indeed, there are certain propositions
which we seem more inclined to revise than others as if they carry more weight. In
other words, it does appear that information networks have some internal ordering
among their elements. For instance, within a given information network, we may
hold p:q quite dear but p' _ :q substantially more so, say, because we take
the latter to be a law of some sort while we only assume the former by hearsay or
whatnot. Were we to maintain the consistency of our information network around
p:'q, we would have two options: replace either p' _ :q or p:q with their
negations. Clearly, replacing p'_:q for p:'^qwould be irresponsible, while
replacing p:'q for its negation seems to be the reasonable move. However, since
our last function makes no distinction between the elements of a given information
network, the incorrect move is as probable as the correct move. So, despite the fact
that it ensures consistency, our last function is not ët for the task. We still need to
do better.
To get around our current issues, we must reshuﬄe our cards. We need a new
model of information networks which allows us to mirror the order of their ele-
ments. How can we achieve that eﬀect? For all intents and purposes, we may model
an information network as a so-called stack. A stack is a data structure whose ele-
ments are ordered and whose operations all target the front-most element. Let us
call the front-most and back-most elements of a stack its ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ respec-
tively. On the supposition that an information network imposes a preorder on its
elements by their weight, we may order these elements internally into a totally or-
dered equivalence classes of weight. We may thus think of an information network
as a stack, where the propositions gradually become heavier from top to bottom
such that any proposition is either of equal or less weight than the proposition im-
mediately under it. To implement our stack, we may simply use an n-tuple whose
ërst element we designate as the top and the n-th element as the bottom. We will
also need a notion of an empty stack, which contains no elements, which we shall
implement with the empty tuple. Let hi denote the empty tuple.
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To operate on our stack, we may deëne its functions as follows. Let (x; y)
denote the function which adds an element y to a stack x and returns the stack
whose top is y and whose remaining elements are x’s elements in preserved order:
(hxǫ; : : :i; y) = hy; xǫ; : : :i. Let (x) denote the function which removes
the top from a stack x and returns the stack whose elements are x’s remaining
elements in preserved order unless x is empty: (hxǫ; xǬ; : : :i) = hxǬ; : : :i. Let
(x) denote the function which returns the top from a stack x unless x is empty:
(hxǫ; : : :i) = xǫ. Although we need not worry about the empty stack case here,
we may simply let (x) and (x) remain undeëned when x is an empty stack.
Finally, let (x) denote the function which tells us if a stack x is empty by
returning true but false otherwise: (x) = true iﬀ x is hi.
With our stack in place, we may now deëne the consistency maintenance func-
tion as follows:
Consistency Maintenance (Sophisticated Toyeory)
Let x
 y be a function which takes two arguments, a stack of propo-
sitions x and a proposition y, and returns a stack of propositions. e
value of x
 y is as follows:
x
 y:=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(x; y) if (x)
((x)
 y; (x)) if (x)
 y
and (x)
are consistent
((x)
 y;:(x)) if (x)
 y
and :(x)
are consistent
(x)
 y otherwise
Intuitively, the function decomposes a given information network in order of
the weight of its elements and then reconstructs a new network with the existing
pieces, their negation or neither, whichever agrees with the information network we
have built up so far in our process. Again, to gain a better intuitive grasp of this
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operation, we may perhaps think of it as analogous to when we take a fairly complex
and layered object apart and then reassemble it in reverse order in accordance to its
parts ët to the amalgam at that point. We may, say, shed our attire according to our
preference and then put the individual articles of clothing back on if they agree in
some sense with what have put on so far.
Although this implementation gets around the previous shortcomings by its
sensitivity to the weight of the networks elements, there are further issues. In par-
ticular, what will happen when two elements are of equal weight? Well, in the
fashion we modelled information networks just now, the order in which we run
through elements of equal weight is arbitrary. Sadly, that will not do: since our
current function will treat elements lower in the stack as if they were of more
weight, we will sooner or later get unwanted results. For instance, suppose that
p' _  _  q, p:q and p: q constitute an information network where the
ërst proposition has more weight than the other two, which we shall suppose to
be of the same weight. To make the example slightly more concrete, this is what
would happen in our Hamlet case in context Cǭ. Intuitively, were we to maintain
consistency around p:'q, the result would be an information network without
 and  as neither has weight over the other. However, our latest procedure gets
that wrong. When we cast the information network in question into a stack, two
equally legitimate options are available: h: : : ;:;: ; : : : ; ' _  _  ; : : :i and
h: : : ;: ;:; : : : ; '__ ; : : :i. Suppose we arbitrarily choose the ërst and then
maintain its consistency around p:'q with our present function, the result would
be h: : : ; ;: ; : : : ; ' _  _  ; : : ::'i. Likewise, if we take the second option,
we would end up with h: : : ;  ;:; : : : ; '__ ; : : ::'i. Sadly, both options
are wrong. Although we must make distinctions when it comes to the weight of
elements, we ought not make distinctions without diﬀerences. We must therefore
do still better.
What can we do? We are in some luck now: we can combine elements of our
earlier strategies to get around this problem. Instead of working with a stack of
propositions, we can work with a stack of sets of propositions of equal weight. Let
this therefore be our next and ënal proposal:
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Consistency Maintenance
Let x 
 y be a function which takes two arguments, a stack of sets
of propositions x and a proposition y, and returns a stack of sets of
propositions. e value of x
 y is as follows:
x
y:=
(
(x; y) if (x)
((x)
 y; ((x)
 y) (x)) otherwise
Moreover, let x  y be a function which takes two arguments,
a stack of sets of propositions x and a set of n proposition y, and
returns a set of propositions. Let ypǫ; : : : ; ypn! be the stacks of every
permutation of the elements of y. e value of x y is as follows:
x y:=
n!\
i=ǫ
(x	 ypi )
Finally, let x	y be a function which takes two arguments, a stack
of sets of propositions x and a stack of propositions y, and returns a
set of propositions. e value of x	 y is as follows:
x	 y:=
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
? if (y)
(x	 (y)) [ (y) if x	 (y); (y)
and x are consistent
(x	 (y)) [ :(y) if x	 (y);:(y)
and x are consistent
x	 (y) otherwise
Intuitively, the function decomposes a given information network layer by layer
in the order of the weight of its elements and then reconstructs a new network in
layers with the existing pieces, their negation or neither, whichever agrees with the
information network we have built up so far in our process. Again, to gain a better
grasp of this operation, we may perhaps think of it as analogous to when we take a
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fairly complex and layered object apart and then reassemble it in accordance to its
parts ët to the amalgam whereby we try every possible composition of each layer
and rid the layer of those items which are not stable across permutations. Our
clothing analogy is wearing quite thin now: we may, say, shed our entire attire from
the outside in certain groups of items and then put parts of each group on as long
as they agree under diﬀerent permutations with whatever we have put on so far.
As the reader might be inclined to verify, this operation gets past the draw-
backs of our earlier proposals. Nonetheless, our latest implementation of consis-
tency maintenance is computationally too complex. In that respect, the function
is arguably psychologically unrealistic and might be taken as an indication that we
must do better. We shall, however, come to rest now and only hint at direction for
further improvements.
Our implementations of consistency maintenance so far have all had in com-
mon that an entire information network is under consideration. It seems more
reasonable and realistic to consider only those elements of the network which are
related in some sense to the proposition around which we maintain consistency. To
get a proposal of that ilk oﬀ the ground, we need more complex models of infor-
mation networks than we have used so far. Earlier, we realised that sets were com-
pletely unsuited for the purpose, so we introduced stacks as models of information
networks. However, the computational cost induced by our stack implementations
likewise seems to indicate that we need an even more complex data structure.
e name we have chosen for the subject of our enquiry has probably betrayed
our demand: for our purposes, we need a net whose vertices represent propositions
and whose edges represent their internal relations. Our target of consistency main-
tenance would then only be the propositions on particular paths within the net.
Although somewhat more complex in implementation, such model of information
networks will presumably turn out to be substantially less computationally demand-
ing in maintenance. Having hinted at a probable solution to our issues, let those
be our last words on the subject.
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Appendix B: Argument Centred Semantics
Our present proposal has several shortcomings. In particular, the issue of closure
remains open. Moreover, there is the further issue of embedded conditionals and
degrees of credence.ǭǮ
On the one hand, conditionals which embed further conditionals in their an-
tecedents fare badly with respect to semantics we have outlined. So far, we have not
said anything about how one would add an indicative conditional to an information
network. In particular, we have taken indicative conditionals to be derivative of in-
formation networks but not its constituents. One might certainly claim that there
are no natural language conditionals which sensibly embed further conditionals in
their antecedents but that issue seems open to serious discussion. Indeed, when, for
instance, we explainModus Ponens to someone in natural language, we do arguably
express an embedded natural language conditional: ‘if ' and if ', then , we may
infer ’.ǭǯ
On the other hand, our account seems ill-equipped to account for the fact that
we may ënd certain conditionals more credible than others. According to our se-
mantics, an indicative conditional is either true or false or neither; there are no
further shades between true or false available. Arguably, an account of credence
in conditionals is something which semantics cannot reasonably be expected to ex-
plain. Similarly, although wemight expect our semantics to give us truth conditions
for belief ascriptions without providing us with any information about how credi-
ble a given belief is to the agent in question. Whether the same might be said for
indicative conditionals we will leave as a subject for later discussion.
Both of those issues might potentially be resolved but let us instead brieìy con-
sider an alternative implementation of the Ramsey Test. Let us begin by revisiting
Ramsey’s passage:
If two people are arguing ‘If p, will q?’ and are both in doubt as to
p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and
ǭǮSee Gärdenfors (ǫǳǲǰ).
ǭǯFor further examples, see xǮ.ǯ.ǯ.
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arguing on that basis that q ...ǭǰ
Upon a closer scrutiny, we might realise that there are in fact two ways in which we
might understand Ramsey’s directions. On the one hand, as we have already inter-
preted the test, we might add the antecedent to our information network, maintain
for consistency and then look for the consequent or its negation in the resulting in-
formation network. On the other hand, we might take the antecedent as a premiss
together with the content of our information network and then try to argue on that
basis for the consequent or its negation.
Roughly speaking, then, we may conceive of the Ramsey Test as an attempt
to argue from the antecedent in question and our information network to either
the consequent or its negation. If we succeed in the former, we would take the
conditional to be true; if we succeed the latter, we would take the conditional to be
false; and if we were to succeed neither, we would take the conditional in question
to be neither true nor false. In other words, if we let kǫ; : : : ; kn be the elements of
our information networkK , p'! q is true if we have an argument somewhere
along the following lines:
' ki
... kj
...   
... kk

Conversely, if we can derive p:q from the set of premises, p'! q is false. And
ënally, if there is no valid argument to either  or its negation, p'! q is neither
true nor false.
Now, clearly, there are several details which are worth to point out. First of
all, the logic in question would have to be appropriately paraconsistent. Any logic
which would validate  would not get us particularly far: if p:'q 2 K, we
would have bothK;' `  andK;' ` : in any suﬃciently explosive logic. In
ǭǰRamsey (ǫǳǭǫ, p. ǬǮǱ, my emphasis).
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other words, whenever we derive a contradiction on our way towards the consequent
or its negation, we should never be entitled to infer anything except the negation
of one of the premises on which the contradiction rests.
Second, in some relevant sense, the conclusion must rest upon the premise of
the antecedent: importantly, the argument must be from ' to ; ' must thus be
more than an idle cog in the derivation. If we can argue our way from ' andK to
either  or its negation, we expect ' to play some necessary role in the argument.
Roughly speaking, if p' ! q is to be true, the role of ' in the argument must
be such that K;' `  and yet K 0 . And again, in cases of ‘even’ and ‘still’
conditionals, that condition is arguably mitigated.ǭǱ
On the supposition that some appropriate logic may be found for the project,
we might therefore spell out the truth conditions of indicative conditionals along
the following lines:
Indicative Conditional (Argument Analysis)
Let C be a context constituted by an information network K . e
truth conditions of an indicative conditional p' ! q in C are as
follows:
C j= '!  if K;' ` ,
C j= :('! ) if K;' ` :,
C j=/ '!  and C j=/ : ('! ) if K;' 0  and
K;' 0 :.
Although this approach leaves a number of issues open in terms of the appro-
priate logic, it does seem to get pass the problem of closure quite elegantly. In fact,
we might even use elements of this approach to supplement our main account: we
could forget all about closure and simply look for an argument from the updated
information network to either the consequent in question or its negation. We shall
leave further details unspeciëed until later.
ǭǱSee xǬ.ǰ.

ǭ Where to Draw the Line
Natural language conditionals are commonly believed to be of two seman-
tically distinct types: indicative and subjunctive. Although this distinc-
tion is central to many semantic analyses of natural language condition-
als, there seems to be no consensus on the details of its nature. While
trying to uncover the grounds for the distinction, we will argue our way
through several plausible proposals found in the literature. First, we shall
consider whether the grammatical and syntactic features of English con-
ditionals do illuminate the distinction somehow. Second, we shall exam-
ine whether the semantic features of the conditional constituent sentences
do reveal anything about the distinction. And ínally, we shall exam-
ine whether some sort of epistemic/metaphysical distinction underlies the
indicative/subjunctive distinction. Upon discovering that none of those
proposals seem entirely suitable, we shall next attempt to do away with the
distinction. In the wake of the failure of any such reduction, we shall next
reconsider our position and make several helpful observations regarding
the nature of conditional sentences. And ínally, in light of our obser-
vations, we shall propose and argue for plausible grounds for the indica-
tive/subjunctive distinction.
č.Ċ Preamble: e Indicative/Subjunctive Distinction
According to a widespread creed, conditionals in natural languages are of two funda-
mentally distinct types. While conditionals of the ërst sort have commonly become
known as ‘indicative’, conditionals of the other sort are normally called ‘subjunc-
ǰǱ
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tive’. In many respects, indicative and subjunctive conditionals are said to be akin.
Nevertheless, a certain and obvious diﬀerence emerges once we consider the truth
conditions of certain pairs of conditionals.
On the one hand, for instance, the following conditional is traditionally claimed
to be an indicative conditional:
(ǫ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then someone else did.
We normally take this conditional to be true. We know very well that the playHam-
let exists—some of us are even fortunate enough to have seen or else read it—and
since things of this kind do not write themselves, we know that there must have
been an author. For that very reason we take (ǫ) to be true: Hamlet exists, so some-
one must have written it, and if not William Shakespeare, then someone else must
have.
On the other hand, the following conditional is traditionally said to be a sub-
junctive conditional:
(Ǭ) If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then someone else would have.ǫ
We normally take this conditional to be false. Indeed, unless we hold some sort
of Michelangelian conception of artistic creation, Hamlet was not merely ìoating
around in the ether waiting to be written. Quite the contrary, it took an author of
certain genius, living at a particular place and time in history to write the play. In
fact, we might even be tempted to claim that no one apart from Shakespeare could
have written Hamlet. Be that as it may, for even weaker reasons we are inclined to
say that (Ǭ) is false: if Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then no one else would
have.
Of course, none of this is to say that (ǫ) contradicts (Ǭ) in any way. After all,
their truth values may very well coincide in certain situations. Rather, the important
diﬀerence between (ǫ) and (Ǭ) lies in their truth conditions. We take (ǫ) to be true
ǫ(ǫ) and (Ǭ) are, of course, mere recasts of Adams’ famous Oswald-Kennedy pair, Adams (ǫǳǱǪ,
p. ǳǪ): ‘if Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did’ and ‘if Oswald had not killed
Kennedy, then someone else would have’.
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only on the condition that Hamlet was in fact written, while we take (Ǭ) to be
true only on the condition that someone else would have written the play in the
event that Shakespeare had not. And insofar as we take meaning as somehow tied
with truth conditions, (ǫ) and (Ǭ) diﬀer in meaning. In other words, the diﬀerence
between indicative and subjunctive conditionals therefore seems to be a semantic
diﬀerence.
Conditional pairs such as (ǫ) and (Ǭ) reveal that two natural language condi-
tionals that seemingly share an antecedent (or a protasis or a conditional clause)
and a consequent (or an apodosis or a main clause) may diﬀer in their meaning.
Needless to say, this poses a particular challenge to anyone interested in accounting
for the semantics of natural language conditionals: namely, we are not only in need
of a single account of conditionals, rather it seems as if we need two accounts of
conditionals. And in fact, even before attempting to address the issue of the se-
mantics of conditionals, one must feel compelled to understand where to draw the
line between indicative and subjunctive conditionals: indeed, the line might reveal
a good deal about the semantics on either side of it.
is is therefore how we shall proceed. While trying to uncover the grounds
for the indicative/subjunctive distinction, we will argue our way through several
plausible proposals found in the literature. Upon discovering that none of those
proposal available seem entirely suitable, we shall next attempt to do away with the
distinction. In the wake of the failure of such reductions, we will next reconsider our
position and make several helpful observations regarding the nature of conditional
sentences. And ënally, in light of our observations, we shall propose and argue for
plausible grounds for the distinction.
č.Č Discerning the Distinction
e indicative/subjunctive distinction for natural language conditionals is wide-
spread, in fact, so widespread that almost all mainstream semantic theories for con-
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ditionals respect it in one way or another.Ǭ In this section, we shall attempt to
uncover the grounds of the indicative/subjunctive distinction. Dialectically, we
will move though a series of intuitive proposals and argue that they all lack in some
aspect or another. Let us begin our enquiry at the most obvious place.
č.Č.Ċ First Proposal: Grammatical Mood
Traditionally, the words ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’ name verbmoods in languages
of suﬃcient conjugations. Perhaps then, the natural ërst step for anyone inter-
ested in understanding the so-called indicative/subjunctive distinction of natural
language conditionals is to turn her sights toward the moods of any verbs involved.
According to any such proposal, the syntax of conditional sentences would then
determine their semantics.
Presumably, were verb moods to turn out to be responsible for the distinc-
tion—common sense suggests—it would be somehow along the lines that indicative
natural language conditionals are constituted of verbs in the indicative mood, while
their subjunctive counterparts consist of verbs in the subjunctive mood.
Of course, unless involving an ellipsis of some sort, every conditional must at
the very least consist of two verbs: one in its antecedent and one in its consequent.
Whether one or more verbs of a given conditional must be in the subjunctive mood
for it to count as a subjunctive conditional is a moot point at present. However, let
us assume that one verb in its subjunctive form is enough for a conditional to count
as subjunctive. Let this therefore be our ërst proposal:
e Grammatical Mood Proposal
A natural language conditional is subjunctive only if at least one of its
verbs is in the subjunctive mood, otherwise the conditional is indica-
tive.
Before we can consider themerits of this proposal, memust understand what we
mean by ‘mood’ and spell out brieìy the roles of verb moods in natural languages.
ǬJust to name a few, Adams (ǫǳǱǯ), Bennett (ǬǪǪǭ), Edgington (ǫǳǳǯ), Jackson (ǫǳǲǱ), Lewis
(ǫǳǱǭ) and Stalnaker (ǫǳǱǯ/ǫǳǳǳ).
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Grammatical mood refers to forms of verbs in suﬃciently inìected languages. e
mood of a verb usually indicates whether the sentence containing it is believed by
its utterer to express, say, a fact in the case of the indicative mood or a certain
uncertainty, hypotheticality or even conditionality in the case of the subjunctive
mood.ǭ Generally, then, the indicative and subjunctive moods serve as a means to
express the attitude of the utterer to the sentence uttered.
We know, of course, that most natural languages possess more moods than
merely the indicative and the subjunctive. ere are, for instance, the imperative
mood, the interrogative mood and optative mood. However, insofar as we are in-
terested in declarative sentences—and, in particular, conditional sentences—which
allegedly have truth conditions, any conditionals consisting of verbs in either the
imperative, interrogative or optative mood are of no interest presently. Indeed, such
conditionals would express nothing more than a conditional command, conditional
question or conditional expression of wish respectively. Arguably, any theory of
conditionals should illuminate the semantics and pragmatics of such expressions,
but nothing can be said about their truth conditions since, arguably, such condi-
tionals have no truth conditions.
With those pieces in place, we may now ask ourselves, how good is our gram-
matical mood proposal? Let us consider our paradigms of indicative and subjunc-
tive conditionals again. On the one hand, our indicative conditional (ǫ) seems
quite ëne: since all verbs involved are clearly in the indicative mood, the condi-
tional is an indicative conditional according to our proposal. On the other hand,
our subjunctive conditional (Ǭ) seems somewhat problematic for our proposal.
In the ërst place, the antecedent verb phrase ‘had not written Hamlet ’ does not
obviously contain any verbs in the subjunctive mood: the verb phrase consists of
the preterite form of an auxiliary verb, ‘had’, and the past participle form of a verb,
‘written’, which together yield the indicative pluperfect (or past perfect) tense of the
verb ‘to write’.
In the second place, the consequent consists of a verb phrase of the familiar
ǭFor an extensive overview and analysis of grammatical moods, see Palmer (ǬǪǪǫ).
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modal verb ‘would’ and a further embedded verb phrase ‘have’. Let us note ërst that
there is nothing that syntactically indicates ‘would’ is in the subjunctive mood, as
we may eﬀortlessly construct indicative sentences which involve ‘would’ as a modal
verb. Recall that ‘would’ is the magical word used in epic storytelling to give our
listeners a strategic glimpse into our story’s unravelled future: ‘little did he suspect
that one day they would meet again’. Furthermore, the embedded verb phrase
consists of the auxiliary verb ‘have’ which is in fact an ellipsis for ‘have written
Hamlet ’. Together, ‘have’ and the past participle ‘written’ merely yield the indicative
present perfect tense of the verb ‘to write’.
So far the diﬀerence between (ǫ) and (Ǭ) merely seems determined by tenses
and modal verbs alone, there is nothing which obviously indicates the subjunctive
mood at play. erefore, according to the proposal, we cannot really claim that (Ǭ)
is a subjunctive conditional. at must be bad news for our grammatical mood
proposal.
Worse yet, the subjunctive mood is embarrassingly poor in English.Ǯ Not only
is the subjunctive mood notoriously uncommon in the English language, it also
seems to be growing ever more so every day. In fact, syntactically, the subjunctive
mood is only distinguishable from the indicative in the third person singular present
tense form of regular verbs, where the indicative ‘-s’ inìection is absent, and for
the verb ‘to be’, where its present tense subjunctive form, irrespective of person
or number, is ‘be’ and its preterite tense subjunctive form, again irrespective of
person or number, is ‘were’ (which is indistinguishable from its indicative preterite
plural form). However, those forms are rare in colloquial English. Although still
around, their use tends at best to convey a formal tone which might even strike
one as somewhat pretentious. Nowadays, we usually only encounter them in ëxed
expressions such as ‘be that as it may’, ‘as it were’, ‘God help you’ and the like, and
in certain conditionals involving either third person singular subjects or appropriate
number and person inìections of the verb ‘to be’.
Needless to say, despite all this, nothing is lost in expressive power: English is
ǮOn the subjunctive in English, see Palmer (ǬǪǪǫ, pp. ǬǪǪ–ǬǪǫ).
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just as expressive as other languages rich with the subjunctive mood. What those
languages achieve with the subjunctive mood, English does with an intricate system
of modal verbs. Importantly, however, the fact remains: there is not very much of
the subjunctive mood—as mood is traditionally understood—in English. In other
words, although English has traces of a subjunctive mood, it seems to be by far too
uncommon to ground a semantic distinction for conditionals as pervasive as the
indicative/subjunctive distinction. Our grammatical mood proposal is therefore
not very useful to us in understanding the indicative/subjunctive distinction.
Yet, although we might agree that the subjunctive mood of English is poor, we
may still persist in our position. Indeed, we might claim that although we can-
not distinguish between indicative mood and subjunctive mood forms of English
verbs, the subjunctive mood is still there, as it were, hidden from our sights. So,
even though verb forms of English do not determine which mood is at play, we can
discern their mood once we consider the contexts in which they occur. Further-
more, we might claim, once we translate English sentences into a language which
is suﬃciently rich in verb mood distinctions, the actual moods of the verbs will ap-
pear. Presumably then, indicative conditionals might turn out to be indicative and
subjunctive conditionals as subjunctive. Let this therefore be our next proposal:
e Fortiíed Grammatical Mood Proposal
A natural language conditional is subjunctive only if at least one of
its verbs is in the subjunctive mood when translated into a language
rich enough in verb mood distinctions, otherwise the conditional is
indicative.
ere are a number of languages which have suﬃciently elaborate grammatical
mood distinctions. While Ancient Greek and Latin are classic examples, Arabic,
Hungarian, Italian, German and Icelandic are examples of modern languages with
well established and widely used subjunctive mood. To test out our present pro-
posal, let us see where the translation of (Ǭ) into Icelandic leads us:ǯ
ǯOn the syntax of Icelandic, see ráinsson (ǬǪǪǱ).
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(ǭ) Ef Shakespeare hefði ekki skrifað Hamlet, þá hefði einhver annar gert það.ǰ
(Admittedly, we may also translate the conditional into Icelandic by placing the
modal verb ‘myndi’ in the consequent, much like we do with ‘would’ in its En-
glish counterpart.Ǳ However, since the subjunctive mood is commonly used in
the Icelandic language, such a conditional would look slightly contrived and stilted
although perfectly understandable.) Importantly, the auxiliary verb ‘hefði’ in the
antecedent and consequent of (ǭ) is the preterite subjunctive form of the verb ‘að
hafa’ (‘að ’ is the inënitive marker in Icelandic) which plays a role in Icelandic akin
to the verb ‘to have’ in English. us, according to the fortiëed proposal, (Ǭ) does
seem to be a subjunctive conditional after all. at must be good news for our
fortiëed grammatical mood proposal.
However, let us not forget the fact that grammar is an empirical science: when
we are still bewildered by the grammar of one language, why introduce a whole
set of empirical problems presented by another language? Not to mention all the
imponderables relating to a faithful translation from the one language into another.
In fact, this whole approach, which sometimes has been know as the ‘Latin Prose
eory’, has been objected to by grammarians for centuries: we simply cannot im-
pose a grammatical doctrine of one language upon our grammatical speculations
about another language without making some fairly substantial assumptions.ǲ So,
although we may ënd languages into which conditionals such as (Ǭ) translate as
conditionals involving verbs in their subjunctive mood form, that is too dubious
a ground for distinction of conditionals in another language. For that reason, we
must reject the fortiëed grammatical mood proposal too.ǳ
Although both of our grammatical mood proposals turned out badly, there still
ǰ Ef Shakespeare hefði ekki skrifað Hamlet,
If Shakespeare have-ǭSG+PST+SUBJ not write-PP Hamlet,
þá hefði einhver annar gert það.
then have-ǭSG+PST+SUBJ someone else do-PP it.
‘If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then someone else would have.’
Ǳ‘Ef Shakespeare hefði ekki skrifað Hamlet, þá myndi einhver annar hafa gert það.’
ǲSee in particular Dudman (ǫǳǲǲ, p. ǫǫǳ).
ǳe rejection of our so-called grammatical mood proposal was pressed extensively by Dudman
(ǫǳǲǲ, ǫǳǲǳ, ǫǳǳǪ, ǫǳǳǫa, ǫǳǳǮa, ǫǳǳǮb); see also Lycan (ǬǪǪǫ, xǱ) and Priest (ǬǪǪǳ).
č.Č Discerning the Distinction ĘĖ
remains wiggle room for anyone inclined tomaintain that the indicative/subjunctive
distinction is grammatically determined. Recall that we said before that English uses
modal verbs such as ‘would’ to achieve what other languages do with the subjunctive
mood. In particular, certain modal constructions in English are widely recognised
as so-called conditional mood constructions (despite being more than mere verbal
inìection) which express a consequent of a hypothetical situation or event. For that
reason, we might argue that the subjunctive mood is more than a mere matter of
appropriate verb conjugations in English. e subjunctive mood, arguably, is also
a matter of certain complex verb constructions involving the appropriate auxiliary
modal verbs. If so, we could claim that conditionals which contain ‘would’ are
subjunctive:
e Extended Mood Proposal
A English natural language conditional is subjunctive only if it has the
word ‘would’ in its consequent, otherwise the conditional is indicative.
According to this proposal, (Ǭ) is clearly a subjunctive conditional, while (ǫ) is an
indicative conditional. So far, so good.
Is that enough? No, unfortunately not. As most non-native English speak-
ers come to know painfully, ‘would’ is indeed a tricky little word. e word is an
extremely delicate modal verb of various roles: ‘would’ may, for instance, appear
as the preterite of the modal ‘will’, it may be used in the aforementioned condi-
tional mood sense and it may be used in the present tense to express a desire or
inclination, to express a polite request or to express conjecture, opinion or hope.
Furthermore, ‘would’ may also appear as a transitive verb which takes a comple-
mentiser phrase (CP) as its object and expresses a wish or regret. Needless to say,
we may, easily enough, come up with conditionals in which ‘would’ appears as a
transitive (non-modal) verb. For instance, Victorians, who were all a little bit mad
about Shakespeare’s persona and work, might reasonably have asserted the follow-
ing conditional which shares the syntactic features of our paradigm indicative yet
contains ‘would’ in its consequent:
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(Ǯ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, would that someone else had.
Intuitively, this conditional seems to express a wish that someone had writtenHam-
let even if Shakespeare did not.
Now, if anything, this is cheating. We can make the extended mood proposal
invulnerable to alleged counterexamples of this sort merely by restricting the pro-
posal to modal verb uses of ‘would’:
e First Fortiíed Extended Mood Proposal
A English natural language conditional is subjunctive only if it has
the word ‘would’ as a modal verb in in its consequent, otherwise the
conditional is indicative.
However, that alone will not suﬃce for the simple reason that there are far more
modal verbs in English than ‘would’ alone. What about, say, ‘will’, ’must’, ‘shall’,
‘should’, ‘may’, ‘might’, ‘can’ and ‘could’? What are we to say about condition-
als having any of these modal verbs in its antecedent? For instance, consider the
following conditional:
(ǯ) If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then someone else could have.
Interestingly enough, although this conditional bears family resemblance to our
paradigm subjunctive conditional, the truth conditions of this conditional do ob-
viously neither agree with those of (ǫ) nor (Ǭ).
is might be obvious but recall that (ǫ) is true only on the condition that
Hamlet was indeed written. However, (ǯ) may be true even in the case that Hamlet
was never written, just as long as there was someone apart from Shakespeare who
could have written it. Again, a vast plethora of stories will provide the case needed
but here is one: suppose that Shakespeare died brieìy after only outlining no more
than vague sketches ofHamlet and although no one ever attempted to write the play
from Shakespeare’s vague sketches, John Fletcher could easily have done so—he had
enough information about Shakespeare’s intentions with the play, he had the skill,
he had the right social and historical background and whatnot—if only he could
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have been bothered. Anyway, in that case, (ǫ) is false while (ǯ) true. erefore, as
we knew from the very beginning, (ǫ) and (ǯ) disagree in truth conditions.
Neither do (Ǭ) and (ǯ) agree in truth conditions. Recall that (Ǭ) is true only
on the condition thatHamlet must—for some reason or other—have been written,
and if not by Shakespeare, then by someone else. Still staying within the same
scenario: although Fletcher alone could have writtenHamlet instead of Shakespeare,
Fletcher’s authorship was far from inevitable. us, while (Ǭ) is false, (ǯ) is true.
erefore, as we knew too, (Ǭ) and (ǯ) disagree in truth conditions.
Were we thus to pursue our fortiëed extended mood, we would be in a peculiar
bind: the indicative/subjunctive dichotomy that we started out with seems oddly
inadequate. Indeed, now there seems to be a matter of trichotomy between condi-
tionals such as (ǫ), (Ǭ) and (ǯ). Moreover, we will most deënitely muddle things
further merely by considering the other modal verbs. For that reason, we might
want to conclude that the extended mood approach to the indicative/subjunctive
distinction is doomed to failure.
Nonetheless, we might persist and claim that not only ‘would’ but also ‘could’
and perhaps ‘should’ and ‘might’ are subjunctive markers in English. In fact, we
might argue somewhere along the lines that ‘would’ is the subjunctive form of ‘will’,
‘could’ of ‘can’, ‘should’ of ‘shall’ and ‘might’ of ‘may’. Our proposal would then be
roughly as follows:
e Second Fortiíed Extended Mood Proposal
A English natural language conditional is subjunctive only if it has
the word ‘would’, ‘could’, ‘should’ or ‘might’ as a modal verb in in its
consequent, otherwise the conditional is indicative.
Against that claim, we could point out that ‘would’, ‘could’, ‘should’ and ‘might’
are still also the preterite forms of the modal verbs ‘will’, ‘can’, ‘shall’ and ‘may’.
us, for instance, we can imagine that the writing of Hamlet was commissioned
by some mysterious and secret brotherhood. Ignoring fundamental issues regarding
the identity of works of art, let us assume that the members of our mysterious broth-
erhood argue over whom to hire for the job: several members believe that Shake-
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speare is the only man ët for the job, while others believe that Francis Beaumont
might be equally able enough. us, we may imagine that while certain members
of the secret brotherhood would object, the rest would claim that:
(ǰ) If Shakespeare does not write Hamlet, someone else can.
We must admit that there is nothing intuitively subjunctive about this condi-
tional. Moreover, we could in fact point out that there seems to be at least two
distinct readings of (ǰ): ërst, it is epistemically possible that if Shakespeare does not
write Hamlet, someone else will, and second, it is metaphysically possible that if
Shakespeare does not write Hamlet, someone else will. Interestingly, the two read-
ings demand diﬀerent truth conditions for (ǰ) since epistemic and metaphysical
modalities need not coincide. Some metaphysically impossible propositions may
be true for all we know and some metaphysically possible propositions are incom-
patible with all we know. Even more interestingly, we seem to have found semantic
distinction which is not reìected in surface syntax. We might therefore suspect that
any attempt to understand the indicative/subjunctive distinction based on gram-
matical features is doomed.
But let us not get ahead of ourselves for we still have not entirely done away
with the extended mood proposal. Suppose we take the ërst reading of (ǰ) to be
indicative and suppose that the members of our secret brotherhood were in fact
disputing about epistemic possibility rather thanmetaphysical. In that case, it seems
plausible that some brotherhood member, while compiling his memoirs decades
later, might recall a particular dispute whose subject was whether or not:
(Ǳ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then someone else could have.
If we agree that this conditional is indicative, the extended mood proposal seems
refuted. If we do not agree, we must explain how a mere tense shift of an indicative
conditional may result in a subjunctive conditional. And if we never agreed in the
ërst place that our reading of (ǰ) was particularly indicative, we are again left with
two semantically distinct subjunctive readings—one somewhat epistemic, the other
somewhat metaphysical—of (ǰ) which still require an account.
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On those grounds, we should also abandon our extended mood proposals. We
must conclude that semantic distinction we are after is not grounded in the gram-
matical indicative/subjunctive distinction. at is not to deny that the distinction is
somehow grounded in syntax, only that the moods are not solely responsible. How-
ever, let us for the time being turn our back on the syntactic features of conditionals
and look for grounds in the semantic features of their constituents.
č.Č.Č Second Proposal: Counterfactuality
All of our grammatical mood proposals have turned out to be unsuitable. Of course,
that does not undermine the indicative/subjunctive distinction, it merely shows us
that the labels ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’ were ill-chosen.ǫǪ Moving on, where do
we go next? In the conditionals literature, it often seems as if the terms ‘subjunctive
conditional’ and ‘counterfactual’ are used synonymously. Let us therefore make this
our next proposal:ǫǫ
e Strong Counterfactual Proposal
A natural language conditional is subjunctive only if it is counterfac-
tual, otherwise the conditional is indicative.
So, what is a counterfactual conditional? We will take a counterfactual condi-
tional to be a conditional whose antecedent is false.ǫǬ A true counterfactual condi-
tional is therefore one which expresses a real conditional relationship of some sort
between the antecedent and consequent, such that if the antecedent were to be true,
the consequent would also be true for some reason or another. More carefully put,
what all counterfactuals allegedly have in common is that they express a conditional
relationship of some sort between two propositions, ' and , in a particular order,
where ' is false for one reason or another, and if the counterfactual is true,  would
be true on the condition that ' is true.
ǫǪFor similar sentiments, see also Chisholm (ǫǳǮǰ), Ayers (ǫǳǰǯ), Bennett (ǫǳǲǲ, ǬǪǪǭ) and
Edgington (ǫǳǳǯ, xǫ).
ǫǫSee, for instance, Lakoﬀ (ǫǳǱǪ), Stalnaker (ǫǳǱǯ/ǫǳǳǳ) and von Wright (ǫǳǯǱ).
ǫǬSee, for instance, Stalnaker (ǫǳǱǯ/ǫǳǳǳ, p. ǰǲ).
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As we might imagine there are numerous diﬀerent ways in which antecedents
can be false. In some cases, ' may be false by necessity of some sort or another:
' may express a violation of a natural law or even a metaphysical law and ' may
be a mathematical impossibility or even a logical contradiction. In other cases, '
might simply be a contingent statement yet false. Among counterfactuals we may
therefore distinguish between, for instance, counterlegal, counterpossible, counter-
mathematical, counterlogical and everyday counterfactual conditionals.ǫǭ
Upon this construal of counterfactuals, our strong counterfactual proposal seems
quite absurd: the class of counterfactual conditionals must extend the class of sub-
junctive conditionals. Recall our paradigm example of an indicative conditional:
assuming that Shakespeare did in fact write Hamlet, our apparently true indicative
conditional does have a false antecedent. e strong counterfactual proposal, that
subjunctive conditionals are co-extensional with counterfactuals, seems therefore to
be an absolute non-starter.
However, as proponents of the strong counter factual proposal, we might of
course bite the bullet and claim that (ǫ) is in fact a subjunctive conditional. at,
however, is not very helpful for our purposes because the riddle of why (ǫ) and (Ǭ)
diﬀer in truth conditions will still linger. Recall, the indicative/subjunctive distinc-
tion was drawn in order to give us a handle on the semantic diﬀerence between (ǫ)
and (Ǭ) and to claim that both conditional are on the subjunctive side of the line
merely leaves one anew in need of a distinction.
Faced by the failure of the strong counterfactual proposal, we might make a
weaker proposal somewhere along the following lines:
eWeak Counterfactual Proposal
A natural language conditional is subjunctive only if it is counterfac-
tual.
Our strong counterfactual proposal claimed that subjunctive conditionals, all and
alone, are counterfactual conditionals. Our present proposal, however, merely claims
ǫǭSee, for instances, Mares (ǬǪǪǮ, xǲ).
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that subjunctive conditionals, although not necessarily only, are counterfactual con-
ditionals. Our ërst proposal was therefore a claim of co-extensionality while our
present proposal is a mere claim of inclusion.
First of all, we should notice that our weaker proposal does not promise to oﬀer
a deënition of subjunctive conditionals; if correct, it merely speciëes a necessary
condition for subjunctive conditionals. So, although we might agree with the weak
counterfactual proposal, something more still needs to be said in order to fully ex-
plicate the indicative/subjunctive distinction. However, with that proviso in place,
let us consider the merits of our weak counterfactual proposal.
Our present proposal certainly seems more reasonable than the strong counter-
factual proposal. For one thing, our paradigm example of a subjunctive conditional
supports the claim. However, we would be far too hasty to induce the validity of
our weak proposal from that alone.
In order to reject the weak proposal, it seems at ërst blush that we must merely
ënd a subjunctive conditional whose antecedent is true. Well, that seems to be
fairly easy: on the supposition that Francis Bacon actually wroteHamlet, (Ǭ) would
either be a subjunctive conditional with a true antecedent or else mysteriously meta-
morphose into an indicative conditional. Since the second option merely leaves us
anew in need of semantic distinction, we might conclude that we have discovered
a counterexample to our weak counterfactual proposal. Clearly, however, there has
to be more to the proposal than that—the proponent of the weak counterfactual
proposal must have something more subtle in mind. Something, say, along the
lines that were one to maintain a subjunctive conditional and also its antecedent,
one would contradict oneself. Or perhaps, if one does not contradict oneself, then,
at least, one does something otherwise inappropriate by asserting such a conditional
while believing its antecedent. In other words, insofar as we were either rational or
adhering to some relevant pragmatic maxims, we would never express subjunctive
conditionals whose antecedents we believe to be true, in which case, presumably,
all felicitously uttered subjunctive conditionals would be counterfactual.
Along those lines, we may thus distinguish between two strands of the weaker
counterfactual proposal. First, that p'  q entails the truth of p:'q and thus
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to maintain p'  q and ' would be to contradict oneself. Let us call this the
semantic proposal. Second, that p'  q implies a belief in p:'q and thus to
assert p'  qwithout believing that p:'qwould be improper and misleading.
Let us call this the pragmatic proposal.
On the one hand, in order to reject the semantic proposal, we need a true sub-
junctive conditional whose antecedent is true. On the other hand, in order to reject
the pragmatic proposal, we need a situation in which we might assert a subjunctive
conditional felicitously without a belief in the antecedent’s negation. Let us begin
by considering the semantic strand of the weak counterfactual proposal.
Although the view that subjunctive conditionals must have a false antecedent is
widespread, there have been good counterexamples around for a long time.ǫǮ Here
is one. Suppose that, in the late sixteenth century, we run into a young son of a
glover and alderman by the nameWilliam Shakespeare who tells us about his grand
aspirations to establish a career as a playwright. Being a gentleman given to talk, he
also tells us of a couple of his ideas for plays and of several lines that he has been
working on recently. In particular, he tells us proudly about the following sentence:
‘ere is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.’ Being somewhat
bourgeois, only decades later do we come to learn that this young lad did in fact
succeed in making a career for himself as a playwright and that one of his most
famous pieces at the time is a tragedy calledMacbeth. (In other words, our relevant
(true) beliefs are that ‘Shakespeare wrote a number of plays’, ‘Shakespeare wrote
Macbeth’ and ‘Shakespeare incorporated “ere is nothing either good or bad, but
thinking makes it so.” into one of his plays’.) Remembering well what transpired
years before, we are completely justiëed in claiming the following true subjunctive
conditional:
(ǲ) If Shakespeare had not incorporated ‘ere is nothing either good or bad,
but thinking makes it so’ into Macbeth, he would have done so elsewhere.
ǫǮAnderson (ǫǳǯǫ); see also discussion in Chisholm (ǫǳǮǰ) and Ayers (ǫǳǰǯ). Notice however
that there are certain subjunctive conditionals which are, as it were, automatically counterfactual:
so-called ‘mismatched past counterfactuals’ and ‘verb-ërst counterfactuals’ are arguably subjunctive
and invariably counterfactual; see Iatridou and Embick (ǫǳǳǭ) and Ippolito (ǬǪǪǭ).
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We might even be bothered to discover that Shakespeare did not, in fact, use the
line in Macbeth, in which case we will happily detach the consequent and admit
that he must have found another place for it. Needless to say, countless examples
of this sort can be generated easily if there is merely an appropriate amount of
ignorance involved. e semantic strand of our current proposal thus seems refuted:
p'  q and ' need not contradict each other.
Furthermore, (ǲ) also seems to falsify the pragmatic strand of the weak coun-
terfactual proposal. By uttering (ǲ), a subjunctive conditional whose antecedent we
do not believe, we have certainly not done anything inappropriate. We have only
exposed our blatant ignorance, not said anything improper. Indeed, as far as we
neither have a belief in the antecedent nor its negation, we seem to be in a position
to assert conditionals such as (ǲ) quite felicitously.
In fact, expressions of uncertainty are one of the roles of the subjunctive mood
in languages of suﬃcient mood distinctions. Using the only verb of the properly
subjunctive mood form English has to oﬀer, ‘to be’, we may actually see traces of
this. Say, we might be ignorant about the extent of our library and wonder whether
a copy of Hamlet were somewhere to be found. Being given to order, we could
even claim that ‘if there were a copy ofHamlet in our collection, it would be placed
between our copies of Cymbeline and Henry IV ’. Were we then to go and have a
look, we might discover that we did in fact have a copy, in which case we would
certainly not be inclined to retract our earlier claim.
It seems therefore that neither strand of the weaker counterfactual proposal
passes closer scrutiny. However, as proponents of this proposal, we might strike
back and claim that (ǲ) is not a subjunctive conditional at all but merely a cleverly
disguised indicative conditional. Apart from being somewhat ad hoc, a reply of that
ilk faces two problems.
First, we may cast (ǲ) in indicative terms akin to (ǫ), ‘if Shakespeare did not
incorporate “ere is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so” into
Macbeth, he did so elsewhere’, whose truth conditions will be diﬀerent from those
of (ǲ): we may correctly recall reading ‘ere is nothing either good or bad, but
thinking makes it so’ in some Shakespearean play without it being necessary that
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Shakespeare wrote the line, in which case (ǲ) is false. Yet ‘if Shakespeare did not
incorporate “ere is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so” into
Macbeth, he did so elsewhere’ is true. us, were we to claim that (ǲ) is indica-
tive, we merely end up with two sorts of indicative conditionals whose semantic
diﬀerence we must explain all over again.
Second, wemust explain why two conditionals of the same grammatical proper-
ties, such as (Ǭ) and (ǲ), fall within diﬀerent semantic categories. Insofar as semantic
properties are supposed to supervene on syntactic or grammatical properties, claim-
ing that (ǲ) is indicative seems inappropriate.
Admittedly, the second objection is not an impossible bullet to bite. However,
the ërst objection seems quite devastating. We must therefore conclude that the
counterfactual proposals will not help us to understand the indicative/subjunctive
distinction. e time has come again to look elsewhere.
č.Č.č ird Proposal: Epistemic& Metaphysical Necessities
Upon a brief reìection on (ǫ) and (Ǭ), we might soon come to the conclusion that
that while (ǫ) has an epistemic ìavour of a certain sort, (Ǭ) has more of a meta-
physical nature. Indeed, the truth value of (ǫ) intuitively seems to depend on its
antecedent together with what we know. Conversely, the truth value of (Ǭ) in-
tuitively seems to depend on its antecedent together with certain facts about the
world. It need not therefore surprise us that the indicative/subjunctive distinction
has sometimes been taken to be closely related to an epistemic/metaphysical distinc-
tion of some sort or another.ǫǯ According to that story, the indicative/subjunctive
distinction is supposed to parallel the one of epistemic and metaphysical necessity
in some interesting sense. Let us therefore make this our next proposal:
e Epistemic and Metaphysical Necessity Proposal
A natural language conditional is subjunctive only if it makes claims
ǫǯSee, for instance, Chalmers (ǫǳǳǲ), von Fintel (ǫǳǳǲa), Lowe (ǫǳǳǫ), Kratzer (ǫǳǲǰ), Nolan
(ǬǪǪǭ), Stalnaker (ǫǳǱǯ/ǫǳǳǳ) and Weatherson (ǬǪǪǫ); see also Adams (ǫǳǱǯ) and Edgington
(ǫǳǳǯ, ǫǳǳǯ) Gibbard (ǫǳǲǫ).
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of metaphysical necessity, and indicative only if it makes claims of
epistemic necessity.
According to this proposal, an indicative conditional is a claim of epistemic ne-
cessity in the following sense: were we to add the conditional’s antecedent to our
present stock of knowledge and then maintain consistency appropriately, the con-
sequent would turn out to be true. is understanding of indicative conditionals,
which has become known as the Ramsey Test, is traditionally traced back to the
following oft quoted passage:
If two people are arguing ‘If p, will q?’ and are both in doubt as to
p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and
arguing on that basis that q . . . ǫǰ
Along those lines, an indicative conditional would be true only if its conse-
quent were to turn out as true once we have added its antecedent to our stock of
knowledge and and presumably false only if its consequent were to turn out as false.
For instance, were we to add ‘Shakespeare did not write Hamlet ’ hypothetically to
our stock of knowledge and adjust appropriately to maintain consistency, ‘someone
else wroteHamlet ’ would turn out to be—depending on the content of our current
stock of knowledge—either true, false or neither true nor false. If ‘someone else
wrote Hamlet ’ is true in a particular stock of knowledge upon adding ‘Shakespeare
did not writeHamlet ’, (ǫ) would be true; if ‘someone else wroteHamlet ’ is true in a
particular stock of knowledge upon adding ‘Shakespeare did not write Hamlet ’, (ǫ)
would be false; and, arguably, if ‘someone else wrote Hamlet ’ is not in a particular
stock of knowledge upon adding ‘Shakespeare did not write Hamlet ’, (ǫ) would be
neither true nor false.
However, nothing of this sort is supposed to hold for subjunctive condition-
als. According to the proposal, subjunctive conditionals are said to make broadly
metaphysical claims. Subjunctive conditionals are supposed to be claims about the
world: claims about what obtains on the condition that something else does. ey
ǫǰRamsey (ǫǳǭǫ, p. ǬǮǱ).
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are not claims about what follows from adding some proposition to a stock of knowl-
edge.
According to this story, the truth conditions of subjunctive conditionals are
supposed to be such that we must consider a consistent situation as metaphysi-
cally similar—according to some standard or other—as possible to our actual sit-
uation—either past, present or future—where the antecedent is true, and then we
must ask ourselves whether the consequent is true in that situation as well. Should
the consequent thus turn out as true, the conditional is true, otherwise the condi-
tional is false or possibly neither true nor false, if we are to allow more than one
most similar situations.
Although they need not do so necessarily, semantics for subjunctive conditionals
are normally spelled out in terms of possible worlds whichmay be ordered according
to a similarity metric of some sort.ǫǱ For instance, were we to inspect the closest
world or worlds in which Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, it might be true or
false that someone else wroteHamlet in the world or worlds in question. Semantics
for subjunctive conditionals such as (Ǭ) might then, for instance, be spelled out in
the following terms: if someone else wroteHamlet in all the closest worlds in which
Shakespeare did not, (Ǭ) is true; if no one else wroteHamlet in all the closest worlds
in which Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, (Ǭ) is false; and if someone else wrote
Hamlet in some of the closest worlds in which Shakespeare did not write Hamlet
but no one did in some of the closest worlds, (Ǭ) is neither true nor false.
Taken together, an interesting picture emerges. On the one hand, indicative
conditionals are conditional expressions of epistemic necessity: given what we know
in conjunction with the antecedent of an indicative conditional, the consequent
will be true or not after an appropriate consistency maintenance. On the other
hand, subjunctive conditionals are conditional expressions of metaphysical neces-
sity: given the way the world actually is in conjunction with the antecedent of a sub-
junctive conditional, the consequent will be true or not in the worlds deemed to be
closest according to some appropriate metric. And for those reasons, the nature of
ǫǱSee, for instance, Lewis (ǫǳǱǭ), Stalnaker (ǫǳǰǲ/ǫǳǳǫ) and Weatherson (ǬǪǪǫ).
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these two sorts of conditionals should roughly parallel epistemic and metaphysical
necessity.
We must admit, this proposal is extremely charming. Not only does this pro-
posal draw a neat distinction among our natural language conditionals. More im-
portantly, this proposal draws the line in terms which are philosophically funda-
mental. However, before we get ahead of ourselves, we must ask whether there
is any reason for us to suspect that our natural languages respect a distinction as
conceptually elemental. To be sure, that would certainly not be impossible but
nonetheless quite remarkable. Although natural languages do often reìect crucial
insights, they often seem quite arbitrary and erratic in their conceptual framework.
Verb tenses in natural languages, for instance, reìect a rather naïve conception of
time and noun genders often miss the mark altogether of their biological counter-
parts. So, why should conditionals in natural languages do any better at carving
reality at its joints?
Indeed, at ërst blush, there seems to be certain conditional sentences which
falsify the claim outright. Merely consider the following conditional:ǫǲ
(ǳ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, we will never know about it.
Come up with whichever story you like and as long as there is an element of suﬃ-
cient deceit involved, the conditional will be intuitively true. So, we might ask, is
(ǳ) an indicative conditional? Well, (ǳ) shares its syntactical properties with (ǫ), our
paradigm indicative conditional.ǫǳ However, if we treat (ǳ) as an indicative condi-
tional subject to the Ramsey Test, it seems as if it will inevitably come out as false:
adding the proposition ‘Shakespeare did not write Hamlet ’ hypothetically to our
stock of knowledge will certainly make the consequent false. Indeed, just having
added the proposition to our stock of knowledge, how could we possibly not know?
ǫǲConditionals of this sort are commonly attributed to Richmond omason, see van Fraassen
(ǫǳǲǪ).
ǫǳWell, that is not entirely true, the antecedent and consequent of (ǫ) agree in tenses as both are in
the preterite. We may as well recast (ǳ) as ‘If Hamlet is not by Shakespeare, we do not know about it’
to maintain that agreement. Whether conditionals such as (ǳ) are indicative has—of course—been
debated, see Bennett (ǫǳǲǲ, ǫǳǳǯ), Dudman (ǫǳǲǯa, ǫǳǳǫb, ǫǳǳǬ, ǬǪǪǪ), Gibbard (ǫǳǲǫ), Jackson
(ǫǳǳǪ, ǫǳǳǫ) and Lowe (ǫǳǳǫ).
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Wemight of course object to (ǳ) and claim that indicative conditionals claiming
our ignorance of their antecedents in their consequence are dubious. However, a
claim like that is no less dubious: we understand very well what someone means
by uttering a conditional such as (ǳ). We even have an intuitive grasp of the truth
conditions of such conditionals.
A more promising strategy, however, would be to argue that when we add
‘Shakespeare did not write Hamlet ’ hypothetically to our stock of knowledge, we
are wrong to consider merely whether or not we end up with that proposition in our
stock of knowledge. Rather, we should consider whether or not the consequent is
in our updated stock of knowledge: only if the proposition ‘we will never know that
Shakespeare did not write Hamlet ’ were in our updated stock of knowledge, would
(ǳ) be true. Slightly more carefully put, when we evaluate a conditional of the form
p' ! :Ks'q, we must ask ourselves whether :Ks' is in our updated stock of
knowledge; we must ask whether we would then know :Ks' and not merely '.
And insofar as' and:Ks' could consistently constitute the stock of knowledge in
question—which intuitively seems to be the case—the conditional would be true.
Another strategy would be to claim that (ǳ) is in fact a subjunctive conditional.
According to our present proposal, (ǳ) would then be an expression of metaphysical
necessity of a certain sort and thus true as far as there is some such necessity at play.
e closest possible worlds in which Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, might be
such that there has been a widespread, hitherto and eternally successful conspiracy
on behalf of Danish authorities to attribute the play of their tragic prince to Eng-
land’s greatest playwright. In those worlds, our ignorance of that fact may very well
be inevitable and in which case (ǳ) would be true. Conversely, there might have
been no such conspiracy in the closest worlds, in which case (ǳ) would be false. And
ënally, only some closest worlds might be such that our ignorance is inevitable, in
which case (ǳ) would be neither true nor false. All of this does seem to ët well with
our intuitions about (ǳ).
Notice that our present proposal makes no assumption to the eﬀect that seman-
tic features of natural language conditionals must supervene in some way upon their
syntactic properties. So, although (ǳ) seems syntactically more similar to (ǫ) than
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(Ǭ), we may still claim that (ǳ) is subjunctive since that conditional seems to make
a metaphysical claim rather than an epistemic one. We cannot therefore object to
our current proposal on the grounds that (ǳ) ‘looks’ indicative while really being
subjunctive. According to the proposal, although there may be some correlation,
the syntactic features of conditionals do not determine their semantic features.
Either way, whether we treat (ǳ) as an indicative or subjunctive conditional,
our epistemic and metaphysical necessity proposal seems unharmed. How then,
if at all, are we supposed to reject the proposal? On the assumption that the in-
dicative/subjunctive distinction is supposed to be mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive, there seems to be room for objection. Insofar as we may ënd condi-
tionals which seem to make both epistemic and metaphysical claims or neither, we
might be onto something.
On the one hand, the following and vaguely familiar conditional does seem to
allow for both epistemic and metaphysical reading:
(ǫǪ) If Shakespeare and Cervantes were compatriots, they would both have been
English.
On the epistemic reading, this conditional would be understood as a claim to the
eﬀect that were we to add its antecedent to our stock of knowledge, its consequent
would be true. Supposing that our stock of knowledge is such that we know that
Shakespeare was English, while having no information whatsoever on Cervantes’
nationality, (ǫǪ) would come out as true. On the metaphysical reading, however,
(ǫǪ) would be understood as a claim to the eﬀect that were we to examine all closest
worlds in which Shakespeare and Cervantes were compatriots, we would discover
that Shakespeare and Cervantes are English in those worlds. Supposing that there
was some metaphysical necessity such that this was the case, the conditional would
be true. However, of course, it seems more reasonable that only in some but not all
the nearest worlds Shakespeare and Cervantes were English, in which case the con-
ditional would be neither true nor false.ǬǪ Importantly, since (ǫǪ) seems to support
ǬǪSee Lewis (ǫǳǱǭ, p. ǲǪ).
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both epistemic and metaphysical readings, (ǫǪ) is both indicative and subjunctive
according to our current proposal.
On the other hand, the following conditional seems to allow for a reading which
is neither epistemic nor metaphysical:
(ǫǫ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, the real author should be rightfully
acknowledged.
On the most natural reading of this conditional, we are making a deontic claim of
some sort: whoever wrote Hamlet ought to be rightfully acknowledged. It would
be a mistake to understand (ǫǫ) as an epistemic or metaphysical claim. We are
certainly not claiming that were we to add ‘Shakespeare did not write Hamlet ’ to
our stock of knowledge, ‘Hamlet’s real author should be rightfully acknowledged’
would appear after some appropriate consistency maintenance. Moreover, we are
not claiming that in all the closest worlds in which Shakespeare did not writeHam-
let, Hamlet’s author should be rightfully acknowledged; for all we know, the closest
worlds might be such that no one wrote Hamlet. Importantly, since (ǫǫ) seems to
support neither epistemic nor metaphysical readings, (ǫǫ) is neither indicative nor
subjunctive according to our current proposal.
In other words, if we were to accept our current proposal, the indicative/subjunc-
tive distinction would be neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive. at is
certainly not to say that there are not classes of natural language conditionals which
deserve epistemic and metaphysical semantics respectively. In fact, we seem to have
ample evidence already to support that claim. However, if we were to pursue our
current proposal, we would be in a peculiar bind: the indicative/subjunctive distinc-
tion seems to inadequate for our subject matter. If we want to give an appropriate
account of natural language conditionals, the categories of ‘indicative’ and ‘sub-
junctive’ as understood in terms of epistemic and metaphysical necessity are simply
not suﬃcient.
Sheepishly, we might have to admit now that we have all but run out of ideas
as to where to draw the indicative/subjunctive line. At any rate, we have consid-
ered numerous variations of the most commonplace proposals and found them all
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inadequate on diﬀerent accounts. In order to understand the distinction, we might
therefore conclude that we are in need of a new account altogether. However, be-
fore we venture on such a project, we should take some time to understand why it
is not an option to discard the distinction.
č.č Interlude: Discarding the Distinction
Although we have assumed so far that there is a distinction to be drawn between
diﬀerent classes of natural language conditionals, we might of course attempt to
abandon that assumption.Ǭǫ Needless to say, that will leave us in dire need of an
explanation that does away with the semantic diﬀerence between conditional pairs
such as (ǫ) and (Ǭ). However, having failed so far to ënd the grounds for the indica-
tive/subjunctive distinction, such project might seem like the most viable option.
Let us therefore make this our next proposal:
e No-Distinction Proposal
All natural language conditionals are of the same semantic kind.
Before we consider this proposal, a word of caution is in place: we must be
careful not to forget that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) do quite clearly diﬀer in their truth conditions.
at said, let us now reconsider our paradigms of indicative and subjunctive con-
ditionals again and discover that a good deal more is going on at the grammatical
level in those conditionals than we ërst assumed.
Until now, we have taken our paradigm indicative and subjunctive condition-
als, (ǫ) and (Ǭ), as nothing more than two sentences made up of the same two
constituent sentences ìanking two diﬀerent connectives. Indeed, we have assumed
that there are two constituent sentences, p and q, roughly ‘Shakespeare did not
write Hamlet ’ and ‘someone else (than Shakespeare) wrote Hamlet ’, merely con-
nected by two diﬀerent logical connectives of some sort or another: namely an
ǬǫSee in particular Priest (ǬǪǪǳ) and Schaﬀer (ms.a); see also Jackson (ǬǪǪǳ).
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indicative conditional connective, that is traditionally represented by ‘!’, and a
subjunctive conditional connective, that is traditionally represented by ‘’. Most
importantly, we have taken (ǫ) and (Ǭ) as involving the same two sentences and
therefore assumed that the diﬀerence in meaning between them must lie in their
connectives. In other words, since pp! qq and pp  qq diﬀer in meaning, the
diﬀerence must somehow be accounted for in terms of their connectives.
Are things really so simple? Well, considering their grammatical diﬀerences,
there seems to be a reason to suspect that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) do not share antecedents and
consequents. In particular, the diﬀerences in verb tenses and modal verbs might be
taken as an evidence. Interestingly, if (ǫ) and (Ǭ) do not share their constituents, we
might be able to claim that the semantic diﬀerence is a mere product of the diﬀerent
constituents and not their connectives. Let us therefore have a closer look at our
paradigms in turn.
What we take to be a paradigm of indicative conditional (ǫ) is a conditional
sentence whose antecedent is a subject-predicate-object subordinate clause having
the auxiliary verb ‘to do’ in its preterite tense, ‘did’, followed by a negation and a
verb in the inënitive, ‘write’. e auxiliary verb in the antecedent is merely there to
support the negation; if we would drop the negation, the sentence would simply be-
come ‘Shakespeare wroteHamlet ’. On the other hand, the sentence’s consequence is
a subject-predicate clause whose predicate is merely an auxiliary verb in the preterite
tense, ‘did’, which is an elliptical verb phrase for the inënitive verb and the object of
the subordinate clause: ‘someone else did writeHamlet ’. Notice that in this case we
can, of course, do without the auxiliary verb as long as we shift the tense of ‘write’
to its preterite form, ‘wrote’: ‘someone else wrote Hamlet ’.
ere is nothing very complex at play at the grammatical level of this con-
ditional. e mood of the verbs in both clauses is the indicative. e tense of the
auxiliary verbs in both clauses is the preterite, which is the most primitive past tense
English has on oﬀer, yielding a preterite tense of both predicates. Moreover, there
are no modal verbs involved which might otherwise muddle things. Perhaps inter-
estingly, both clauses can stand on their own: ‘Shakespeare did not write Hamlet ’
and ‘someone else did write Hamlet ’ are both grammatical sentences in isolation.
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On the other hand, our paradigm of subjunctive conditional is more complex.
e antecedent is again a subject-predicate-object subordinate clause containing
the past participle form of its main verb, ‘written’, which together with its familiar
auxiliary ‘had’ yields the pluperfect (or past perfect) tense. In this sentence, notice
that the auxiliary verb does far more than support the negation: the auxiliary verb
helps to make up the tense of the predicate. On the other hand, the consequent is
again a subject-predicate clause whose predicate consists of the familiar modal verb
‘would’ followed by the auxiliary verb ‘have’ which is an elliptical verb phrase for
the past participle form of a verb, ‘written’, yielding the present perfect tense, and
the object of the subordinate clause: ‘someone else would have written Hamlet ’.
ere is clearly something more complex at play at the grammatical level of
this conditional. As we remarked on earlier, there is nothing that suggests anything
other than the indicative mood of the verbs involved although wemight claim, as we
proposed before, that the modal verb does contribute some sort of subjunctivity to
the clauses. Furthermore, the tenses of both clauses are complex, the subordinate
clause is in the pluperfect tense, while the main clause involves a present perfect
construction embedded within the scope of the modal verb ‘would’. Arguably,
although not very importantly, such a construction gives us the complex future-in-
past tense. Again, perhaps interestingly, both clauses seem somewhat strange on
their own: ‘Shakespeare had not written Hamlet ’ and ‘someone else would have
written Hamlet ’ strike us as a little bit funny in isolation.ǬǬ
For all those reasons, it is very tempting to suspect that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) have dif-
ferent antecedents and consequents altogether. As obviously as, say, ‘Shakespeare
wrote Hamlet in ǫǯǳǳ’, whose tense is the preterite, and ‘Shakespeare had written
Hamlet in ǫǯǳǳ’, whose tense is the pluperfect, disagree obviously in meaning, we
might claim that so do too the clauses of (ǫ) and (Ǭ). If that is the case, the seman-
tic diﬀerence between (ǫ) and (Ǭ) does not necessarily spring from their diﬀerent
connectives. Indeed, the connectives need not be diﬀerent at all, their diﬀerence in
meaning might be the product of their diﬀerent constituent sentences.
ǬǬSee Priest (ǬǪǪǳ, xǬ.ǫ).
Ěď Where to Draw the Line
ere are a number of issues here we need to address. First, it is hardly the case
that the sentences ‘Shakespeare had not written Hamlet ’ and ‘someone else would
have writtenHamlet ’ are ungrammatical or senseless in isolation outside conditional
sentences.Ǭǭ
Once we consider the grammatical properties of the antecedent and consequent,
it is fairly easy to embed those sentences in a context where their place is natural.
e ërst one has its predicate in the pluperfect tense, which we commonly use to
refer to the past of an already implied past. us, when speaking about some time
tǫ prior to the time of utterance tǪ, we may use the pluperfect tense to reach further
back to some time tǬ, such that tǬ < tǫ < tǪ, a past-in-past, as it were. erefore,
supposing I were to relate to you the history of European literature in the early
sixteenth century, I might begin along the following lines: ‘In the early sixteenth
century, the landscape of European literature was quite barren. True, some time ago,
Dante had written hisDivine Comedy and Chaucer had written hisCanterbury Tales.
However, Cervantes had not yet written the story of Don Quixote, Shakespeare had
not written Hamlet, and Pope had not written his Dunciad . . . ’.
e same goes for the consequent whose predicate is a curious matrimony of
the modal verb ‘would’ and a verb phrase in the present perfect tense. Although we
seldom ënd ourselves in situations where such expressions are called for, we may
use this structure to refer to the past of a future of an already implied past. us,
when speaking about some time tǫ prior to the time of utterance tǪ, we may use
this structure to reach back to the future tǬ and its past tǭ, such that tǫ < tǪ, tǫ
< tǬ and tǭ < tǬ, a future-in-past, as it were. erefore, suppose that the events
Hamlet relate actually took place. In his prime, Christopher Marlowe came across
the tragic anecdote about the prince of Denmark. Although the story moved him,
he decided that the tale was not ët for the stage and not worthy of further pursuit.
If I were now to relate those facts to you, I would probably cast my narrative in
the past tense. Yet, after having recounted those facts, I might conclude my little
chronicle along those lines: ‘Never did Marlowe suspect that someday someone else
ǬǭSee, again, Priest (ǬǪǪǳ, xǬ.ǫ).
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would have written Hamlet. In fact, never in doubt of his own talent, he could not
imagine that someone else would have written Hamlet to a great repute some years
later’.ǬǮ
What about properly subjunctive sentences? Say, if our antecedent had been
‘Shakespeare were not the author of Hamlet ’ or ‘Shakespeare were Marlowe’? Are
those sentences ungrammatical outside the refuge of conditional structures. Well,
they may look odd but we must submit that this only stems from the fact that the
subjunctive case is as good as lost from English. It is for that very reason that expres-
sions like ‘God bless you’, ‘be that as it may’ and ‘come what may’, although well
entrenched into the vernacular, strike us as odd once we give them a thought. Yet,
once we recall the alleged roles of the subjunctive mood, the cases seem abundant.
Recall that we use the subjunctive mood primarily to express our attitude to the
truth of the sentence uttered. erefore, suppose that I have in high stakes devoted
my lifework in some way or another around Shakespeare’s authorship of Hamlet in
which I hold a sturdy belief. Were someone to ask me of my greatest fear, it seems
only natural for me to reply: ‘at Shakespeare were not the author ofHamlet.’ Or
about some conspiracy theorist: ‘Often times he wondered whether Shakespeare
were Marlowe.’
We must therefore conclude that whatever else might be said about the dif-
ference between (ǫ) and (Ǭ), their antecedents and consequents may well appear
outside conditional constructions. e disparity is therefore no more than appar-
ent. Despite that, we are still not forced to abandon the no-distinction proposal: the
fact that the constituents of (Ǭ) can appear grammatically outside conditional con-
structions does not compromise the claim that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) do not share antecedents
and consequents. However, let us now return to a more serious objection.
e most serious objection to the no-distinction proposal comes from the way
in which natural language conditionals behave in reasoning.Ǭǯ In particular, let us
consider how (ǫ) and (Ǭ) behave in reasoning with inference rules such as Modus
ǬǮWe must of course assume too, contrary to numerous conspiracy theories, that Marlow was
not Shakespeare. For more cases, see for instance Schaﬀer (ms.a)
ǬǯI am in debt to Frank Jackson for this suggestion.
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(Ponendo) Ponens () and Modus (Tollendo) Tollens ().
Recall that  is the inference rule that tells us that from a conditional and its
antecedent we may infer its consequent. Furthermore, supposing that  is valid
for natural language conditionals, we may infer  from pif ', then q and '.Ǭǰ On
the other hand,  is the inference rule that tells us that from a conditional and the
negation of its consequent we may infer the negation of its antecedent. Moreover,
supposing that  is valid for natural language conditionals, we may infer pnot
'q from pif ', then q and pnot q.ǬǱ
Keeping that in mind, let us now consider how (ǫ) and (Ǭ) behave in reasoning.
Starting with , it appears that we do in fact use the same minor premise to get
things oﬀ the ground in both cases. Namely, the sentence ‘Shakespeare did not
writeHamlet ’ is all we need to apply  and detach ‘Someone else wroteHamlet ’.
Indeed, for (ǫ) we get:
If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then someone else did.
Shakespeare did not write Hamlet.
Someone else wrote Hamlet.
And similarly so for (Ǭ), we have:
If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then someone else would have.
Shakespeare did not write Hamlet.
Someone else wrote Hamlet.
On the other hand, now with , we need again the same minor premise to
set our inference in motion. Namely, in either case, the sentence ‘No one else wrote
Hamlet ’ is all we need to apply  and infer ‘Shakespeare wrote Hamlet ’. So, for
(ǫ) we get:
ǬǰOn the validity of  for natural language conditionals, see xǯ.
ǬǱAlthough it remains in general agreement that contraposition fails for subjunctive conditionals,
 is generally taken to be valid. See Lewis (ǫǳǱǭ, pp. ǭǯ–ǭǰ) and Adams (ǫǳǲǲ)
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If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then someone else did.
No one else wrote Hamlet.
Shakespeare wrote Hamlet.
And so in the same manner for (Ǭ), we have:
If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then someone else would have.
No one else wrote Hamlet.
Shakespeare wrote Hamlet.
What are we to make of this? Well, the obvious conclusion to draw from this
is that (ǫ) and (Ǭ) do after all—despite appearances otherwise—share the same an-
tecedent and consequent. In other words, the semantic diﬀerence between (ǫ) and
(Ǭ) does not stem from their constituent sentences because they are the same in both
cases. e diﬀerence must therefore lie elsewhere.
We have thus now seen that we cannot easily explain away the indicative/subjunc-
tive distinction: the semantic diﬀerence between (ǫ) and (Ǭ) cannot be blamed en-
tirely on their constituent clauses. We should therefore continue our search for an
adequate account of the distinction. However, before we do that, let us make several
valuable observations which will help us to formulate our ultimate account.
č.ď Several Observations
č.ď.Ċ First Observation: Grammar of Natural Language Conditionals
ose whose youth was fortunately graced with studies of English grammar might,
albeit vaguely, recall a distinction between so-called ërst, second, third and zero
conditionals.Ǭǲ is distinction has been recognised for a long time and has been
observed across diﬀerent natural languages to some extent. As those things go, this
is one of the classical grammarian account of conditionals. We should nonetheless
remain aware that there is another equally classical distinction for certain languages,
ǬǲSee for instance Swan (ǬǪǪǯ, xǬǯǰ–xǬǰǯ).
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for instance Latin, between simple conditionals, so-called more and less vivid future
conditionals and contrary-to-fact conditionals. However, since our primary interest
here is with conditionals in English, we will not get too bogged down with this
distinction. Moreover, there is also the classical distinction between so-called realis
and irrealis conditionals to consider. However, since the realis/irrealis distinction
aligns with the ërst/second/third/zero distinction, with zero and ërst conditionals
on the realis side and second and third conditionals on the irrealis side, we will not
consider the realis/irrealis distinction any further.
Before moving on, a brief remark on the nature of grammar is probably in place.
Grammar, in the sense used here, is an empirical science. Although prescriptive
grammar instructs us on how to speak and write grammatically, its data is the result
of the work of the descriptive grammarian. Indeed, although prescriptive grammar
is normative, its norms spring from the ‘best’ of our language use. e grammatical
rules of English are not arbitrary chosen in a darkly lit back room. Quite the con-
trary, the rules of grammar are an empirical hypotheses intended to describe and
explain the way we use our language in the best of times.
Of course, no one seriously denies that people do often speak and write un-
grammatically. Part of the grammarian’s predicament is to demarcate whether a
particular sentence which falls outside the prevalent theory of grammar is a case of
bad language or a counterexample to the current theory of grammar. As pressing
as that issue may be, however, we do not need to address that here. All we must
keep in mind is that any grammatical story—including the story about conditional
sentences which we are about to relate—is nothing more that a hypothesis as to how
people ideally use English and how we thus ought to speak or write. What we must
therefore keep in mind is that the rules of grammar are no more than well observed
regularities of our language which are as open to empirical refutation as any other
empirical theory.
A certain analogy with logic is perhaps emerging: insofar as logic is to model the
best of our reasoning, so are the rules of grammar to capture our ideal language use.
In this sense, both logic and grammar may be mistaken: the models they provide
may very well turn out to be inadequate for the data. A certain dissimilarity has
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presumably also emerged: although our logic and grammar might be mistaken,
correct reasoning seems more eternal than the good uses of natural language. e
logician’s target is therefore, so to speak, more static than the grammarian’s: a valid
argument remains valid (although our logic of choice may deem it as invalid), an
ungrammatical sentence, on the other hand, may well become grammatical as the
language evolves. Having said all this, let us now familiarise ourselves with the
zero/ërst/second/third conditionals account.
č.ď.Ċ.Ċ First Conditional
In addition to being an expression of conditional relation of some sort, the so-called
ërst conditional expresses, as it were, a real (subjective) possibility of its antecedent.
In other words, the utterer of ërst conditionals usually takes its antecedent to be
quite probable. According to the story, we normally use ërst conditionals to talk
about actual future conditions. For a ërst conditional, the antecedent is a clause
in the (simple) present tense and the consequent consists of a determiner phrase,
a particular modal verb and a verb phrase whose verb is of its inënitive form. We
may give the following schema of ërst conditionals:
(First Conditional) If [DPǫ] [present tense VPǫ],
then [DPǬ]
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
will
shall
can
may
must
shouldǫ
ought (to)
. . .
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
[inënitive VPǬ].
An example of a ërst-conditional sentence is the following conditional:
(ǫǬ) If you read Shakespeare’s Hamlet, then you may learn something important
about human nature.
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According to the story, this conditional tells us two things. First, the conditional
says that on the fulëlment of the condition expressed by its antecedent, that you
readHamlet, then the consequent obtains, that you may learn something important
about human nature. Second, by casting my conditional expression in those terms,
I convey that I believe there is a real possibility that you will read Hamlet. Needless
to say, much depends on our choice of a modal verb when it comes to the meaning
of the conditional. In our example, ‘may’ indicated a possibility on the condition
of the antecedent, while, say, ‘will’ expresses necessity. However, whichever modal
verb we choose, the important fact remains, this sort of conditional expresses a belief
of real possibility of its antecedent by its utterer. Interestingly, conditionals of this
ilk are expressed in the indicative mood in some languages that are rich enough of
verb moods inìections.Ǭǳ
č.ď.Ċ.Č Second Conditional
e so-called second conditional is also an expression of conditional relation which
furthermore expresses, so to speak, an unreal (subjective) possibility although not
quite impossibility of its antecedent. In other words, the utterer of second condi-
tional usually takes its antecedent to be quite improbable although not impossible.
According to the story, we use these conditionals often to talk about improbable fu-
ture conditions. For a second conditional, the antecedent is a clause in the preterite
tense and the consequent consists of a determiner phrase, a particular modal verb
and a verb phrase whose verb is of its inënitive form. We may give the following
schema of second conditionals:
ǬǳFor instance, again, in Icelandic:
Ef þú lest Hamlet Shakespeares,
If you read-ǬSG+PRS+IND Hamlet Shakespeare+GEN,
þá getur þú lært . . .
then may-ǬSG+PRS+IND you learn-PP . . .
‘If you read Shakespeare’s Hamlet, then you may learn something important about human nature.’
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(Second Conditional) If [DPǫ] [preterite VPǫ],
then [DPǬ]
8>>>><>>>>:
would
shouldǬ
could
might
9>>>>=>>>>; [inënitive VPǬ].
An example of a second-conditional sentence is the following conditional:
(ǫǭ) If I staged Hamlet, then I would appreciate the play better.
According to the story, this conditional tells us two things. First, the conditional
says that on the fulëlment of the condition expressed by its antecedent, that I stage
Hamlet, then the consequent obtains, that I would appreciate the play better. Sec-
ond, by casting my conditional expression in those terms, I convey that I believe
there is no real possibility, although not quite impossibility, that I will stage Ham-
let. As before, much depends on our choice of a modal verb when it comes to the
meaning of the conditional. However, whichever modal we choose, the important
fact remains, this sort of conditional expresses a belief of unreal possibility of its
antecedent by its utterer. Again interestingly, conditionals of this sort are expressed
in the subjunctive mood in some languages rich enough of verb moods.ǭǪ
č.ď.Ċ.č ird Conditional
e so-called third conditional is one which expresses a conditional relation of some
sort in addition with the (subjective) impossibility of its antecedent. In other words,
the utterer of third conditional usually takes its antecedent to be impossible for some
reason or another. Furthermore, according to the story, we use conditionals of this
sort frequently to talk about the counterfactual past situations. For a third condi-
tional, the antecedent is a clause in the pluperfect tense and the consequent consists
ǭǪAgain, in Icelandic:
Ef ég sviðsetti Hamlet,
If I stage-ǫSG+PST+SUBJ Hamlet,
þá mæti ég leikritið betur.
then appreciate+ǫSG+PST+SUBJ I play-DEF+DET better.
‘If I staged Hamlet, then I would appreciate the play better.’
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of a determiner phrase, a particular modal verb and a verb phrase whose verb is of
present perfect form. We may give the following schema of third conditionals:
(ird Conditional) If [DPǫ] [pluperfect VPǫ],
then [DPǬ]
8>>>><>>>>:
would
shouldǬ
could
might
9>>>>=>>>>; [present perfect VPǬ].
An example of a third-conditional sentence is our (Ǭ), ‘if Shakespeare had not
written Hamlet, then someone else would have (written Hamlet)’. According to
the third-conditional story, this conditional too tells us two things. First, the con-
ditional says is that on the impossible fulëlment of the condition expressed in the
antecedent, that Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then the consequent would
obtain, that someone else wroteHamlet. Second, by casting my conditional expres-
sion in those terms, I convey that I believe there is a no possibility whatsoever that
Shakespeare did not write Hamlet because, say, I know in fact that he did. As be-
fore, much depends on our choice of a modal verb when it comes to the meaning of
the conditional. However, whichever modal we choose, the important fact remains,
this sort of conditional expresses a belief of the impossibility of its antecedent by its
utterer. And ënally, unlike ërst conditionals but like second conditionals, condi-
tionals of this ilk are expressed in the subjunctive mood in languages rich enough
of verb moods.ǭǫ
Apart from diﬀerences in tenses, modalities and moods in some languages, the
only signiëcant diﬀerence between ërst, second and third conditionals seems to be
their utterer’s attitude towards their antecedent.ǭǬ One might therefore suspect that
the distinction is one of interest for the pragmatics of conditionals but of no impor-
tant relevance to an account of their semantics. at, however, would be too rash
ǭǫReview our gloss from xǫ.ǫ.
ǭǬAlso, although irrelevant to our project, recall that the realis/irrealis distinction cuts across this
categorisation with zero and ërst conditionals on the realis side and second and third on the irrealis
side; on more of the realis/irrealis distinction, see Palmer (ǬǪǪǫ, xǰ).
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as diﬀerent sorts of conditionals might carry diﬀerent presuppositions which might
in turn both determine the utterer’s attitude and their truth conditions. However,
even if we ëx the sort of conditional and the modal verb in question, we may come
up with, say, ërst conditionals which seem to call for diﬀerent sorts of truth condi-
tions: while ‘if he doesn’t have his umbrella, he must be soaking’ calls for epistemic
reading, ‘if you want to enter, you must pay the admittance fee’ demands a deontic
reading of some sort. We might therefore conclude that semantic categories of con-
ditionals are orthogonal to the ërst/second/third distinction which in turn merely
provides pragmatic distinction.
Another issue of interest to note is that there is a certain back-shift in tenses
in cases of second and third conditionals.ǭǭ Although second conditionals may
be about the present or the future, their tenses are shifted backwards: both their
antecedent verb-phrase and their consequent modal verb are cast in the preterite
tense. Likewise, although third conditionals may allegedly be about the past, the
present and even the future, both their antecedent verb-phrase and their consequent
modal verb are shifted, as it were, once tense further back: the antecedent verb-
phrase is cast in the pluperfect tense and the consequent under its modal scope
is cast in the present perfect tense. is phenomenon is even more drastic when
we cast conditional sentences whose context already calls for the pluperfect tense:
the antecedent is pushed even further back into the so-called plupluperfect tense,
a tense which does not otherwise occur in English.ǭǮ In general, it seems that the
more unlikely an utterer takes an antecedent to be true (the higher the degree of the
conditional’s hypotheticality), the observed back-shift is more likely to occur.
č.ď.Ċ.ď Zero Conditional
at said, let us now turn to the so-called zero conditional. Apart from being a con-
ditional expression, conditionals of that ilk convey, according to the story, certainty
of the consequent on the condition of the antecedent to their utterer. ose are the
conditionals the utterer takes to express a fact of some sort or another that relates
ǭǭSee Comrie (ǫǳǲǰ, xǰ), Dudman (ǫǳǲǭ, ǫǳǲǯb, ibid.) and Tynan and Lavín (ǫǳǳǱ).
ǭǮSee Comrie (ibid.).
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antecedent and consequent. Needless to say, there may be diﬀerent reasons for the
zero conditional utterer to believe in the said certainty. For instance, in some cases,
there might be something like a logical necessity of sorts involved and, in other
cases, the utterer might simply have a ërm belief in the habits or dispositions of
the sentence subject. Note however, that in the case of zero conditional, its utterer
may very well be unsure whether the conditional’s antecedent obtains or not and
whether it will or has indeed ever obtain. In this manner, the nature of the message
conveyed is quite diﬀerent from that of ërst, second and third conditionals. For
a zero conditional, according to the story, the antecedent and the consequent are
clauses in the present tense. We may therefore give the following schema of zero
conditionals:
(Zero Conditional) If [DPǫ] [present tense VPǫ],
then [DPǬ] [present tense VPǬ].
An example of a zero conditional is the following conditional:
(ǫǮ) If Shakespeare is still alive, he is quite old.
According to the zero-conditional story, this conditional merely tells us that on the
fulëlment of the condition expressed in the antecedent, that Shakespeare is still
alive, then the consequent obtains, that he is quite old. Arguably, this conditional
does not provide us with any information about its utterer’s attitude towards the
antecedent. For all we know, its utterer might not even have any opinion whatsoever
about the antecedent’s truth value. Conversely, we might claim that the utterer
must at least believe that there is a possibility that the zero conditional antecedent
is true. Whatever the case is, it is helpful to contrast zero conditionals with since-
sentences which do deënitely convey something about their utterer’s attitude to
their subordinate clause: anyone who were to utter ‘since Shakespeare is still alive,
he is quite old’ felicitously, implies a belief in Shakespeare still being alive.
Another important feature to notice about zero conditionals is that they of-
ten coincide in meaning with respective when- or whenever-sentences.ǭǯ However,
ǭǯNotice that there is a subtle diﬀerence between when- and whenever-sentences: ‘when Shake-
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we may see that this is not always the case since recasting our zero conditional ex-
ample from above in these terms, ‘when/whenever Shakespeare is still alive . . . ’,
clearly yields an odd result. Apart from cases like this, when a zero conditional an-
tecedent describes events of some sort or another, it can in many cases be recast as
a when/whenever-sentence. However, notice that this does not obviously obtain as
freely in the other direction since ‘when’ may, for instance, act as a relative adverb as
in ‘when Shakespeare wrote Hamlet, he had encountered Saxo Grammaticus’ Vita
Amlethi’.
č.ď.Ċ.Ė Limitations of the Classical Account
Wemust admit that all of this is pretty neat and tidy. However, it is time to burst the
bubble: this picture of conditionals in English is far from complete. For instance,
we have seen that third conditionals, such as (ǲ), may well be felicitously asserted
without any belief in the falsity of their antecedent. Likewise, we have seen that
natural language conditionals come in more tenses than the ërst, second, third and
zero conditionals schemata seem to allow for. Importantly, where do conditionals
such as, for instance, (ǫ) ët into this picture?
e classical account seems too simple mostly for the reason that there are far
more conditional constructions in natural languages than the account allows for. To
begin with, we can shift the tenses of the zero conditional back and forth, yielding a
great number of diﬀerent zero conditionals. Although we use the present tense zero
conditional to expresses some conditional relation we believe to obtain at present,
we may do so for any tense we like. We may, for instance, express a conditional
relation which we do believe obtained in the past with a preterite tense zero con-
ditional. By stretching our language, we might be willing to submit that we can
in fact express zero conditionals of all the following tenses in English: pluperfect,
imperfect, preterite, past continuous, present perfect, present, present continuous,
speare was born, . . . ’ and ‘whenever Shakespeare was born, . . . ’ (‘whenever’ in the sense ‘every time’,
not ‘at whatever time’). It seems we cannot combine clauses describing unique events together with
complimentisers such as ‘whenever’.
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future perfect, future and future continuous.ǭǰ Moreover, nothing seems to be in
our way of expressing zero conditionals whose antecedent and consequent disagree
in tenses: we may have an unshakeable faith in a conditional relationship, say, be-
tween something in the past and the future—‘if Shakespeare died in ǫǰǫǰ, then we
will not ënd him alive anywhere’—or even, say, between something in the present
and the past—‘if Shakespeare is still alive, then he did not die at Stratford-upon-
Avon’. We may therefore propose a revised schema for zero conditionals along the
following lines:ǭǱ
(Zero Conditional) If [DPǫ] [
8>><>>:
pluperfect VPǫ
imperfect VPǫ
: : :
9>>=>>;],
then [DPǬ] [
8>><>>:
pluperfect VPǬ
imperfect VPǬ
: : :
9>>=>>;].
Interestingly, upon that construal of third conditionals, (ǫ) now falls squarely within
the category of zero conditionals.
Another thing to remark on, although not of fundamental importance, is that
the classical account assumes that all conditionals in English are of the form ‘if . . . ,
then . . . ’. However, as we should know, that is not the case. In fact, we can get
away with expressing conditionals without both ‘if ’ and ‘then’.ǭǲ Considering (Ǭ),
ǭǰTo remind ourselves, here the tenses of the verb ‘to go’ in the ërst person: ‘went’ (preterit),‘had
gone’ (pluperfect), ‘used to go’ (imperfect), ‘was going’ (past continuous), ‘go’ (present), ‘have gone’
(present perfect), ‘am going’ (present continuous), ‘will go’ (future), ‘will have gone’ (future per-
fect), and ‘will be going’ (future continuous). (Whether some of those tenses are proper tenses or
mere pseudo tenses brought about by an interplay of tenses and aspect—in particular by the perfect
and progressive aspects in English—is a moot but irrelevant point.) For an extensive overview and
analysis of grammatical tense, see for instance Comrie (ǫǳǲǯ).
ǭǱNotice that conditionals with simple, perfect or continuous future tense antecedents are del-
icate structures which are only felicitously uttered in contexts in which the antecedent has already
been been asserted, see Tynan and Lavín (ǫǳǳǱ). Conditionals whose antecedent echos something
which has already been presented in the discourse have sometimes been called ‘factual conditionals’
or ‘premise conditionals’; see Iatridou (ǫǳǳǫ) and Haegeman (ǬǪǪǭ)
ǭǲOn worries regarding the absence of ‘then’, see Davis (ǫǳǲǭ) and Geis (ǫǳǲǯ). On ‘then’, see
also Iatridou (ǫǳǳǭ)
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for instance, there seems to be no harm done by omitting ‘then’: ‘if Shakespeare
had not written Hamlet, someone else would have’. Furthermore, we may also
do without the word ‘if ’ through a subject-predicate inversion of the antecedent:
‘had Shakespeare not written Hamlet, someone else would have’. In other words,
neither of the words ‘if ’ nor ‘then’ are a necessary condition for a sentence to express
a conditional proposition.
Conversely, the word ‘if ’ is certainly not unique to conditionals. Indeed, in the
cases where ‘if ’ is substitutable with ‘whether’, there is normally nothing conditional
at play. For instance, ‘I wonder if Shakespeare actually wrote Hamlet ’ is in no sense
expressing a conditional of any sort. Rather, the ‘if ’ here serves as a complementiser
which introduces an indirect question.ǭǳ Of course, that is not to say that the word
‘if ’ does not always have the syntactic role of complementiser—because, arguably, it
does—but rather that the word is not a suﬃcient condition for a sentence to express
a conditional proposition.
Also, according to the classical account, the antecedent is invariably expressed
prior to the consequent. With some exceptions, most natural languages allow for
the reverse.ǮǪ Again, we may just as well express (Ǭ) as ‘someone else would have
written Hamlet if Shakespeare had not’. Interestingly, perhaps, such a movement
of the consequent yields a loss of the word ‘then’. Furthermore, we may lose the
‘if ’ again by subject-predicate inversion: ‘someone else would have written Hamlet,
had Shakespeare not’.
Moreover, it seems that although we express certain thoughts with conditional
sentences, we might as well cast them in diﬀerent terms. We already remarked
upon the way in which we may just as well cast many zero conditionals in terms
of when- and whenever-sentences. Furthermore, there is nothing to stop us using
a great number of other linguistic constructions to get our points across. We may,
for instance, use locutions of the following sorts to transmit certain conditional
thoughts across:
ǭǳSee Harman (ǫǳǱǳ) and Bhatt and Pancheva (ǬǪǪǰ).
ǮǪFor more on those exceptions, see Comrie (ǫǳǲǰ).
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8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
On the assumption
Supposing
In the event
Given
: : :
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
[CPǫ], it follows [CPǬ].
Clearly, not every conditional lends itself to expression in those terms. Nonetheless,
we should remain aware that we may quite generally cast our conditionals in such
terms.
Furthermore, certain conditional sentences, generally with a future referring
antecedent and an authoritative tone achieved with the imperative mood, may ënd
expression either as disjunctions or conjunctions. For instance, I might utter ‘read
Hamlet and you will not regret it’ or ‘read Hamlet or you will regret it’ roughly to
express the conditional ‘if you read Hamlet, then you will not regret it’ although
on a natural reading the ërst carries a tone of recommendation and the second of
threat. Notice, however, that the disjunction ‘read Hamlet or you will regret it’
also implies, on its natural reading, that ‘only if you read Hamlet, then you will not
regret it’, while the conjunction does not to the same extent.
č.ď.Ċ.ė e Moral of the Story
What have we learned from this observation? Most importantly, we have seen that
syntactic and grammatical features of conditionals in English do not determine in
any obvious sense what sort of truth conditions a particular conditionals demands.
Rather, the grammatical features convey information about the attitude of their
utterer either towards their antecedent, in the case of ërst, second and third condi-
tionals, or the conditional relation, in the case of zero conditionals. Now, of course,
that is not to say that the attitude of the utterer to the conditional expressed does not
provide some evidence about how we are supposed to understand the conditional
in question.
In an interesting sense, diﬀerent conditionals may express diﬀerent thoughts
which ultimately do determine the appropriate truth conditions. However, the
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attitude of their utterers may provide important indications about which sort of
thought they express. Together with the context in which conditionals are ex-
pressed, the utterer’s attitude may in many cases suﬃce to guide correctly towards
interpretation. Having now touched on the idea that tokens of conditional sen-
tences express conditional thoughts of some sort, let us now turn to that issue.
č.ď.Č Second Observation: What We Mean& What We Say
It is an uncontroversial platitude that we sometimes express our thoughts by our ut-
terances. Indeed, our words—be they spoken, written or otherwise manifested—do
generally express ourminds. And astoundingly often we domanage to get our inten-
tions across to our audience who correctly interpret our utterances. Needless to say,
the fact that we domanage to pull oﬀ successful communication is no small wonder.
However, for our present purposes, we need only realise that conditional sentences,
like any other meaningful sentences, are expressions of propositional thoughts of
some sort or another. Conditional sentences do certainly express thoughts quite
distinct from more simple sentences. However, there is no sensible way in which
we can deny the fact that conditional sentences do express thoughts of some sort or
another.
All this is important for us because we seem to use the same natural language
conditional sentences to express diﬀerent sorts of thoughts.Ǯǫ Already with a con-
ditional such as (ǫǪ), we discovered that certain conditionals allow themselves to
at least two distinct readings. In the terms we have just adopted, that is merely to
say that diﬀerent sorts of thoughts do seem to ënd the same sort of conditional
expression.
Let us spell this out more carefully and clearly. We may express our thoughts by
our utterances. However, when we give expression to our thoughts, by some pro-
cess of encoding or another, our utterances do not uniquely determine our thoughts.
More often than not, however, our utterances may be correctly interpreted, by some
process of decoding or another, as expressing our thoughts. By suﬃcient sensitivity
Ǯǫis observation is, of course, inspired by Dudman (ǫǳǲǮa, ǫǳǲǮb, ǫǳǲǰ, ǫǳǲǲ, ǫǳǲǳ, ǫǳǳǪ,
ǫǳǳǫa, ǫǳǳǮa, ǫǳǳǮb).
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to various contextual parameters, on the assumption that conversational partici-
pants respect a certain set of pragmatic maxims, and with the aid of our vast ‘world
knowledge’, we do quite reliably stumble upon correct interpretation. However, in
certain cases, we do admittedly make mistakes: we might overlook some contextual
information, the utterer might not adhere to our maxims, or we might simply not
get something on account of our ignorance. In those cases, our thoughts—which
were already underdetermined by their utterances—will be misconstrued.ǮǬ
For an illustration, I might for some reason wish to convey to you my belief that
everyone loves someone although, of course, the one or ones loved by someone need
not be the same for everyone. My thought has a particular logical form—which we
may express unambiguously in, say, ërst order logic as p8x9yLxyq—which does
presumably determine its meaning to a certain extent. However, when I express
my thought, I might perhaps, somewhat misleadingly, utter the sentence ‘everyone
loves someone’. My utterance has a particular phonetic form, which you might in-
terpret either incorrectly as expressing a thought of the logical form p9y8xLxyq
or correctly as expressing a thought of the logical form p8x9yLxyq. Insofar as I
was in fact interested in getting my thought across to you, I ought to have expressed
myself more clearly unless, of course, I thought that there was already enough in-
formation available in the context or some pragmatic principles to guide your in-
terpretation correctly or that I assumed that you possessed some relevant world
knowledge required. And insofar as you are sensitive to the features of the context
which I intended as your guidance, my thought will most likely get across to you.
Our claim is that natural language conditional sentences share the same symp-
toms. In the terminology we have adopted, that is merely to say that diﬀerent sorts
of thoughts may all be encoded as conditional utterances of the same sort. And
as such, certain conditional sentences may be interpreted as expressing diﬀerent
thoughts. Again, provided that everything runs smoothly in communication, the
thought an utterance was intended to express may be correctly decoded. However,
ǮǬAll of this seems quite compatible with the story of Chomsky’s generative grammar; see, for in-
stance, the classic Chomsky (ǫǳǯǱ/ǬǪǪǬ, ǫǳǰǯ, ǬǪǪǰ) and, for more recent developments, Chomsky
(ǫǳǳǯ, ǬǪǪǪ); see also Sperber and Wilson (ǫǳǲǰ)
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again, a misunderstandingmay easily arise when we either overlook some contextual
information, ìout certain pragmatic maxims, or fail to get something on account
of our ignorance.
So, we might ask, what sort of thoughts do we actually express by conditional
sentences? We have already distinguished between roughly metaphysical, epistemic
and deontic readings of conditionals. Arguably, each of those readings might cor-
respond to distinct sorts of thoughts.Ǯǭ Moreover, we also noticed that we may
use conditionals sentences (as well as when- or whenever sentences sometimes) to
express what we usually express in terms of generalisations, habituals or generics.ǮǮ
Finally, we do commonly use conditional sentences for the sole sake of decorum
and politeness or rhetorical eﬀect. Along those lines, we may then distinguish be-
tween at least four broad categories of thoughts which lend themselves to expression
as conditional sentences.
First, there are thoughts of a roughly metaphysical nature: thoughts to the eﬀect
that should something be the case, something else would be the case by some sort of
metaphysical necessity broadly construed. Although those thoughts may, of course,
refer to past present and future actual and counterfactual situations, they are all of a
similar nature in an important sense: they are claims of metaphysical relationships.
Interestingly, on the most natural interpretation of (Ǭ), the sentence expresses a
thought of that very ilk: had Shakespeare not written Hamlet, things would have
turned out such that someone else had.
Second, there are thoughts of a nature more akin to deductive arguments. How-
ever, when we express those thoughts—perhaps for the sake of economy—we ex-
press them as conditional sentences whose antecedent is in some sense the crucial
premise or premises of the argument and whose consequent is the conclusion, and
hope that the remaining premises which we take for granted are somehow obvious
to our audience. ose conditional sentences are therefore arguably akin to en-
thymemes in nature. In other words, conditionals of this sort resemble condensed
arguments of which we only express some premises and the conclusion and hope
ǮǭSee xǭ.Ǭ.ǭ.
ǮǮSee xǭ.Ǯ.ǫ.Ǯ.
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that the implicit premises are shared by our audience. Interestingly, on the most
natural interpretation of (ǫ), the sentence expresses a thought of that very strain:
Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, therefore—since Hamlet does exist and things
of that sort must be written by someone, someone clearly must have written Ham-
let—someone other than Shakespeare wrote Hamlet.
ird, there are thoughts of a nature alike to generalisations, generics or ha-
bituals expressing that whenever something is the case, something else is also the
case. It seems that thoughts of this sort may just as well be encoded with when- or
whenever-sentences instead of conditionals. On its most natural interpretation, the
following conditional sentence expresses a thought this kind:
(ǫǯ) If Shakespeare felt dejected, then he wrote another sonnet.
Now, since generalisations, generics and habituals are presumably distinct sorts of
claims, we may well expect that there is a certain variability in truth conditions for
conditionals expressing thoughts of this sort. In other words, conditionals which
express generalisations require semantics suited for generalisations, and so forth.
Finally, we do commonly use conditional sentences for the sake of decorum
and politeness or rhetorical eﬀect. Arguably, those conditionals do not really convey
anything beyond what their consequents do express although their tone is somewhat
diﬀerent. e following conditionals are examples of the sort:
(ǫǰ) a) If you want my honest opinion, I think you should read Hamlet.
b) If you don’t mind me saying so, you remind me of Ophelia sometimes.
c) If I may say so, you would be better oﬀ without those Hamlet examples.
d) If you are interested, I have a copy of Hamlet that you may read.Ǯǯ
e) . . . or, if you will, Hamlet had a bit of the so-called oedipal complex.
f ) If one were so inclined, one might say that Hamlet was a moral relativist.
g) If truth be told, I have never seen or read Hamlet.
ǮǯConditionals of this sort have sometimes been called ‘biscuit conditionals’. See, for instance
Austin (ǫǳǯǰ), DeRose and Grandy (ǫǳǳǳ), Siegel (ǬǪǪǰ) and Predelli (ǬǪǪǳ).
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Arguably, only thoughts of the ërst two sorts are properly conditional. In much
the same manner as we claimed that certain disjunctions and conjunctions are actu-
ally conditional expressions, we might likewise claim that conditionals like (ǫǯ) are
actually expressions of generalisations, generics or habituals. And we might there-
fore claim that a theory of conditionals should not account for conditionals of this
sort any more than, say, a theory of conjunctions should account for conjunctions
which express conditionals. Rather, we should defer conditionals of this sort to
whichever semantic account of generalisations, generics and habituals to which we
might adhere. In a similar fashion, we may also claim that conditionals such as
(ǫǰa)–(ǫǰg) are merely gloriëed expressions of their consequent and thereby not re-
ally expressions of conditional thoughts. We should nonetheless remain aware that
conditionals such as (ǫǯ) seem both subject to modus ponens and modus tollens
and that conditionals such as (ǫǰa)–(ǫǰg) seem at least subject to modus ponens.
In other words, although the thoughts we express by those conditionals sentences
are not strictly conditional in nature, those expressions do share certain behaviour
with proper conditionals—which is perhaps precisely why we cast those thoughts
in such terms.
Finally, we might also point out that those who are fortunate enough to traﬃc
in logics often use natural language conditional sentences to express thoughts of
a diﬀerent nature: when expressing, say, material or strict implication, logicians
frequently utter natural language conditional sentences. Although that is true, that
is not really relevant for our purposes. Insofar as our objective is to analyse natural
language conditionals, we are interested in the conditional sentences that natural
language speakers use in normal discourses. However, since the semantics of the
logician’s artiëcial conditionals are, nearly always, well deëned, we need not worry
too much about those issues here.Ǯǰ
However, the important issue remains: our problem is that diﬀerent sorts of
ǮǰFinally, it is probably worth it to mention that conditionals which have been called ‘speech-act
conditionals’ in certain circles do not fall into any of our categories. An example of a speech-act
conditional is ‘if someone asks, I am not here’. Arguably, that needs not worry us much because
such conditionals are not conditional sentences but rather conditional commands: the conditional
‘if someone asks, I am not here’ is in fact an ellipsis of ‘if someone asks, tell them that I am not here’.
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thoughts are encoded as conditional sentences. To gain a better grasp of the thoughts
involved, let us now turn our sights to suppositions.
č.ď.č ird Observation: On Ways of Supposing
We may agree that most conditionals express a suppositional thought of some sort
or another: namely, whoever asserts a conditional seems to be asserting that on the
supposition of its antecedent, its consequent is true. Interestingly, however, there
are at least two distinct ways in which we can make suppositions.ǮǱ On the one
hand, we may consider how our world would have panned out had our supposition
actually been the case. On the other hand, we may consider what we know about
the world at the instant of our act of supposition and assess how the world must be
in order for it to conform to our supposition.
On the one hand, by our ërst way of supposing, we must look at our world at
the time of our supposition and we must ask ourselves how it would have panned
out had the supposition been true. How do we do that? Well, we know that were
our supposition the case, it could not have occurred in isolation: some events must
have been its cause and some events must be its eﬀect and in turn, each of those
may have further causes and eﬀects and so on. More metaphorically, we throw our
supposition into our world and observe its ripple spread through time and space.
However, this is somewhat more delicate than we have made things out to be:
we may well make suppositions of this sort on top, as it were, of other suppositions.
For instance, we may very well make this sort of supposition against ëctional set-
tings: we may suppose against the world portrayed by Shakespeare’s Hamlet that
Polonius did in fact survive Hamlet’s stab. Under such a supposition, we are con-
cerned about the metaphysical or nomological entailments of Polonius’ survival in
the world of Hamlet but not in the actual world in which, for all we know, there
never was anything as Shakespeare made things out to be in the tragedy. In order to
capture this, we must therefore relativise our suppositions to some world or another.
ǮǱI am in debt to Frank Jackson for this observation. See also Jackson (ǬǪǪǳ, xǭ) and Lance and
White (ǬǪǪǱ).
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Let us call this way of supposing ‘modal’ and characterise its procedure as fol-
lows:
Modal Supposition
A modal supposition of ' against a world w is made by a revision of
the facts in w which nomologically necessitate or are necessitated by
'.
How does this relate to conditionals? Well, interestingly, when faced by a condi-
tional we may suppose its antecedent in this very manner. If the antecedent is false,
we must ëgure out how the world would have had to be so that the antecedent
was true. If the consequent turns out to be true under such a supposition we are
inclined to regard the conditional as true and otherwise false. Interestingly, this is
exactly what we do when we think about (Ǭ): we ask ourselves what would be dif-
ferent if Shakespeare had not written Hamlet. Well, there are many things we must
consider—and it is indeed remarkable that we can do that—but having considered
everything, we are very tempted to conclude that in all likelihood, no one would
have writtenHamlet had Shakespeare not. And for that very reason we are inclined
to take (Ǭ) as false. Of course we might be wrong, simply because we have not con-
sidered all the relevant facts, but still, in cases where we have, this is precisely how
we seem to get to the truth value of (Ǭ).
On the other hand, by our second way of supposing, we go about it quite diﬀer-
ently. In this case, we consider what we know and ask ourselves what, if anything,
must be diﬀerent were our supposition to be true. If our supposition is actually
consistent with what we know, that is the end of that: our knowledge would just
be as it were before our supposition. However, when our supposition does run
counter to something which we know, we must revise our knowledge accordingly
in order to maintain consistency. However, insofar as particular knowledge does
not contradict our supposition we must leave it as it is, even although it might be
immensely improbable given our supposition. More metaphorically, we throw our
supposition into our web of knowledge to corrode away anything which contradicts
it but leave all other things as they stand.
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We may also make suppositions of this sort on top of other suppositions. We
may, again, very well make a supposition of this sort about, say, ëctional settings:
we may suppose against the background of Shakespeare’s Hamlet that, say, Polo-
nius did in fact survive Hamlet’s stab. Under this sort of supposition, we are merely
concerned about revising what we know about Hamlet that contradicts our suppo-
sition, not of things we know about the actual world in which, for all we know,
there never was anything as Shakespeare made things out to be in Hamlet.
Let us call this way of supposing ‘amodal’ and characterise its procedure as fol-
lows:
Amodal Supposition
An amodal supposition of ' against a set of propositions K is made
by the minimal revision of K required to consistently accommodate
'.
When facing a conditional, we may too suppose its antecedent in this man-
ner. If the antecedent runs counter to something that we know, we must revise
our knowledge accordingly to accommodate our supposition and see where that
takes us. is, of course, is very reminiscent of the Ramsey Test. If the consequent
then either turns out to be true or otherwise follows from our revised knowledge,
we are inclined to regard the conditional as true and otherwise false. Interestingly,
this is precisely what we do when we think about (ǫ): we ask ourselves what would
be diﬀerent if we had been wrong about Shakespeare’s authorship of Hamlet. Un-
less our epistemic state is suﬃciently impoverished, most of our knowledge will be
consistent with the supposition that Shakespeare did not write Hamlet. However,
there will almost certainly be something that we know which does contradict our
supposition and therefore needs revision. Interestingly, the supposition does not
contradict the fact that there is a play called Hamlet and that Hamlet was written.
Now, since our knowledge of those facts is compatible with our supposition, we
must infer that someone other than Shakespeare wrote Hamlet. And for that very
reason we are inclined to take (ǫ) as true.
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is distinction, we must submit, seems quite fundamental. In particular con-
sidering that it explains why we are wont to regard (ǫ) as true and (Ǭ) as false. As
our chosen labels suggest, there is nothing particularly modal about our ërst means
of supposition. Indeed, our amodal suppositions are more akin to deductive argu-
ments than modal reasoning: given a set of propositions, we make our supposition
and infer some conclusions on these grounds. When supposing in this fashion, we
are not in any obvious sense considering any ways in which a world might have
been. Rather, we are considering a world as it is and merely assuming that we were
mistaken in our beliefs about it. On the other hand, when we make a modal sup-
position, what we are doing has a strong ìavour of modal reasoning: given a world,
we make our supposition and consider how that world would have had to pan out
and then draw our conclusions on those grounds.
Another important diﬀerence to notice between those two modes of supposi-
tion is the element of supposition time. While amodal supposition simply involves
considering what we know at the time of supposition, here and now, the modal
supposition drags us to whichever time the supposition speciëes. On the one hand,
when we amodally suppose that Shakespeare did not writeHamlet, we merely think
of the world of here and now—a world in which Hamlet does exist—and suppose
on top, as it were, that we were wrong about Shakespeare’s authorship. On the other
hand, when we modally suppose that Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, we must
ërst trace our way back to when Shakespeare allegedly wrote Hamlet, suppose that
he did not and consider the way the world would have unfolded diﬀerently. e
world of which we conceive by this mode of thought may be dramatically diﬀerent
from the world from where we started. In the case of the supposition, made in the
actual world, that Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, there will be stark diﬀerences:
most likely, there will be noHamlet and, for instance, Fielding’sTom Jones, Melville’s
Pierre and Joyce’s Ulysses will all be, if at all, quite diﬀerent works of literature.
is observation gives us a neat explanation of two apparently unrelated phe-
nomena. First, this observation explains why it seems absurd to amodally suppose
that things would be diﬀerent from the way they actually are; since we are consid-
ering a world as it actually is and merely supposing that we are, as it were, wrong
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about something, inferring that something will be diﬀerent from the way it actu-
ally is seems quite senseless. Since we never even take oﬀ from actuality, as it were,
nothing could ever be diﬀerent from actuality in the ërst place: we are merely con-
sidering no more than what is actual.Ǯǲ Again, let us consider (ǫ): when we suppose
amodally that Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, we are merely supposing that we
had been wrong about that particular fact in the actual world and as a consequence
reject any other true sentences contradicting our supposition. All along, however,
we keep our sights ëxed on the actual world.
Our observation also explains why possible-world accounts get certain things
wrong when we are dealing with amodal suppositions: namely, that wemay be fairly
conëdent that if ' were the case,  would be even when we are sure that not all real
and relevant '-worlds are -worlds.Ǯǳ Indeed, a vast number of things in the actual
world are very unlikely but real nonetheless. From a certain deterministic point of
view, the fact that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet might have been inevitable. But still,
that he did, that he chose the very words that he did, when he did and where he
did, was all extremely unlikely from any less of a deterministic point of view. But
even so, it was even more unlikely that someone else should have. Keeping all of
that in mind, of the set of nearby possible worlds in which Shakespeare did not
write Hamlet, there will presumably be next to no world where someone else did
due to the very high improbability that someone would write Hamlet. Although
this all seems ëne under our second mode of supposition, our ërst mode eludes
possible-world accounts for this reason.ǯǪ
Ǯǲis relates to Jackson’s so-called ‘actually’ argument, see Jackson (ǫǳǲǱ).
ǮǳI am in debt to Dorothy Edgington for this observation. See also Edgington (ǬǪǪǲ). However,
see also Nolan (ǬǪǪǭ)
ǯǪInterestingly, this seems to explain why Fine’s counterexample to Lewis’ Counterfactuals misses
its target; see, Fine (ǬǪǪǯ). Interestingly, Fine’s counterexample makes sense—albeit harmlessly—by
amodal supposition.
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It is high time to put together the pieces we have gathered from our observations.
We ought to agree that natural language conditionals call for diﬀerent interpre-
tation based on the thought they were intended to express. However, since the sur-
face form of natural language conditionals need not determine the thought which
they express, we are destined for misinterpretation in certain cases. Nonetheless,
when we are suﬃciently sensitive to contextual parameters and pragmatic particu-
lars, we are quite successful in understanding each other’s intentions.
From our observation of the so-called ërst, second, third and zero conditionals,
we noticed that diﬀerent types of conditional sentences convey information about
their utterer’s attitude towards either the probability of the antecedent or the na-
ture of the conditional relationship involved. Arguably, since we are more wont to
make modal suppositions than amodal suppositions about something we take to be
improbable or impossible, second and third conditionals are usually used to express
modal suppositions. Likewise, since we are arguably more inclined to make amodal
suppositions than modal suppositions about things for which we have no beliefs,
ërst and zero conditionals are usually used to express amodal suppositions.
Nonetheless, things are not quite as simple as that. We seem to be well endowed
cognitively to make amodal suppositions about things we know to be false and,
conversely, to make modal suppositions about something we do not believe to be
false. Wemay therefore, it certainly seems, express amodal suppositions with second
and third conditionals and modal suppositions with ërst and zero conditionals.
In fact, we might even suspect that any conditional might express either modal
or amodal supposition in some appropriate context. Nonetheless, that is not to
say that second and third conditionals do not generally express modal suppositions
while ërst and zero conditionals generally express amodal suppositions.
Moreover, we might suspect that all this in turn relates to the sort of thoughts
which conditionals are uttered to express, namely, that second and third condi-
tionals do generally encode thoughts of the ërst kind—the ones we said to be of
metaphysical nature—while ërst and zero conditionals normally express thoughts
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of the second genre—the ones we said are akin to deductive arguments. Again, we
might claim that this is because the thoughts of the ërst kind seem to be nothing
more than modal suppositions, while the thoughts of the second kind are simply
amodal suppositions.
e time is ripe for us to jettison the labels ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’. Al-
though those labels have technical and relatively well deëned meaning within the
study of grammar, we have seen that they do not capture anything of interest in our
quest for semantic theories of conditionals. Of course, for the sake of tradition, we
might hang on to those but to avoid further misunderstanding I propose we start
afresh and adopt the labels ‘modal’ and ‘amodal’ to refer to the two sorts of condi-
tionals we have identiëed. Let us call conditionals which demand an interpretation
in terms of our modal way of supposition ‘modal conditionals’:
Modal Conditional
A modal conditional is a conditional that expresses a modal supposi-
tion.
Conversely, let us call conditionals which demand an interpretation in terms of our
amodal way of supposition ‘amodal conditionals’:
Amodal Conditional
An amodal conditional is a conditional that expresses an amodal sup-
position.
We now have everything in place that we need in order to give an outline for
the semantics of natural language conditionals. First, to avoid connotations of yore,
let us also reserve fresh pair of symbols to represent modal and amodal conditionals
formally:
'  := under the modal supposition of ',  obtains.
' >  := under the amodal supposition of ',  obtains.
Since modal conditionals involve modal supposition, their truth conditions
should be spelled in those terms:
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p' q is true iﬀ  is true under the modal supposition of '.
Conversely, since amodal conditionals involve amodal supposition, their truth con-
ditions should be spelled out in those terms:
p' > q is true iﬀ  is true under the amodal supposition of '.
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We set oﬀ in search of a ground for the indicative/subjunctive distinction. We be-
gan by going through a series of intuitive proposals—several grammatical mood
proposals, counterfactual proposals and epistemic and metaphysical necessity pro-
posals—which we eventually found wanting on diﬀerent accounts. We next con-
sidered the prospect of doing without the distinction but consequently discovered
projects of that ilk to be futile. We then made several helpful observations relating
to our subject matter: we considered the way conditionals are frequently used in
English and other languages; we considered what sort of thoughts we express with
conditional sentences; and ënally, we considered suppositions and their relation to
conditionals. Based on our observations, we ënally proposed that a line be drawn
between indicative and subjunctive conditionals and hinted at the semantics suited
for natural language conditionals.
Instead of the widespread labels ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’, we suggested that
talk of ‘modal’ and ‘amodal’ conditionals would be more appropriate: while modal
conditionals express modal suppositions, amodal conditionals express amodal sup-
position. e modal/amodal distinction, we submit, is a fundamental distinction
of natural language conditionals and one which any semantics should respect. We
must conclude that we have ënally found a satisfying answer to our question as to
where to draw the line.
In the next chapter, we shall work out the semantics for modal and amodal
conditionals more carefully.

Ǯ Suppositional Semantics
is chapter oﬀers semantics for natural language conditionals. We shall
begin by exploring the nature of suppositions and subsequently draw a dis-
tinction between modal and amodal suppositions. In light of our analysis
of suppositions, a corresponding distinction is then drawn between modal
and amodal conditionals and their character further examined. Conse-
quently, we shall uncover the syntax of conditionals in English for the
purpose of providing input for our semantics. And ínally, we will oﬀer
compositional semantics in generative grammar for modal and amodal
conditionals.
ď.Ċ Preamble: Modal& Amodal Conditionals
Earlier, we came to the conclusion that natural language conditionals are of two
fundamentally distinct types.ǫ We decided to call the ërst sort ‘modal conditionals’
and claimed that such conditionals express modal suppositions. Conversely, we
called conditionals of the second sort ‘amodal conditionals’ and claimed that such
conditionals express, yes, amodal suppositions.
Modal suppositions, we claimed, are suppositions that are made against a world
or situation of some description.Ǭ Normally, the world in question is the world
ǫSee xǭ.Ǯ.ǭ.
ǬHenceforth, we shall assume that suppositions and thus conditionals are sensitive to situations
ǫǬǭ
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of utterance, although suppositions of this sort may as well be made against some
other contextually salient world, say, one of hypothesis or ëction. When wemodally
suppose ' against a world w, we consider how w would have had to pan out for '
to have been the case in w.
When wemake suppositions of this sort, we assume that certain laws still obtain
in the world in question. In most cases, the occurrence of ' could thereby not
have occurred in isolation: rather, there must be a chain of causes and eﬀects, as it
were, leading up to and trailing from '. Our task, as modal supposers, is therefore,
metaphorically speaking, to straighten out the bump in our carpet so that we end
up with a world in which ' is the case and which is only diﬀerent from w in the
ways which ' requires. Now, although in some cases there might be a unique way
in which the world in question would have had to turn out, there will presumably
be other cases in which there are number of diﬀerent ways the world could contain
our supposition. And in those cases we end up with a number of diﬀerent worlds
compatible with our world of departure and our supposition. e resulting world
or set of worlds is then, so to speak, the product of our modal supposition.
A modal conditional is a conditional which expresses the truth of its consequent
on themodal supposition of its antecedent against some contextually relevant world.
Inmost contexts, for instance, the following conditional would be uttered to express
the truth of its consequent on the modal supposition of its antecedent:
(ǫ) If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then someone else would have.
Upon the modal reading of this conditional, its utterer claims that on the modal
supposition that Shakespeare did not write Hamlet against, say, the actual world of
utterance, it is true that someone else wroteHamlet. If the actual world of utterance
is such that had Shakespeare not written Hamlet, someone else would have, then
(ǫ) is true and otherwise false. Or else, if we were perhaps so inclined, neither true
rather than only worlds. Whenever we mention worlds hereafter, what we say should be understood
as pertaining to situations alike. For further information about situations semantics, see Barwise
(ǫǳǲǫ) and Barwise and Perry (ǫǳǲǭ) and subsequent literature.
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nor false in case the product of our supposition constitutes certain worlds in which
someone else wrote Hamlet and other worlds where no one did.
Conversely, we claimed that amodal suppositions are suppositions which are
made against some set of propositions. Normally, the set of propositions in question
represents our knowledge, although, we said, suppositions of this sort might well be
made against a background of, say, our beliefs or some other contextually salient set
of propositions, for instance, of hypothesis or ëction. When we amodally suppose'
against a set of propositionsK , we add' toK and then restore equilibrium by some
sort of consistency maintenance procedure. Now, as for modal suppositions, there
may well be several equally valid ways in which consistencymay bemaintained. And
in those cases we end up with a number of diﬀerent sets of propositions compatible
with our original set and supposition. e resulting set of propositions or set of sets
of propositions is then the product of our amodal supposition.
An amodal conditional is one which expresses the truth of its consequent on
the amodal supposition of its antecedent against some contextually relevant set of
propositions. In most contexts, for instance, the following conditional would be
uttered to express the truth of its consequent on the amodal supposition of its an-
tecedent:
(Ǭ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then someone else did.
Upon the amodal reading of this conditional, its utterer claims that on the
amodal supposition that Shakespeare did not write Hamlet against, say, the ut-
terer’s knowledge, it is true that someone else wrote Hamlet. Much like before, if
the utterer’s knowledge is such that were we to add to it ‘Shakespeare did not write
Hamlet ’, maintain for consistency and then get out ‘someone else wrote Hamlet ’,
then (Ǭ) is true and otherwise false. Or else, if we are so inclined, neither true nor
false in case the product of our supposition constitutes certain sets of propositions
which contain ‘someone else wrote Hamlet ’ and others which do not.
is chapter will oﬀer semantics for modal and amodal conditionals. First, we
shall explore the nature of modal and amodal suppositions in detail. Subsequently,
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we shall investigate the details of the corresponding conditionals. Once we have
understood the essential features of modal and amodal conditionals, we will turn to
the syntax of English conditionals to provide us with some input for our semantics.
And ënally, once we have given an appropriate account of syntax, we will oﬀer
semantics for modal and amodal conditionals in generative grammar.
ď.Č On Suppositions
When we began our investigation of suppositions, we soon noticed that there are
at least two distinct ways in which we may suppose. On the one hand, we may
consider how our world would have had to pan out for our supposition to be true.
And on the other hand, we may reìect on what we know and then assess whether
we must have been wrong about something were our supposition true. Due to the
modal ìavour of the former, we decided to call that sort of suppositions ‘modal
suppositions’ while we called the later ‘amodal suppositions’.
We soon realised that in the case of modal suppositions, the world against which
we suppose need not be our actual world. In fact, we may make modal suppositions
against any world whatsoever. Normally, we keep the actual world as background
to our suppositions but we may as well suppose against, say, a hypothetical or ëc-
tional world. We thus arrived at the following preliminary characterisation of modal
suppositions:
Modal Supposition (Naïve Analysis)
A modal supposition of ' against a world w is made by a revision of
the facts in w which nomologically necessitate or are necessitated by
'.
Conversely, in the case of amodal suppositions, the set of propositions against
which we suppose need not be our own knowledge. In fact, we may make amodal
supposition against any set of propositions whatsoever. Normally, however, we do
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keep our own knowledge as background to our suppositions but we may well sup-
pose against, say, someone else’s knowledge, mere beliefs, hypothesis, pretence or
ëction. We thereby arrived at the following preliminary characterisation of amodal
suppositions:
Amodal Supposition (Naïve Analysis)
An amodal supposition of ' against a set of propositions K is made
by the minimal revision of K required to consistently accommodate
'.
With this preliminary grasp of the modal/amodal supposition distinction, let
us now explore those two kinds of suppositions in greater detail.
ď.Č.Ċ Modal Suppositions
Modal suppositions are modal in the following sense: when we modally suppose
' against a world w, we are concerned with how w would have to have panned
out for ' to have been the case. We have already said a good deal about modal
suppositions but enough still remains to be said. Let us begin with the issue of the
context sensitivity of modal suppositions.
Somewhat contrary to what we said before, modal suppositions actually seem to
be context sensitive in two distinct senses. On the one hand, as we already claimed, a
modal supposition is sensitive to a situation or world of some description. is is the
world against which the supposition in question is made. Often, we already said, the
world in question is merely the world of the context, although, we also said, we may
suppose against any world whatsoever. Importantly, then, the world of the context
and the world against which we suppose in the context need not be the same world.
On the other hand, a modal supposition is sensitive to the laws which we assume
obtain in the world of supposition. We do not need to have any ërm position on
the nature of laws in our present context but may simply assume that they may be
represented by a collection of generalisations or other lawlike statements of some
ilk or another. Often, the laws in question are the laws actually at play in the world
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against which we suppose, although, any set of laws might be in the background of
our suppositions.
In order to emphasise this dual context sensitivity, let us return to our original
example. While modally supposing, there seem to be numerous ways in which we
can make the following supposition:
(ǭ) Shakespeare did not write Hamlet.
On the one hand, we might be in a context where the world against which
we suppose is the actual world: we suppose that (ǭ) were the case in our actual
world. Now, if the context in which we suppose (ǭ) is such that we assume some
sort of everyday commonsensical (or folk) physical laws to obtain, we have good
reason to suspect that the world, or worlds, which result from our supposition are
all such that no one wroteHamlet. However, if a set of laws of quantum probabilistic
nature—according to which just about anything, so to speak, can happen—were to
be raised to contextual salience, we would have equally good reason to suspect that
some worlds, which result from our supposition, are such that someone (other than
Shakespeare) wrote Hamlet.
On the other hand, we might be in a context where the world against which
we suppose is not the actual world but some other contextually salient world. For
instance, the world could be one in which Shakespeare did in fact write Hamlet
but in which Francis Beaumont was all but bound to do it had Shakespeare failed.
Again, if the context in which we suppose (ǭ) is such that we assume some sort
of everyday commonsensical laws to obtain, we have good reason to suspect that
the world, or worlds, which result from our supposition are all such that someone
(other than Shakespeare) wrote Hamlet, namely Beaumont. Again, however, if a
set of laws of quantum probabilistic nature were to be raised to contextual salience,
we have reason to suspect that some worlds, which result from our supposition, are
such that no one wrote Hamlet.
Now, it is worth pointing out that instead of this twofold context sensitivity, we
can equally well get by with introducing a thicker notion of possible worlds whereby
every world comes equipped with its own set of laws. Our present approach has the
ď.Č On Suppositions ĊČĚ
only beneët that we may say that one and the same world can act with diﬀerent sets
of laws in diﬀerent contexts. us, once a diﬀerent set of laws is raised to salience, we
may still suppose against the same world as we began with. For instance, this might
be beneëcial if we tried to account for disagreement in suppositions between, say, a
folk physicist and a quantum physicist who presumably agree over some particular
thing, namely the world of supposition, but disagree as to which kind of laws obtain.
However, we shall leave unsettled at present whether that is actually a beneët or not.
An issue of some sort of objectivity is important here. On the assumption that
there are such things as laws, a certain (possibly empty) set of laws will obtain at
a particular world. Of course, if we are dealing with, say, the actual world, we
might not know the full extent of the laws in question but that is not really relevant
here. More importantly, since we may assume any set of laws when against our
supposition, we could easily suppose something which need not coincide with the
laws obtaining at the world in question. Clearly, then, a supposition made against
a world whose actual laws do not coincide with the set of laws assumed in the
context might not be, as it were, objectively correct. For instance, assuming that
the actual world is in fact as predicted by the laws of quantum mechanics, any
supposition made against the actual world and a set of some more commonsensical
laws would be incorrect in the above sense. Indeed, given the laws which do obtain
in the actual world, the world would have panned out diﬀerently had the content
of our supposition been the case. is is perhaps even more vivid when we make
suppositions about the future of the actual world. We might suppose that ' will be
the case in the actual world in, say, a few minutes and furthermore assume a set laws
where, say, the law of gravity is absent. We do not need to take the supposition far
to realise that its product will be a peculiar world where everyday concrete things,
for instance, get lost astoundingly often. In particular, if the actual world then
turns out to be such that ' became the case several minutes later, precisely as we
had assumed, we will soon notice that the actual world and the product of our
supposition do not coincide at all. In other words, the supposition in question was
not objectively correct. Andmoreover, assuming that the aim of supposition is some
sort of objective correctness, our supposition would be, so to speak, defective.
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However, that is not at all to say that an objectively incorrect supposition could
not be correct in the context in which it is made. For instance, we might well be
in a context where, say, the laws in question are merely our commonsensical laws
of physics and the salient world is the actual world. In that particular context, we
would be correct in our modal supposition that Shakespeare did not write Ham-
let only if all worlds which result from our supposition are such that no one did
and incorrect otherwise. In other words, suppositions are contextually correct if
their result is appropriately sensitive to the relevant elements of the context. In
a certain sense, then, suppositions are quite similar to other contextually sensitive
phenomena such as epistemic modals: although ' is the case, the relevant stock of
knowledge in the context in question might be such that ‘might not '’ is true in
that context. In much the same way, a supposition might be correct in the context
in which it is made, although it is objectively incorrect.
It is worth emphasising, if the fact is not already apparent to us, that our ability
to suppose against any set of laws, gives us a great leeway in our suppositions. For
instance, the laws need not be only physical or metaphysical in nature. We may, for
instance, be in a context where deontic laws are salient. Or we may be in a context
where juridical laws are salient. We may thus suppose, say, on the assumption that
the world is fair and moral, or on the assumption that everybody abides by the
laws, or on the assumption that every crime is complemented by its appropriate
punishment. In fact, we do often make suppositions of that sort: for instance, when
reasoning about counterfactual situations in moral, political or legal philosophy, we
work with such assumptions. And moreover, we do, it seems, quite frequently, in
our everyday practical reasoning, make suppositions assuming laws of all sorts: rules
of games, house rules, traﬃc regulations, . . . and whatnot.
Having said all that, we seem ënally to be in a position to give an adequate
deënition of modal suppositions:
Modal Supposition.
A modal supposition of ' against a world w is made by a revision of
the facts in w which nomologically necessitate or are necessitated by
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' and a set of laws l.
For later purposes, we will need to introduce a convenient formalism for modal
suppositions. First, we can represent contexts as n-tuples of contextual parameters.
It matters not, currently, what we take the other parameters of contexts to represent
but we do require that one parameter represent the relevant world against which we
suppose and another the laws assumed to obtain in the world in question. Let a
context C therefore be represented by an n-tuple constituted by Sw and SL, where
Sw is the world against which we make our supposition in C and SL is the set of
laws assumed to obtain in Sw in C .
Second, it will be helpful to represent a modal supposition as a function from
the content of the supposition, the world against which the supposition is made and
the set of laws assumed to obtain in that world, to a set of worlds which results from
the supposition. LetM(x; y; z) therefore be a function which has three arguments,
a proposition x, a world y and a set of laws z, and returns a set of worlds.
With those pieces all in place, we can now formalise our deënition of modal
suppositions as follows:
Modal Supposition (Formal Representation)
LetC be a context constituted by a worldSw and a set of lawsSL. e
result of modally supposing' inC is the set of worldsM('; Sw; SL).
ď.Č.Č Amodal Suppositions
Amodal suppositions are not modal in the sense which modal suppositions are:
when we amodally suppose ', we are concerned with how some set of propositions
or another must be to in order to accommodate ' rather than how some world
would have had to pan out for ' to be the case. Needless to say, the propositions
in question may well be taken to represent a world of some description.
Like modal suppositions, amodal suppositions are also sensitive to their context
in two distinct senses. On the one hand, an amodal supposition is sensitive to the
set of propositions against which it is made. Usually, we already said, the set in
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question is our knowledge, although, we may equally well suppose against, say, our
beliefs or any other set for that matter. On the other hand, amodal suppositions are
sensitive to whichever logic that is assumed to hold for the set in question. Again,
we do not need to have any ërm position about the nature of logic in our present
context but we may simply assume that logics may be represented by a collection
of introduction and elimination rules of some sort or another. Whichever logic
we assume to obtain for the set of propositions in the context will determine both
what constitutes a contradiction and therefore what sort of revisions are required to
maintain consistency upon supposition.
In order to emphasise this dual context sensitivity, let us yet again return to our
original example. While amodally supposing, there are various ways in which we
can make the following supposition:
(ǭ) Shakespeare did not write Hamlet.
On the one hand, wemight be in a context where we suppose against our knowl-
edge: assuming that we know that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet, we can suppose the
contrary. Now, if our context is such that the consistency of our stock of knowledge
is dictated by a logic which, say, validates   ` ' _  iﬀ it validates either   ` '
or   ` , we might end up making diﬀerent sort of revision than if consistency
is dictated by a logic that does not. For instance, assuming that the knowledge in
the context is such that beside Shakespeare, whom we know wrote Hamlet, Fran-
cis Beaumont and John Fletcher are the only obvious candidates for the tragedy’s
authorship: in the context where the ërst logic dictates consistency, a revision will
presumably yield two equally valid sets of propositions, one which contains ‘Beau-
mont wrote Hamlet ’ and another which contains ‘Fletcher wrote Hamlet ’; in the
context where the second logic dictates consistency, a revision will yield a set in
which contains neither propositions nor their negations—which is to say that we
would be agnostic about who wroteHamlet on the supposition that Shakespeare did
not—although the proposition ‘either Beaumont or Fletcher wrote Hamlet ’ would
be in the revised set.
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On the other hand, wemight be in a context where we amodally suppose against
some contextually salient set of propositions which is not our knowledge but, say, a
ëction whereby tragedies such as Hamlet are either written by authors or else come
mysteriously into being out of thin air. Were we to suppose (ǭ) in such context,
assuming some fairly uncontroversial logic, revision would yield a set of propositions
which constitutes ‘no one wrote Hamlet ’.
Again, the issue of objectivity looms large but in a slightly diﬀerent way than
before. is time, a supposition made against a set of propositions whose actual
logic does not coincide with the contextually salient logic is not objectively correct.
Were we to assume, for instance, that some deviant logic dictated the consistency
of our knowledge in a particular context, the result of our supposition would be
objectively incorrect. However, like before, we can still claim that a supposition
may be correct in the context which it is made despite being objectively incorrect.
at all said, we are now ënally in a position to give a deënition of amodal
suppositions:
Amodal Supposition
An amodal supposition of ' upon a set of propositions K is made
by a minimal revision of K required to consistently accommodate '
according to the logic l.
For our later purposes, we shall also need a convenient formalism for amodal
suppositions. Like before, we may represent contexts as n-tuples of contextual pa-
rameters. For our purposes, again, it does not matter what we take the parameters of
the context to represent as long as one represents a set of propositions against which
we suppose and another the logic assumed in the context in question to dictate the
consistency of our set of propositions. Let a context C therefore be represented
by an n-tuple of constituted by SK and Sl, where SK is the set of propositions
against which we make our supposition and Sl is the logic assumed to dictate the
consistency of SK .
As for modal suppositions, we may think of amodal suppositions as a function
from the content of the supposition, the set of propositions against which the sup-
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position is made and the logic assumed to dictate the consistency of that set, to a set
of sets of propositions which results from the supposition. LetN(x; y; z) therefore
be a function which three arguments, a proposition x, a set of propositions y and
a logic z, and returns a set of sets of propositions.
at said, we may now formalise our deënition of amodal suppositions as fol-
lows:
Amodal Supposition (Formal Representation)
Let C be a context constituted by a set of propositions SK and a
logic Sl. e result of amodally supposing ' in C is the set of sets of
propositions N('; SK ; Sl).
ď.Č.č Prospect for Uniícation
Unsurprisingly, we might now wonder whether there is any prospect of unifying the
two accounts such that we would actually only be up against one sort of supposition
rather than two. To answer that question, let us consider the ways in which modal
and amodal suppositions are alike and unlike.
In the ërst place, the time of supposition seems to be of importance. On the
modal supposition of (ǭ), on the one hand, we must locate the time of Shakespeare
and then trace the chains of causes and eﬀects wherever they may take us. On the
other hand, however, on the amodal supposition of (ǭ), we must consider what
we know in the context in question and then simply work from there. In fact, for
that very reason, our suppositions yield quite diﬀerent products: upon a modal
supposition, no one wrote Hamlet, while upon an amodal supposition, someone
other than Shakespeare did. Since Hamlet took an author of considerable genius,
living at a particular place and time in history, it seems all but necessary that no one
else could have written the tragedy had Shakespeare not. However, since Hamlet
does exist and such tragedies do not just come into being without an author, there
must have been an author even if Shakespeare did not write Hamlet.
However, the plot thickens somewhat in cases where the content of the suppo-
sition in question does not denote a synchronic fact. For example, we may either
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modally or amodally suppose the proposition expressed by the following sentence:
(Ǯ) No one has read Hamlet.
When we modally suppose (Ǯ), our task is no longer that of locating a single fact
in the world against which we suppose, but rather numerous facts of particular de-
scription. Of course, the fact that we can do such a thing is no small cognitive
achievement but nonetheless one which we do generally master. In any common-
place context, the modal supposition of (Ǯ) will result in a set of worlds in which
no one has ever staged Hamlet since, quite obviously, no one has ever read the play.
However, the amodal supposition of (Ǯ), will result in sets of propositions where
Hamlet has been staged numerous times although, oddly enough, no one involved
has ever read the play. Importantly, the fundamental diﬀerence remains: modal
suppositions require us to locate the time of the content of our supposition while
amodal suppositions do not.
In the second place, the modal and amodal aspects of modal and amodal sup-
positions is of considerable importance. While the products of modal suppositions
are closely related to ways in which the worlds in question could be, the products
of amodal suppositions need not even represent possible worlds of any contextually
interesting modality. For instance, the result of amodally supposing (ǭ) in some
everyday context will, we must agree, result in a set of propositions which contains
propositions along the lines of ‘Hamlet exists’, ‘someone wroteHamlet ’ and ‘Shake-
speare did not writeHamlet ’. Were we so inclined, we may let the set represent a set
of possible worlds in which the propositions in question are true. Importantly, the
worlds determined by our set of propositions may all well be metaphysically pos-
sible yet physically impossible: given the make-up the actual world and assuming
some sort of common sense physical laws, it seems impossible that Hamlet would
exist had Shakespeare not been its author.
One might, of course, retort that amodal suppositions do relate to modality of
some sort, to wit, epistemic or doxastic modality. Yes, indeed, in the cases where
we amodally suppose against our knowledge or beliefs, we are indeed concerned
with epistemic or doxastic possibilities: given what we know or believe, the product
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of our amodal supposition is epistemically or doxastically necessary. at, how-
ever, misses the point that modal suppositions have to do with the ways in which
worlds could have been while their amodal counterparts do not. In other words,
the modal ìavour of modal suppositions does not seem to characterise their amodal
counterparts.
In the third place, the fact that modal and amodal suppositions are sensitive
to diﬀerent elements of their contexts seems to reveal a fundamental diﬀerence in
their nature. While modal suppositions are sensitive to a world or situation of some
description and the set of laws assumed to obtain there, amodal suppositions are
sensitive to a set of propositions and the logic assumed to dictate the consistency of
the set in questions.
However, as we should know, the ties between propositions and worlds have
traditionally been assumed close-knit: depending on one’s purposes, a world may
be represented by the set of propositions which are true in the world or, conversely,
a proposition may be represented by the set of worlds in which it is true. Per-
haps, then, there lurks a prospect for a translation between the world parameter of
modal suppositions and the set-of-propositions parameter of amodal suppositions,
and vice versa. Apart from the usual problems involved treating worlds as sets of
propositions or vice versa, there are, to be sure, certain further issues involved: sets
of propositions which represent, say, our knowledge and beliefs do rarely determine
a single possible world; in fact, the number of worlds grows exponentially with our
ignorance. However, we may, of course, well claim that suppositions are sensitive
either to sets of worlds or sets of propositions, which then are interchangeable.
Moreover, we might oﬀer a translation between the set-of-laws parameter of
modal suppositions and the logic parameter of amodal suppositions. Naturally,
this will depend on what one takes laws, on the one hand, and logic, on the other
hand, to involve. Were we, for instance, to take both laws and rules of logic to be
schematically represented by generalisations and introduction and elimination rules
respectively, we might argue that the diﬀerence between laws and rules of logic is
merely one of matter but not kind. Indeed, we do not have to venture too far into
the quagmires of metaphysics for the boundary between logical and metaphysical
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laws begins to blur. On reìection, we might soon ask ourselves, say, whether the
law of non-contradiction is one of metaphysics or logic—or indeed neither.
Are all our suppositions perhaps of the same kind? Say, are all all our supposi-
tions merely some sort of universal revision process, which is sensitive to a contextu-
ally salient set of propositions and a contextually salient set of laws of various sorts?
Although the details remain to be spelled out, we might certainly argue for that
claim. We will however not pursue that project further at present but merely leave
the issue at that. However, for our purposes, we have decided to treat suppositions
as of two distinct kinds. An immediate eﬀect of that decision is that conditionals
will also be of two sorts.
ď.č Modal& Amodal Conditionals
Conditionals, we claimed before, are expressions of their consequents upon the
supposition of their antecedents. And since we have decided to treat suppositions
as of two fundamentally distinct sorts, we end up with two corresponding sorts of
conditionals, which we have aptly decided to call ‘modal conditionals’ and ‘amodal
conditionals’.
In this section, wewill give a preliminary semantic account ofmodal and amodal
conditionals, which we will use later to feed into our generative grammar account.
However, before we do that, let us make several remarks pertaining to modal and
amodal conditionals alike.
Firstly, we claimed earlier that many conditional could receive either modal or
amodal readings in respectively appropriate contexts. Our claim was that there are
no syntactic markers for diﬀerent sorts of conditionals in English, rather only in-
dications, most notably temporal shifts and modal verbs that betray their utterers’
attitude and consequently imply the sort of conditional expressed and interpretation
required.ǭ Conditionals are therefore distinctly context sensitive in three respects:
ǭSee xǭ.Ǯ.
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apart from the dual context sensitivity required by their constituent suppositions,
the context moreover determines whether we are up against modal or amodal condi-
tionals. Once we ënally turn to giving proper generative semantics for conditionals,
we will return to this issue.
Secondly, although we have talked as if the context determines world of sup-
position, the laws obtaining at a world, set of propositions, the logic dictating the
consistency of sets of propositions, the sort of conditionality expressed and whatnot,
that is merely an idealisation. Without oﬀering an argument, let us merely admit
that we believe that the utterer’s intentions determines all such things. In ideal sit-
uations, where the utterer is abiding by principles of cooperation by successfully
exploiting contextual elements and pragmatic particulars to get his thoughts across,
a competent interpreter may pick up on the relevant intentions through suﬃcient
sensitivity to such factors and thus interpret accurately and understand the utterer.
In those cases alone, we can actually claim that there is contextual salience of some
sort or another and that the context may be used to determine the meaning of the
sentences uttered in that context. We will, however, continue to talk as if the con-
text provides us with the appropriate parameter although we should keep in mind
that that is merely a convenient idealisation.
irdly, although suppositions require us to follow their appropriate processes
of revision to the bitter end, we are often permitted to take short-cuts in cases of
conditionals. For instance, when we are up against a modal supposition of (ǭ), we
do not have to follow the supposition that Shakespeare did not write Hamlet to
the end of our contextually salient world. Instead, we do merely have to follow the
ripples of causes and eﬀects until we have reached the fact denoted by the conse-
quent or its negation. In other words, although conditionals quite often require
daunting cognitive eﬀorts on our behalf, we often get by more lightly than their
constitutive suppositions give us reason to expect: conditionals often require only
partial suppositions.
And ënally, although we did claim that all proper conditionals are either modal
or amodal, we have certainly not claimed that there are no other conditional sen-
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tences around.Ǯ Rather, we said, there are certain sorts of thoughts which frequently
ënd their expression in conditional sentences without actually being of proper con-
ditional nature. at is to say, certain sentences may have the surface form of a
conditional without having the appropriate logical form. In particular, there are
thoughts of a nature akin to generalisations, generics or habituals that are often ex-
pressed as conditionals. Moreover, conditional sentences are often merely used for
the sake of decorum and politeness or rhetorical eﬀect to express their consequent.
And conversely, as we also said before, conditional thoughts do not necessarily have
to ënd their expression in conditional sentences: in appropriate contexts, condi-
tional thoughts may be expressed as conjunctive or disjunctive sentences.
ď.č.Ċ Modal Conditionals
According to our earlier intuitive characterisation of modal conditionals, we may
tentatively deëne them in the following terms:
Modal Conditional (Naïve Analysis)
A modal conditional is a conditional which expresses its consequent
on the modal supposition of its antecedent.
In the introduction, we already gave an example of an alleged modal condi-
tional:
(ǫ) If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then someone else would have.
In most common contexts, this conditional would be uttered to express the truth
of its consequent on the modal supposition of its antecedent.
Upon the modal reading of (ǫ), its utterer claims that someone else wroteHam-
let on the modal supposition that Shakespeare did not. As we already said before,
the utterance of (ǫ) is (ideally) made in a context which determines the world against
which the supposition is made and the laws assumed to obtain in that world. And
(ǫ) is therefore true only on the condition that if on the modal supposition that
ǮSee xǭ.Ǯ.Ǭ
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Shakespeare did not write Hamlet against the contextually salient world of suppo-
sition and the laws assumed to obtain in that world, someone else wrote Hamlet.ǯ
Since the product of modal suppositions need not be a single world (as the
world of supposition could have panned out in diﬀerent ways), the issue of bivalence
requires attention. Presumably, we are willing to say that a modal conditional is
true in a context if in every world of the product of the modal supposition of its
antecedent in that context, the consequent is true. And conversely, presumably, we
are willing to say that a modal conditional is false in a context if in every world of the
product of the modal supposition of its antecedent in that context, the consequent
is false. But what about cases where the consequent is true in some worlds and
false in others? We have quite obvious reason to claim that such conditionals are
not true. However, whether such conditionals are false or not is a more interesting
question. If we were to agree that such conditionals are neither true nor false, we
would have the following truth conditions for modal conditionals:
Modal Conditional
Let C be a context constituted by a world Sw and a set of laws SL.
e truth conditions of the modal conditional p' q in C are as
follows:
C j= '  iﬀ 8w 2M('; Sw; SL); w 2 ,
C j= :(' ) iﬀ 8w 2M('; Sw; SL); w /2 ,
C j=/ '  and C j=/ : (' )
iﬀ 9w;w0 2M('; Sw; SL); w 2  ^ w0 /2 .
In other words, the ërst clause says that p' q is true in C iﬀ  is true in every
world produced by the modal supposition of ' against Sw and SL, the second
clause says that p' q is false in C iﬀ  is false in every world produced by the
modal supposition of ' against Sw and SL, and the ënal clause says that p' q
is neither true nor false in C otherwise. However, if the third truth value strikes us
ǯNotice that this sort of account sits well with so-called causal theories of counterfactuals; see,
in particular, Downing (ǫǳǯǳ), Jackson (ǫǳǱǱ) and their followers.
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as excessive, we may simply get away with the following clause: C j= '   if
8w 2M('; Sw; SL); w 2 , and C j= :(' ) otherwise.
Finally, before moving on to amodal conditionals, let us consider a few examples
of modal conditionals to appreciate the leeway their context sensitivity provides.
First, suppose that we are in a context where we would suppose against the actual
world but where we are sympathetic to the latest trends of physics which predict
probability of fantastic ìukes. Indeed, were we tomodally suppose that Shakespeare
did not write Hamlet in that context, the result would be a set of worlds in which
there will be worlds where no one wroteHamlet but also, more importantly, worlds
in which someone else, by some fabulous quantum mechanical twists and turns,
did. In the context in question, the following conditional will be true:
(ǯ) If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then someone else could have.
Second, suppose that we are in a context where we would still suppose against
the actual world and where we assume that common sense physical laws obtain but
moreover also that, as some sort of law, that Shakespeare was a gentleman of moral
integrity. We need not assume that that deontic laws obtain in the world in question
but merely that Shakespeare was unable to act out of line with respect to a certain
class of actions. Again, were we to modally suppose that Shakespeare did not write
Hamlet in that context, the result would be a set of worlds in which, of course,
there will be no worlds in which someone else wrote Hamlet but there will also be
no worlds in which Shakespeare did anything morally delinquent. In the context
in question, the following conditional will be true:
(ǰ) If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then he would not have pretended
that he had.
ird, suppose we are in a context much like the one before except that we
now assume that deontic laws obtain, in the sense that there are certain acts that
one ought to perform and others one ought not to perform, and that Shakespeare
is not quite immune to temptations. Were we, yet again, to modally suppose that
Shakespeare did not writeHamlet in that context, the result would be a set of worlds
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in which, again, no one did throughout but also in which in every world it would
be morally culpable for Shakespeare to pretend an authorship of a drama he did not
write. In the context in question, the following conditional will be true:
(Ǳ) If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then he ought not have pretended
that he had.
Fourth, suppose that we are in a context where the world we suppose against is
not the actual world but rather the world (or, rather, one of the worlds) compatible
with Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Moreover, in the context in question, let us assume
that queen Gertrude upheld strict house-rules in Elsinore Castle, whereby anyone,
noble and common alike, had to clean the crockery after use. Were we to modally
suppose that young prince Hamlet had used the crockery, the result would be a set
of worlds in which in every world Hamlet had to clean up his mess. In the context
in question, the following conditional will be true:
(ǲ) If Hamlet had used the crockery, he would have had to clean it afterwards.
Finally, suppose that we are in a context much similar to the one before except
that we have added the rules of chess to our set of laws. Were we to modally suppose
that young prince Hamlet was playing a game of chess with his mate Horatio in
which he had already moved his king, the result would be a set of worlds in which
in every world Hamlet would be unable to castle. In the context in question, the
following conditional will be true:
(ǳ) If Hamlet had already moved his king, he would not be able to castle.
ď.č.Č Amodal Conditionals
According to our earlier intuitive characterisation of amodal conditionals, we may
tentatively deëne them in the following terms:
Amodal Conditional (Naïve Analysis)
An amodal conditional is a conditional which expresses its consequent
on the amodal supposition of its antecedent.
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In the introduction, we already gave an example of an alleged amodal condi-
tional:
(Ǭ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then someone else did.
In most common contexts, this conditional would be uttered to express the truth
of its consequent on the amodal supposition of its antecedent.
Upon the amodal reading of (Ǭ), its utterer claims that someone else wroteHam-
let on the amodal supposition that Shakespeare did not. As we already said before,
the utterance of (Ǭ) is (ideally) made in a context which determines a set of propo-
sitions against which the supposition is made and a logic assumed to dictate the
consistency of the set. And (Ǭ) is therefore true only on the condition that if on the
amodal supposition that Shakespeare did not writeHamlet against the contextually
salient set of propositions and the logic assumed to dictate the consistency of the
set, ‘someone else wrote Hamlet ’ will be in the set resulting from the supposition.
Since the product of amodal suppositions need not be a single set of proposi-
tions, the issue of bivalence begs attention again. As before, we are willing to say
that an amodal conditional is true in a context if the consequent is in every set of
the product of the amodal supposition of its antecedent in that context. And con-
versely, again, we are willing to say that an amodal conditional is false in a context if
the negation of the consequent is included in every set of the product of the amodal
supposition of its antecedent in that context. Again, what about themiddle ground?
If we are tempted to say that such amodal conditionals are neither true nor false,
we may spell the truth conditionals of amodal conditionals as follows:
Amodal Conditional
LetC be a context constituted by a set of propositions SK and a logic
Sl. e truth conditions of the amodal conditional p' > q in C
are as follows:
C j= ' >  iﬀ 8S 2 N('; SK ; Sl);  2 S,
C j= :(' > ) iﬀ 8S 2 N('; SK ; Sl);  /2 S,
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C j=/ ' >  and C j=/ : (' > )
iﬀ 9S; S 0 2 N('; SK ; Sl);  2 S ^  /2 S 0.
In other words, the ërst clause says that p' > q is true in C iﬀ  is in every
set of propositions produced by the amodal supposition of ' against SK and Sl,
the second clause says that p' > q is false in C iﬀ  is in no set of propositions
produced by the amodal supposition of ' against SK and Sl, and the ënal clause
says that p' > q is neither true nor false in C otherwise. However, if the third
truth value strikes us as excessive, we may simply get away with the following clause:
C j= ' >  if 8S 2 N('; SK ; Sl);  2 S, and C j= :(' > ) otherwise.
In order to get a better grasp of the context sensitivity of amodal conditionals,
let us consider an example.ǰ Suppose now that we are Shakespeare’s contempo-
raries and I know that Shakespeare is far from ët enough to swim the across the
English Channel and that were he to try in his current state, he would be certain
to drown. Were I to amodally suppose that Shakespeare were to swim across the
Strait of Dover—which is the narrowest part of the English Channel—against my
knowledge, the result would be a set of sets of propositions each containing ‘Shake-
speare drowns’. In the context in question, the following conditional will therefore
be true:
(ǫǪ) If Shakespeare attempts to swim across the Strait of Dover, he will drown.
Now, suppose furthermore, that you know something about Shakespeare that
I do not: Shakespeare is sensible and cautious and would thus never attempt do
anything of this sort unless being sure of his own safety. In particular, you know
that Shakespeare would never attempt to swim across the strait unless he had had
suﬃcient training and never without having someone on a boat nearby at all times
in case of exhaustion. Were you to amodally suppose that Shakespeare were to swim
across the Strait of Dover against your knowledge, the result would be a set of sets
of propositions each containing ‘Shakespeare does not drown’. In the context in
question, the following conditional will therefore be true:
ǰe so-called Gibbard cases provide an excellent example of this, see xxǬ.ǫ–Ǭ.
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(ǫǫ) If Shakespeare attempts to swim across the Strait of Dover, he will not
drown.
Of course, (ǫǫ) is false in my context and (ǫǪ) is false in your context. at,
however, does not pose any particular problems. Assuming there are no other rel-
evant facts to be known in the case, you are objectively right while I am wrong:
were Shakespeare actually to attempt the swim, he would not drown. However, I
have made no error in my supposition and neither have you: we have both made
correct amodal suppositions and correctly expressed the truth of diﬀerent proposi-
tions upon our respective suppositions. Arguably, therefore, we have both uttered
true propositions in our respective contexts. Of course, were you to let me in on
the relevant facts, my context would shift and I would reasonably reject (ǫǪ) and
accept (ǫǫ). However, the important fact remains: the truth conditions of amodal
conditionals are sensitive to their context in ways which allow for great ìexibility.
ď.č.č Conîation of Modal& Amodal Conditionals
In some cases, modal and amodal conditional are hard to tell apart. In fact, when
we are up against certain conditionals in particular contexts, it does not matters
truth-conditionally whether we interpret them modally or amodally. For instance,
suppose I were to utter the following conditional:
(ǫǬ) If Shakespeare had not married Anne Hathaway, he would have married
someone else.
By uttering (ǫǬ), I might mean one of two distinct things. On the one hand, I might
assume a great deal about the laws—physical, social and whatnot—which obtained
in our world in the latter half of the ëfteenth century and on those grounds, I might
suppose modally that had Shakespeare not married Hathaway, he would doubtlessly
have married some other woman—such was the way of the world in those days. On
the other hand, I might hold no beliefs about the intricate social laws of Elizabethan
England but still, say, know that although Shakespeare did marry Hathaway, he
also had an eye for certain fair damsel and thus also know that he was destined to
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marry one or the other. And on those grounds, I might amodally suppose that had
Shakespeare not married Hathaway, he would have married the other woman.
Were you to successfully interpret my utterance of (ǫǬ), your task would nor-
mally be to determine which of the two I had meant. However, in this particular
context, it matters not in which way you choose to interpret my utterance: as long
as you are only interested in the truth conditions, the result would be one and the
same.
In cases of present and future tense conditionals, such conìation becomes even
more harmless. For instance, suppose I were to utter the following conditional:
(ǫǭ) If Gabriel García Márquez rewrote Hamlet, he would infuse it with magical
realism.
Again, it would not matter truth conditionally whether you understood me as ex-
pressing a modal conditional or an amodal conditional. Moreover, by uttering (ǫǭ),
I might not even be entirely certain myself which of the two I have in mind: I might
only know that Márquez would imbue any story with magical realism and whether
I am assuming there to be a law of some sort or merely a constituent of my knowl-
edge might not even be obvious to myself. Yes, if I had assumed there to be such
a law obtaining in the world and modally supposed against the actual world that
Márquez rewrote Hamlet, I would have expressed a modal conditional. And con-
versely, if such a proposition had only been a constituent of my knowledge and I had
amodally supposed against my knowledge that Márquez rewrote Hamlet, I would
have expressed an amodal conditional. However, perhaps because it does not really
matter in such cases, I might not even have considered which sort of supposition
I wanted to express. In fact, I might not even have one particular supposition in
mind. Perhaps, I had intended to express both a modal conditional and an amodal
conditional at once.
What we should ultimately say about such cases is a subject for further discus-
sion. However, let it suﬃce to say that modal and amodal conditionals are subject
to harmless conìation in many cases. Of course, we should not forget that in many
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cases such conìation will turn out disastrous. However, we should also keep in
mind that conìation will not impede successful interpretation in many cases.
ď.ď Syntax of English Conditionals
In order to oﬀer semantics for modal and amodal conditionals, we ought to pay heed
to the syntax of conditional sentences in our object language.Ǳ One might of course
argue that the issues involving the syntax/semantics interface should be delegated to
linguists, while philosophers should be left alone to philosophise about the actual
semantics. If we were to agree with that view, we might stop our enquiry now as
we have already provided adequate semantics for modal and amodal conditionals.
However, since we do believe that a proper semantic account should appropriately
align with the syntax of its subject matter, we will now oﬀer a rough analysis of the
syntax of English conditional sentences which in turn we shall use as input to our
semantics in generative grammar. roughout our discussion, we should keep in
mind that we are not concerned with the syntax of the surface form, since, as we
should know by now, approximately anything goes at the surface. Rather, the phrase
marker trees we will deal with are to represent the deep form, if not the logical form,
of conditional sentences. e form in question, therefore, is the form we assume
shared by all expressions of conditionals irrespective of whether their surface form
is that of conditional sentences, disjunctions, conjunctions or something else.
First, a historical observation. Hitherto, philosophers and logicians alike have
usually worked under the quite natural assumption that conditional sentences in
natural languages express a proposition composed of two constitutive propositions
joined by a logical connective of some sort and which together determine the mean-
ing of the conditional sentence. Moreover, since conditional pairs such as our (ǫ)
and (Ǭ) diﬀer in meaning yet share the same constitutive propositions, the view
that there are two diﬀerent conditional connectives around in natural languages
ǱOn the syntax of conditionals, see also Iatridou (ǫǳǳǫ) and Bhatt and Pancheva (ǬǪǪǰ).
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has become all but the standard among philosophers and logicians.ǲ Traditionally,
conditional sentences such as (ǫ) and (Ǭ) have thus been understood as p' >ǫ q
and p' >Ǭ q where diﬀerent theories assign their own distinct semantics to >ǫ
and >Ǭ which are somehow spelled out in terms of ' and .
Although this picture is not harmful to the enquiry into the semantics of natural
language conditionals as such, it does place unnatural constraint on the syntax of
conditional sentences given the assumption that syntax must align in some impor-
tant sense with semantics. e picture predicts that antecedents and consequents
are syntactically on a par much like the conjuncts of conjunctions and the disjuncts
of disjunctions. Clearly, that is not to say that antecedents and consequents are
commutative but rather that they occupy the same level in phrase marker trees of
conditional sentences. In fact, according to this picture, the syntactic structure of a
natural language conditional such as (ǫ) is therefore somewhere along the following
lines:ǳ
Sǫ
hhhhh
hhhhh
hhh
VVVVV
VVVVV
VVV
SǬ



==
==
= Conj
if
Sǭ



==
==
=
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wrote Hamlet
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did not write
Hamlet
Although we must admit that this picture is quite charming, linguistic evidence
gives us reason to suspect that it is oversimpliëed for three distinct yet related rea-
sons. In the ërst place, antecedents or so-called conditional clauses behave very
much like adverbial phrases in their matrix clauses.ǫǪ In the second place, the word
‘if ’ behaves syntactically much more like complementiser than conjunction.ǫǫ In
ǲAlthough, see for instance Priest (ǬǪǪǳ) and Schaﬀer (ms.a).
ǳFor the sake of simpliëcation, we have switched the order of our antecedent and consequent
and spelled out the elliptical verb phrase ‘did’ as ‘wrote Hamlet ’.
ǫǪSee in particular Geis (ǫǳǲǯ).
ǫǫSee Harman (ǫǳǱǳ) and Bhatt and Pancheva (ǬǪǪǰ).
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the third place, according to this picture, we cannot really make any sense of con-
ditionals involving adverbs of quantiëcation—such as ‘always’, ‘sometimes’ and
‘never’—in their consequents.ǫǬ Arguably, it seems that the only way we can make
sense of such conditionals is by maintaining that conditional clauses in fact operate
as restrictors on either overt or covert adverbs of quantiëcation.
For those three reasons, we might conclude that antecedents, or conditional
clauses, are in fact constituents of adverbial phrases rather than sub-clauses on par
with consequents.ǫǭ And moreover, for that reason, any conditional where the an-
tecedent appears to the left of the consequent—such as our (ǫ) and (Ǭ)—are either
focus or topic phrases where the antecedent has been raised in the structure for the
sake of focus or topicalisation. e canonical form of natural language conditionals
is one where the consequent appears left of the antecedent.
Very roughly, then, the correct picture seems to be more along the following
much simpliëed lines:
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In many cases, like our (ǫ) and (Ǭ), where there are no explicit adverbs of quan-
tiëcation or modal adverbs, we arguably understand the conditional clause as re-
striction on some non-restricting adverb such as ‘always’ or ‘necessarily’. (ǫ) would
thus be synonymous with the following conditionals and share its logical form:
ǫǬSee, in particular, Lewis (ǫǳǱǯ) but also Kratzer (ǫǳǲǰ).
ǫǭSee Geis (ǫǳǲǯ) and Bhatt and Pancheva (ǬǪǪǰ); see also von Fintel (ǫǳǳǲb) and Kratzer
(ǫǳǲǰ).
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(ǫǮ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then necessarily someone else did.
Moreover, on this sort of construal of conditional sentences, conditional clauses
behave similarly syntactically to any other adverbial phrases. erefore, sentences
such as our (ǫ) are syntactically not so diﬀerent from, say, any of the following
sentences:
(ǫǯ) a) Someone else wrote Hamlet secretly.
b) Someone else wrote Hamlet too.
c) Someone else wrote Hamlet long ago.
Needless to say, there will be a vast semantic diﬀerence between (ǫ) and (ǫǯa)-(ǫǯc)
which is brought about by the obvious semantic diﬀerence of the adverbial phrases
in question. However, insofar as we assume that the meaning of sentences may be
read roughly oﬀ from their structure, wemust go about in a similar manner when we
account for conditional sentences as when we account for other sentences involving
adverbial phrases.
e time has come to be somewhat more precise in our representation of the
phrase markers in question. Using so-called X-bar notation, the phrase marker trees
of conditional sentences look as follows:ǫǮ
ǫǮFor introduction to generative syntax, see, for instance, Carnie (ǬǪǪǱ) and Radford (ǬǪǪǮ).
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qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
MMM
MMM
M
T0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
DPǫ



==
==
= Tǫ
. . .
VPǫ
. . . V0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
V0Ǭ



==
==
= AdvPǫ
. . . Adv0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Advǫ
. . .
CPǬ



==
==
=
if . . .
In this schematic syntactic tree, the subject of the matrix sentence, CPǫ, is DPǫ, the
main verb is V0ǫ and the conditional clause is CPǬ. In order to gain a better grasp
of how actual conditional sentences ët into the structure, let us spell out the phrase
structure trees for our two paradigm conditionals. On the one hand, for our (ǫ),
we get the following tree:ǫǯ
ǫǯStrictly speaking, the quantiëer makes this and subsequent trees slightly more complex than
we make them out to be. However, since that will not matter much in the analysis of our subject
matter, we will (incorrectly but innocently so) treat them as DPs hereafter.
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(ǫ) CPǫ
C0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Cǫ
?
TPǫ
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
MMM
MMM
M
T0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
DPǫ



==
==
= Tǫ
would
VPǫ
Someone else V0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Vperf
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M VPǬ
have -en V0Ǭ
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
MMM
MMM
M
AdvPǫ
V0ǭ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M Adv
0
ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
 Vǫ
write
DPǬ



==
==
= Advǫ

CPǬ
Hamlet C0Ǭ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
CǬ
if
TPǬ



==
==
=
Shakespeare had
not written
Hamlet
Notice that the conditional clause CPǬ, ‘if Shakespeare did not write Hamlet ’,
is not c-commanded by any overt adverb in (ǫ). However, since we already claimed
that the syntactic role of conditional clauses is merely to restrict adverbs, we will have
to treat conditionals which have no overt adverb in their surface form as having
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a covert non-restricting adverb, contributing a meaning similar to ‘necessarily’ or
‘always’, present in their structure. Hereafter, let us call this covert adverb  and let
its meaning, which we will further specify soon, be akin to that of ‘necessarily’ and
‘always’.
On the other hand, for our (Ǭ), we get the following phrase structure tree.
Again, notice that we will have to assume the covert adverb  in the structure of
our conditional.
(Ǭ) CPǫ
C0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Cǫ
?
TPǫ
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
MMM
MMM
M
T0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
DPǫ



==
==
= Tǫ
PAST
VPǫ
Someone else V0ǫ
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
MMM
MMM
M
AdvPǫ
V0Ǭ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M Adv
0
ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Vǫ
write
 DPǬ



==
==
= Advǫ

CPǬ
Hamlet C0Ǭ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
CǬ
if
TPǬ



==
==
=
Shakespeare did
not write Hamlet
Finally, it is worth pointing out that on this construal, we get a quite attractive
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syntactic picture of embedded conditionals. A left-side embedded conditional is
a conditional which embeds a further conditional in its antecedent. Although we
rarely express conditionals of this sort, the following conditional is an example of a
left-side embedded conditional:
(ǫǰ) If Fletcher would have written Hamlet if Shakespeare had not, then
Shakespeare could have spent his time doing something else.
Without going into the relevant details, we may similarly account for left-side
embedded conditionals: instead of stacking adjuncts, the conditional clause con-
tains a conditional of its own. In the case of singly left-side embedded conditionals,
the picture would look as follows:
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CPǫ
C0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Cǫ
?
TPǫ
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
MMM
MMM
M
T0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
DPǫ



==
==
= Tǫ
. . .
VPǫ
. . . V0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
V0Ǭ



==
==
= AdvPǫ
. . . Adv0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Advǫ
. . .
CPǬ
C0Ǭ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
CǬ
if
TPǬ



==
==
=
. . .
if . . .
Conversely, a right-side embedded conditional is one which embeds a further
conditional in its consequent. Such conditionals are fairly common place in natural
discourse and the following conditional provides us with an example:
(ǫǱ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then if Fletcher did not write Hamlet,
then someone else did.
In conditionals like this, according to the picture we have pushed so far, each
conditional clause is merely a further adjunct to the matrix clause’s main verb and
its complement. Although this will become clearer later, that entails that the law of
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importation applies to natural language conditionals:ǫǰ any conditional of the form
pif ', then if , then  q entails truth-conditionally a conditional of the form pif '
and, then q. According to our picture, we will have the following schema for the
syntactic structure of right-side embedded conditionals, whereby any given number
of conditional adverbial phrases, AdvPǫ through AdvPn, may act as adjuncts to any
main verb:
CPǫ
C0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Cǫ
?
TPǫ
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
MMM
MMM
M
T0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
DPǫ



==
==
= Tǫ
. . .
VPǫ
. . . V0ǫ
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
V0n
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
V0n+ǫ



==
==
= AdvPn AdvPǫ
. . . Adv0n
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M Adv
0
ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Advn
. . .
CPn+ǫ



==
==
= Advǫ
. . .
CPǬ



==
==
=
if . . . if . . .
ǫǰSee, for instance, McGee (ǫǳǲǯ); see, however, also xxǯ.Ǳ.Ǭ.
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ď.Ė.Ċ Preliminaries
We must quite naturally begin with some preliminaries.ǫǱ First, we will use the
double brackets to denote the semantic values of sentences, phrases and lexical items
whose mention in our metalanguage we shall represent with bold typeface hereafter
in order to avoid an overabundance of quotation marks. Generally, JK therefore
denotes the semantic value of . More carefully put, JxK denotes an interpretation
function from sentences, phrases and lexical items to their semantic values. For
instance, the semantic value of the word Shakespeare would thus be the individual
Shakespeare:
JShakespeareK = Shakespeare.
Moreover, we will use so-called lambda notation to represent functions: we use
‘x 2 D: y’ as a shorthand for the minimal function from the domainD to some
domain speciëed by the function’s value y. For illustration, the function x 2 N: x
+ ǫ is then the successor function for natural numbers. With the lambda notation,
we may thus represent the denotation of predicates such as, say, wrote Hamlet as
functions from individuals to truth values:
Jwrote HamletK = x 2 D:[x wrote Hamlet].
For further example, when we deal with two-place predicates, which are often ex-
pressed by transitive verbs, we assume that they are functions from individuals to
functions from individuals to truth values. e denotation of, say, wrote is then
the following function:
JwroteK = x 2 D:[y 2 D:[y wrote x]].
In order to deal with conditionals—and a range of other expressions—we will
need our account to handle both context sensitivity and intensionality. In order to
ǫǱFor further background and details, see, in particular, Heim and Kratzer (ǫǳǳǲ) and von Fintel
and Heim (ǬǪǪǱ).
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do so, we must extend our interpretation function such that it takes two further
arguments: an assignment function g, in order to account for context-sensitivity,
and a world of evaluationw, in order to account for intensionality. Let g be a partial
function from the set of free variables, context sensitive terms, traces and the like to
the domain of semantic values. Although this might be an unrealistic idealisation,
we shall assume that the context will provide us with g.
On the one hand, the extension of  is then JKg;w. More precisely, JKg;w de-
notes the semantic value of  under the assignment g and as evaluated in world w.
Even more precisely, JxKg;w denotes a interpretation function from terms, assign-
ment functions and worlds to the domain of semantic values. Upon such extension
of our interpretation function, we now have a means of relativisation to contexts
and worlds of evaluation. Inspired by Kripke, we shall assume that names are rigid
designators whose extension is ëxed across worlds.ǫǲ Quite naturally, however, we
will assume that predicates, descriptions and the like vary their extension fromworld
to world. For instance, then, the extension of the terms Shakespeare, Hamlet and
wrote are as follows:
JShakespeareKg;w = Shakespeare.JHamletKg;w = Hamlet.JwroteKg;w = x 2 D:[y 2 D:[y wrote x in w]].ǫǳ
On the other hand, the intension of  is w:JKg;w. Hereafter, let us use JKg
as a shorthand for w:JKg;w. In short, the extension of  is then JKg;w and its
intension is JKg. More carefully stated, JKg denotes a function from a worldw to
the the extension of  as evaluated in that world. More generally put, JxKg denotes
a function from terms and worlds to the domain of intensions. For instance, the
intension of the terms Shakespeare, Hamlet and wrote are as follows:
JShakespeareKg = w: Shakespeare.
ǫǲSee, of course, Kripke (ǫǳǱǬ).
ǫǳSince none of the terms in question are context-sensitive, the assignment function g is an idle
parameter.
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JHamletKg = w: Hamlet.JwroteKg = w:[x 2 D:[y 2 D:[y wrote x in w]]].
Quite obviously, semantic values are of diﬀerent types. For instance, the ex-
tension of Shakespeare is an individual, the extension of wrote is a function from
individuals to a function from individuals to truth values, and the extension of the
sentence Shakespeare wroteHamlet is a truth value. Let us call the semantic type
of truth values t and the semantic type of individuals e. Let hi; oi denote the type
of a function from a domain whose elements are of type i to domain whose ele-
ments are of type o. We may then represent the semantic type of functions from
individuals to truth values as he; ti, the semantic type of functions from individuals
to functions from individuals to truth values as he; he; tii and so on. Moreover, to
allow for intensions, let w represent the type of worlds. Intensions of names will
then have the semantic type hw; ei, the intension of intransitive verbs will have the
semantic type hw; he; tii and so on. More carefully stated, we may now recursively
deëne the semantic types of our framework as follows:
Semantic Types
(i) t is a semantic type.
(ii) e is a semantic type.
(iii) If a and b are semantic types, ha; bi is a semantic type.
(iv) If a is a semantic type, hw; ai is a semantic type.
(v) Nothing else is a semantic type.
Corresponding to this deënition of semantic types, we may deëne semantic
denotation domains recursively as follows:
Semantic Denotation Domains
(i) Dt := fǪ,ǫg (the set of truth values).
(ii) De :=D (the set of all possible individuals).
(iii) If a and b are semantic types, Dha;bi is the set of all functions
fromDa toDb.
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(iv) If a is a type, thenDhw;ai is the set of all functions from the set
of worldsW toDa.
For instance, then, a semantic value of type hw; he; tii is a function in the domain
Dhw;he;tii, which is the domain of functions fromW to functions of type he; ti.
In order to get us oﬀ the ground, we will need two principles of composition.
We will assume that we work with binary syntactic trees throughout. A binary tree
is a tree whose nodes have at most two children. Following syntactic tradition,
we call parent nodes ‘mothers’ and their children nodes their ‘daughters’. In the
cases where a mother has only one daughter, the value of the mother is simply the
value of its daughter. In the cases where a mother has two daughters, our compo-
sitional principles dictate how to derive the value of the mother from the value of
her daughters. Our two principles therefore tell us how to calculate the meaning of
a branching tree node in terms of its two daughters.
e ërst principle is straightforward functional application: whenever one daugh-
ter node is a function whose domain contains the other daughter node, the value of
the mother node is the value which results from applying the ërst daughter node to
the second:
Functional Application
If  is a branching node and f; g the set of its daughters, then, for
any world w and assignment g: if JKg;w is a function whose domain
contains JKg;w, then JKg;w = JKg;w(JKg;w).
Our second principle of composition is merely an intensional counterpart of
the ërst:
Intensional Functional Application
If  is a branching node and f; g the set of its daughters, then, for
any world w and assignment g: if JKg;w is a function whose domain
contains w0:JKg;w0 , then JKg;w = JKg;w(w0:JKg;w0).
Finally, we will need to tie the notion of truth to our semantic system. For that
purpose, let us introduce the following principle:
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Truth of an Utterance
An utterance of a sentence ' in a world w is true iﬀ J'Kg;w = ǫ.
ď.Ė.Č Putting the Pieces Together
To gain a better grasp of the framework, let us give an example to illustrate how we
compute the semantic values of sentences. Let us focus on the following sentence:
(ǫǲ) Shakespeare wrote Hamlet.
For all intents and purposes, we may assume that the structure of our sentence may
be represented by the following simpliëed phrase marker tree:
(ǫǲ) Sǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
NPǫ
Shakespeare
VPǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Vǫ
wrote
NPǬ
Hamlet
In order to compute J(ǫǲ)Kg;w, we must work our way up from the semantic
values of the terminal nodes. Recall, we already said above that the extensions of
Shakespeare, Hamlet and wrote were as follows:
JShakespeareKg;w = Shakespeare.JHamletKg;w = Hamlet.JwroteKg;w = x 2 D:[y 2 D:[y wrote x in w]].ǬǪ
Wemay substitute the terminal nodes of our tree for their respective extensions.
Let us begin by computing the value of VPǫ whose daughters are Vǫ and NPǬ:
ǬǪSince none of the terms in question are context-sensitive, the assignment function g is an idle
parameter.
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VPǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
VǫJwroteKg;w NPǬJHamletKg;w
e extension of wrote is the function x 2 De:[y 2 De:[y wrote x in w]]
and the extension of Hamlet is the object Hamlet. Since the type of the former is
he; he; tii and the type of the latter is e, our principle of functional application tells
us that JVPǫKg;w is JwroteKg;w applied to JHamletKg;w:
JVPǫKg;w = JwroteKg;w(JHamletKg;w)
= x 2 De:[y 2 De:[y wrote x in w]](Hamlet)
= y 2 De:[y wrote Hamlet in w]
Let us now move on to Sǫ whose daughters are NPǫ and VPǫ. Since we have
already computed JVPǫKg;w, let us leave its value in our tree:
Sǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
NPǫJShakespeareKg;w
VPǫ
y 2 De:[y wrote Hamlet in w]
e extension of Shakespeare is the individual Shakespeare and the exten-
sion of VPǫ, we just computed, is the function y 2 De:[y wrote Hamlet in
w]. Since the type of the former is e and the type of the latter is he; ti, our prin-
ciple of functional application again tells us that JSǫKg;w is JVPǫKg;w applied toJShakespeareKg;w:
JSǫKg;w = JVPǫKg;w(JShakespeareKg;w)
= y 2 De:[y wrote Hamlet in w](Shakespeare)
= Shakespeare wrote Hamlet in w
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Given our principle of truth of utterance, an utterance of (ǫǲ) is then true in a
worldw iﬀ Shakespeare wroteHamlet inw. More importantly, the truth conditions
of (ǫǲ) may therefore be calculated as follows:
J(ǫǲ)Kg;w = ǫ iﬀ JwroteKg;w(JHamletKg;w)(JShakespeareKg;w) = ǫ
iﬀ x 2 De:[y 2 De:[y wrote x in w]](Hamlet)
(Shakespeare) = ǫ
iﬀ y 2 De:[y wrote Hamlet in w]](Shakespeare) = ǫ
iﬀ Shakespeare wrote Hamlet in w.
Now that we have spelt out the preliminaries of our semantic framework, let us
now turn to the issue of conditionals again.
ď.Ė.č Adverbial Phrases
We claimed above that conditional clauses are constituents of adverbial phrases.
In order to understand the semantic contribution of adverbial phrases, let us ërst
consider sentences which contain adverbial phrases but no conditional clauses such
as the following:
(ǫǳ) James Joyce never read Hamlet.
For our present purposes, wemay assume that the syntactic structure of our sentence
may be represented by the following simpliëed phrase marker tree:
(ǫǳ) Sǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
NPǫ
James Joyce
VPǫ
V0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
AdvPǫ
never
V0Ǭ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Vǫ
read
NPǬ
Hamlet
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For more simple sentences, such as (ǫǲ), we have already seen that the verb
phrase of the matrix clause must be of type he; ti in order to correspond with the
subject whose type is e. More carefully put, in such simple sentences, we expect
whichever function the verb and its object, if any, determine together to percolate up
through the tree and eventually end up in the relevant VP node. In more complex
sentences containing adverbial phrases, which are driven like a wedge between the
relevant VP node and the verb and its object, if any, we would therefore expect that
the adverbial phrase node in question would be a function of the type hhe; ti; he; tii
or hhe; ti; hw; he; tiii. Since the latter will make things slightly easier for us, let
us assume that the adverbial phrase operates on the intension of the verb by our
intensional functional application. We would then expect that the types of the
terminal nodes of our previous tree would be as follows:
Sǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
NPǫ
e
VPǫ
V0ǫ
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
MMM
MMM
M
V0Ǭ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
AdvPǫ
hhe; ti; hw; he; tiii
Vǫ
he; he; tii
NPǬ
e
If we let W represent the set of worlds or situations viable in the context, the se-
mantic value of never could, it seems intuitively, be spelt out as follows:Ǭǫ
JneverKg;w =f 2 Dhw;he;tii: [x 2 De:[(fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg\W )
= ?]].ǬǬ
ǬǫIn the case of never and some other adverbs of temporal quantiëcation, we may assume that
W will be the a set of earlier ‘times’ modally presented along the lines of Prior (ǫǳǯǱ) and subsequent
literature. Alternatively, we may build temporal clauses into the denotation of never, say, along the
following lines: JneverKg;w = f 2 Dhe;ti: [x 2 De:[8t < time of context, f(x) = Ǫ at t]].
ǬǬOr alternatively, yet equivalently, JneverKg;w = f 2 Dhw;he;tii: [x 2 De:[:9w(w 2
W ^ f(w)(x))]].
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Assuming the obvious denotations of the other terms, if we were then compute
the truth conditions of (ǫǳ), we would then get the correct results:
J(ǫǳ)Kg;w = ǫ iﬀ JneverKg;w(JreadKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)
(JJames JoyceKg;w) = ǫ
iﬀ f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:[fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg \W = ?]]
(x 2 De:[y 2 De:[y read x in w]])(Hamlet)
(James Joyce) = ǫ
iﬀ f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:[fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg \W = ?]]
(y 2 De:[y read Hamlet in w])(James Joyce) = ǫ
iﬀ x 2 De:[fw : w0:[y 2 De:[y read Hamlet in w0]](w)
(x) = ǫg \W = ?](James Joyce) = ǫ
iﬀ fw : w0:[y 2 De:[y read Hamlet in w0]](w)
(James Joyce) = ǫg \W = ?
iﬀ fw : y 2 De:[y read Hamlet in w](James Joyce) = ǫg
\W = ?
iﬀ fw :James Joyce read Hamlet in wg \W = ?
iﬀ :9w 2 W; James Joyce read Hamlet in w.
So much for non-conditional adverbial phrases. In cases of conditionals, how-
ever, the picture becomes substantially more complex. Recall that we said that
natural language conditionals such as (ǫ) and (Ǭ) have a syntactic structure which
contains a sub-tree of the following form:
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VPǫ
V0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
V0Ǭ



==
==
= AdvPǫ
. . . Adv0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Advǫ
. . .
CPǬ
C0Ǭ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
CǬ
if
TPǬ



==
==
=
. . .
For the sake of compositionality, the verb and its object, if there is any, of the
matrix clause must determine an extension of type he; ti in the cases of conditionals
just as in the case of more simple sentences such as (ǫǲ) and (ǫǳ). So, again, we
expect both the sister of the adverbial phrase and its mother to have an extension of
type he; ti. However, although we claimed earlier that the type of an adverb would
have to be hhe; ti; hw; he; tiii, we now see that there must be more to them than
that: otherwise, if that were the case, there would be no way to combine the adverb
and its relevant complementiser phrase whose type we assume is either hw; ti, if
treated intensionally, or t, if treated extensionally. Since the intensional treatment
of the complementiser phrase in question is more helpful for our purposes, we will
let the type of adverbs be hhw; ti; hhw; he; tii; he; tiii. Without going into the
details of the complementiser phrase at this point, we would expect that the types
of the terminal nodes of our sub-tree would be as follows:
ď.Ė Compositional Semantics in Generative Grammar ĊėĘ
VPǫ
V0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
V0Ǭ



==
==
= AdvPǫ
he; ti Adv0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
Advǫ
hhw; ti; hhw; he; tii; he; tiii
CPǬ



==
==
=
hw; ti
It therefore seems that the meaning we attributed to never before is too sim-
ple. Instead, the correct meaning would have to be something along the following
lines:Ǭǭ
JneverKg;w = p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[(fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg \ fw : p(w) = ǫg) = ?]]].ǬǮ
Now, however, we seem to be in a peculiar predicament: namely, if we agree on
the above meaning of never, we do not seem to be able to compute the meaning
of sentences such as (ǫǲ) any more. To get us out of the bind, we have at least two
distinct options. First, we might maintain that never (and every other adverb which
supports a conditional clause) is in fact ambiguous between two distinct lexical
items, say neverǫ and neverǬ, whose denotations are of types hhe; ti; hw; he; tiii
and hhw; ti; hhw; he; tii; he; tiii respectively. Second, we might maintain that in
ǬǭContrary to Heim and Kratzer (ǫǳǳǲ) and von Fintel and Heim (ǬǪǪǱ) we shall not equivo-
cate sets and their characteristic functions. Although that will inevitably leave our formalism more
complex, it will eventually be more precise and correct.
ǬǮAlternatively, yet equivalently, JneverKg;w = p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2
De:[:9w(f(w)(x)^ p(w))]]]. On yet diﬀerent representation, see also footnote Ǭǫ.
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cases where there are no conditional clauses, such as (ǫǲ), the context provides the
appropriate function from worlds to truth values as an argument to JneverKg;w.
Since adverbs such as never show some obvious symptoms of context sensitivity
(and ambiguity should arguably be avoided whenever possible), the second option
seems far more attractive. First, in order to appreciate the context sensitivity of an
adverb such as never, we can imagine two distinct contextsCǫ andCǬ in which the
utterance of (ǫǳ) is true and false respectively. On the one hand, in Cǫ we might,
say, only be interested what transpired during Joyce’s brief ërst stay in Zürich. Now,
were someone then to utter (ǫǳ) in Cǫ, the proposition expressed by the utterance
would be true due to the domain restriction provided by the context: Joyce never
read Hamlet during his ërst brief stay in Zürich. On the other hand, in CǬ we
might, say, be interested in Joyce’s entire biography and were we to utter (ǫǳ) in
that context, the proposition expressed by the utterance would be false due to the
domain restriction provided by the context: Joyce did readHamlet sometime during
his lifetime.
If we agree that adverbs of quantiëcation have an element of context sensitivity,
we must next decide on some means of integration into our current framework.
A possible way would be to posit a constituent in our syntactic structure which
represents the set of worlds or situations in question. More precisely, we would
need a function of type hw; ti which would return ǫ for the worlds or situations
in question and Ǫ otherwise.Ǭǯ Let us call our overt constituent W and deëne its
denotation as follows:
JWKg;w = g(W ) = w:[w 2 fw0 : w0 is contextually relevantg].
In other words, we expect the assignment function g to provide us with the appro-
priate function from worlds to truth values, such that its value is ǫ iﬀ its argument is
a world or situation which is relevant in the context that determines g. Now, were
we to go for an implementation of this sort, the types of the terminal nodes in the
ǬǯAnother viable implementation would be to posit anchors which a domain ëxing function
of some sort would take as an argument and return the set of relevant worlds. for details, see
Schwarzschild (ǬǪǪǳ) but also Kratzer (ǬǪǪǳ).
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syntactic structure of (ǫǳ) would be of the following form, where our constituent
is Advǫ’s sister:
Sǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
NPǫ
e
VPǫ
V0ǫ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
AdvPǫ
Adv0ǫ
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
qqq
MMM
MMM
M V
0
Ǭ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
W
hw; ti
Vǫ
he; he; tii
NPǬ
e
Advǫ
hhw; ti; hhw; he; tii; he; tiii
Were we now to compute the truth conditions of (ǫǳ), we would get the correct
result:
J(ǫǳ)Kg;w = ǫ iﬀ JneverKg;w(JWKg;w)(JreadKg;w)
(JHamletKg;w)(JJames JoyceKg;w) = ǫ
iﬀ p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg \ fw : p(w) = ǫg = ?]]](g(W ))
(x 2 De:[y 2 De:[y read x in w]])(Hamlet)
(James Joyce) = ǫ
iﬀ p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg \ fw : p(w) = ǫg = ?]]]
(w:[w 2 fw0 : w0 is contextually relevantg])
(y 2 De:[y read Hamlet in w])(James Joyce) = ǫ
iﬀ f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:[fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg\
fw : w0:[w0 2 fw00 : w00 is contextually relevantg](w)
= ǫg = ?]](y 2 De:[y read Hamlet in w])
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(James Joyce) = ǫ
iﬀ x 2 De:[fw : w0:[y 2 De:[y read Hamlet in w0]](w)
(x) = ǫg \ fw : w0:[w0 2 fw00 : w00 is contextually
relevantg](w) = ǫg = ?](James Joyce) = ǫ
iﬀ x 2 De:[fw : y 2 De:[y read Hamlet in w](x) = ǫg\
fw : w is contextually relevantg = ǫg = ?]
(James Joyce) = ǫ
iﬀ fw : y 2 De:[y read Hamlet in w](James Joyce) = ǫg\
fw : w is contextually relevantg = ?
iﬀ fw :James Joyce read Hamlet in wg\
fw : w is contextually relevantg = ?
iﬀ :9w 2 fw0 : w0 is contextually relevantg,
James Joyce read Hamlet in w.
ď.Ė.ď Conditionals
We now have almost everything we need to deal successfully with conditionals.
In the cases of conditionals, we simply expect the conditional clause to pass up a
function similar to JWKg;w above. In particular, we expect the complementiser
phrase to be a function from worlds to truth values such that its value is ǫ if its
argument is a product of the relevant modal or amodal supposition and Ǫ otherwise.
Recall that we claimed that the syntactic structure of the complementiser phrases
of conditionals have the following form:
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CPǬ
C0Ǭ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
CǬ
if
TPǬ



==
==
=
. . .
Since we need the value of the complementiser phrase to be of type hw; ti in order to
match its adverbial sister, either if or the tense phrase will have to pass up a function
of that type. Since the extension of tense phrases is of type t in matrix clauses,
it would be peculiar from a compositional point of view if we were to assume a
diﬀerent sort of meaning of tensed phrases in conditional clauses.Ǭǰ In other words,
it seems that the denotation of if is required to be a function whose argument is a
tensed phrase and whose value is a function of type hw; ti. However, it would be
hasty to conclude already that the extension of if must thereby be of type ht; hw; tii
or hhw; ti; hw; tii. is is because we expect there to be further constituents in
our syntactic structure: namely, based on our earlier analysis of modal and amodal
conditional, the sort of supposition in question, the world or the set of propositions
against which the supposition is made and the laws or the logic assumed to obtain.
In other words, we propose that the syntactic structure of the conditional clause is
of the following form:
ǬǰUnless, of course, one were to take the so-called schmentencite way; see Lewis (ǫǳǲǪ/ǫǳǳǲ)
and also Schaﬀer (ms.b).
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CPǬ
C0Ǭ
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
CǬ
if

qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
 
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
 
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
 TPǬ



==
==
=
. . .
e constituents ,  and  need all be context sensitive in a fashion which
will eventually allow us to get the appropriate elements into the truth conditions of
modal and amodal conditionals.ǬǱ
First, let  be a constituent such that when our contextual assignments func-
tion g is applied to it, the result is either the modal supposition function M or
the amodal supposition function N , depending on which sort of suppositions is
expressed in the context:
JKg;w = g() =
8>>>><>>>>:
M(x; y; z) if a modal supposition
is expressed in the context
N(x; y; z) if an amodal supposition
is expressed in the context
Second, let  be a constituent such that when our contextual assignment func-
tion g is applied to it, the result is either the world against which a modal supposi-
tion is made Sw or the set of propositions against which an amodal supposition is
ǬǱSee xxǮ.Ǭ.ǫ–Ǯ.Ǭ.Ǭ.
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made SK , depending on the supposition expressed in the context and the world or
proposition set salient:
JKg;w = g() =
8>>>><>>>>:
Sw if a modal supposition
is expressed in the context
SK if an amodal supposition
is expressed in the context
ird, let  be a constituent such that when our contextual assignment func-
tion g is applied to it, the result is either the laws assumed to apply in the world
against which a modal supposition is made SL or the logic assumed to dictate the
consistency of the set of propositions against which an amodal supposition is made
Sl, again depending on the supposition expressed in the context:
JKg;w = g() =
8>>>><>>>>:
SL if a modal supposition
is expressed in the context
Sl if an amodal supposition
is expressed in the context
At last, we are now in a position to spell out the required denotation of if.
Quite roughly, JifKg;w needs to be a function which picks up, as it were, whatever
is denoted by ,  and  , the intension of the tensed phrase, and which then re-
turns a function of type hw; ti. Without further ado, let us now present the much
anticipated denotation of if :
JifKg;w = f:[s:[l:[p 2 Dhw;ti:[w:[w 2 f(p; s; l)]]]]].
In order to deal with conditionals such as (ǫ) and (Ǭ), we must furthermore
spell out the denotation of the unarticulated adverb .Ǭǲ As we already claimed,
the meaning of  needs to be quite similar to JalwaysKg;w or JnecessarilyKg;w or
some equally unrestrictive adverb. In other words, we need a function of type
hhw; ti; hhw; he; tii; he; tiii similar in structure to that of JneverKg;w above yet
ǬǲSee xǮ.Ǯ.
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inverse in meaning. e natural candidate for the denotation of  is therefore as
follows:
JKg;w = p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : p(w) = ǫg  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]]].Ǭǳ
Let us now consider how we would derive the truth conditions of (ǫ) and (Ǭ)
in our framework. To make things a little bit easier for us, let us make several fairly
uncontroversial assumptions about our sentences. We shall assume here that then is
semantically vacuous.ǭǪ Furthermore, we shall assume that have and had do noth-
ing more than generate a perfective aspect in their respective clauses and we shall
assume that the perfective aspect, together with the modal verb, does nothing more
here than provide evidence for utterer’s intention of modal supposition. Moreover,
we shall assume that the auxiliary did does no more in (Ǭ) than to support negation
and inspire the past tense of write. Needless to say, we do expect that our best se-
mantic theory of aspect and tense should provide us with an appropriate account of
those elements to ët into a bigger picture. However, at present, we need not worry
about the exact details.
Before we can derive the meaning of (ǫ) and (Ǭ), we need to spell out the deno-
tation of those of their constituents which we have not already spelled out above.
e extension of someone else and not are fairly obvious in our contexts:
Jsomeone elseKg;w = g(someone else) = some x 2 De which is not
Shakespeare.ǭǫJnotKg;w = p 2 Dhw;ti:[w:[w /2 fw0 : p(w0) = ǫg]].
However, the meaning of would requires some imagination. First of all, let us
notice that would seems context sensitive to the same extent as always and some
ǬǳOr alternatively, yet equivalently, JKg;w = p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2
De:[8w(p(w)  f(w)(x))]]].
ǭǪSee, however, Davis (ǫǳǲǭ) and Geis (ǫǳǲǯ).
ǭǫClearly, diﬀerent contexts will provide diﬀerent assignment functions g which in turn will
yield diﬀerent denotations to someone else.
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other adverbs of quantiëcation: when there is no conditional clause, would and
always become sensitive to some contextually salient set of worlds. For instance,
the truth conditions of the following sentence will depend on the context in which
it is uttered:
(ǬǪ) James Joyce would not have written Ulysses.
Again, we may well imagine two distinct contexts Cǫ and CǬ in which the ut-
terance of (ǬǪ) is true and false respectively. On the one hand, in Cǫ we might,
say, only be interested in how Joyce’s life would have turned out had he given up
literature after writing his Dubliners. Now, were someone then to utter (ǬǪ) in Cǫ,
the proposition expressed by the utterance would be true due to the restriction pro-
vided by the context. On the other hand, inCǬ we might, say, be interested in how
Joyce’s life would have turned out had he left Dublin slightly sooner than he actu-
ally did in ǫǳǪǮ. Were we to utter (ǬǪ) in that context, the proposition expressed
by the utterance would (presumably) be false due to the restriction provided by the
context.
Above, we introduced the overtW in order to provide a means to the appropri-
ate context sensitivity of adverbs of quantiëcation. We may repeat a move of that
sort here. In sentences where a modal verb is not complimented by a complemen-
tiser phrase, we can posit a constituent in the syntax which is sensitive to appropriate
elements of the context. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume here that that con-
stituent is in fact our W. On that assumption, we can give the following meaning
to would:
JwouldKg;w = p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : p(w) = ǫg  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]]].ǭǬ
And for the sake of completeness, we can give a corresponding meaning to could,
the dual of would:ǭǭ
ǭǬAlternatively, JwouldKg;w = p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:[8w(p(w) 
f(w)(x))]]].
ǭǭOn this account, would, as it were, entails could. Although this is standardly assumed, we
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JcouldKg;w = p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[(fw : p(w) = ǫg \ fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg) ≠ ?]]].ǭǮ
Moreover, it seems we can assume that other modals will, as it were, follow suit
in the sense that, will, shall, should,must and ought, on the one hand, andmay,
might and can, on the other hand, denote the same functions as would and could
respectively.ǭǯ e apparent diﬀerence between those modal verbs lies merely in the
contextually determined function of the type hw; ti which they pick up.
In the cases of conditionals, the picture gets slighly more interesting: in the
presence of a conditional clause, the modal verbs seem to become sensitive to their
contribution instead of the contextually contributed W. More precisely, in those
cases, it seems thatW is in fact anaphoric (or cataphoric) on the conditional clause
in question. Now, as the attentive reader will without a doubt have noticed al-
ready, our proposed denotation of would is the same as that of  and the adverb
always and, similarly, the proposed denotation of could is the same as that of the
adverb sometimes. For that very reason, we might actually claim that in condition-
als such as our (ǫ),  drops out as the conditional clause moves up to W’s place in
the syntactic structure. Now, of course, we must admit the we are only engaging
in speculative syntax at this point. However, in order to get things right in our
framework, something along those lines will have to be assumed at present about
the syntax of conditionals.
Upon those assumptions, the structure of both (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are roughly along
those lines, where the only diﬀerence could lie in the contribution of the meaning
of ,  and  :ǭǰ
(ǫ) [CP[NPSomeone else] [TPwould [CP if    [TPnot Shakespeare wrote
have reasons to suspect that that assumption is mistaken. For instance, to our annoyance, it might
be true that he would always count on our support although it would be false that he could always
count on our support.
ǭǮAlternatively, JcouldKg;w = p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:[9w(p(w) ^
f(w)(x))]]].
ǭǯA similar proposal is espoused by Kratzer (ǫǳǱǱ, ǫǳǲǫ).
ǭǰUnder our present analysis, the structure of (ǫ) and (Ǭ) has become too complex to typeset in
tree form; for a hint, see previous sub-tree and xǮ.Ǯ.
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Hamlet]]i[VPwrote Hamlet [AdvP ti ]]]].
(Ǭ) [CP[NPSomeone else] [VPwrote Hamlet [AdvP [CP if    [TPnot
Shakespeare wrote Hamlet]]]]].
We are ënally then in a position to derive the truth conditions of (ǫ) and (Ǭ).
Assuming that (ǫ) was uttered to express its consequent on the modal supposition of
its antecedent against the actual world @ and on the assumption that the some fairly
commonsensical physical laws @l obtain in the actual world, the truth conditions
of (ǫ) may be derived as follows:
J(ǫ)Kg;w = ǫ iﬀ JwouldKg;w(JifKg;w)(JKg;w)(JKg;w)(JKg;w)
(JnotKg;w)(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)(JShakespeareKg;w)
(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)(Jsomeone elseKg;w) = ǫ
iﬀ p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : p(w) = ǫg  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]]]
(f:[s:[l:[p 2 Dhw;ti:[w:[w 2 fw0 : w0 2
f(p; s; l)g]]]]])(g())(g())(g())
(p 2 Dhw;ti:[w:[w /2 fw0 : p(w0) = ǫg]])
(x 2 D:[y 2 D:[y wrote x in w]])(Hamlet)
(Shakespeare)(x 2 D:[y 2 D:[y wrote x in w]])
(Hamlet)(some x 2 De which is not Shakespeare) = ǫ
iﬀ p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : p(w) = ǫg  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]]]
(f:[s:[l:[p 2 Dhw;ti:[w:[w 2 f(p; s; l)]]]]])
(M(x; y; z))(@)(@l)(p 2 Dhw;ti:
[w:[w /2 fw0 : p(w0) = ǫg]])
(y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w])(Shakespeare)
(y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w])(some x 2 De : : :) = ǫ
iﬀ p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : p(w) = ǫg  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]]]
(s:[l:[p 2 Dhw;ti:[w:[w 2M(p; s; l)]]]])
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(@)(@l)(p 2 Dhw;ti:[w0:[w0 /2 fw00 : p(w00) = ǫg]])
(Shakespeare wrote Hamlet in w)
(y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w])(some x 2 De : : :) = ǫ
iﬀ p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : p(w) = ǫg  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]]]
(l:[p 2 Dhw;ti:[w:[w 2M(p;@; l)]]])(@l)
(w:[w /2 fw0 : w00:[Shakespeare wrote Hamlet in w00]
(w0) = ǫg])(y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w])
(some x 2 De : : :) = ǫ
iﬀ p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : p(w) = ǫg  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]]]
(p 2 Dhw;ti:[w:[w 2M(p;@;@l)]])
(w:[w /2 fw0 : Shakespeare wrote Hamlet in w0g])
(y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w])(some x 2 De : : :) = ǫ
iﬀ p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : p(w) = ǫg  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]]]
(p 2 Dhw;ti:[w:[w 2M(p;@;@l)]])
(w:[w 2 fw0 : Shakespeare did not write Hamlet in w0g])
(y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w])(some x 2 De : : :) = ǫ
iﬀ p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : p(w) = ǫg  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]]]
(p 2 Dhw;ti:[w:[w 2M(p;@;@l)]])
(w:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet in w])
(y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w])(some x 2 De : : :) = ǫ
iﬀ p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : p(w) = ǫg  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]]]
(w:[w 2M(w0:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet
in w0];@;@l)])(y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w])
(some x 2 De : : :) = ǫ
iﬀ f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:[fw : w0:[w0 2
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M(w00:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet in w00];@;@l)]
(w) = ǫg  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]]
(y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w])
(some x 2 De : : :) = ǫ
iﬀ x 2 De:[M(w0:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet in w0];
@;@l)  fw : w0:[y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w0]]
(w)(x) = ǫg](some x 2 De : : :) = ǫ
iﬀ M(w0:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet in w0];@;@l) 
fw : y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w]
(some x 2 De : : :) = ǫg
iﬀ M(w0:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet in w0];@;@l) 
fw : some x 2 De which is not Shakespeare wrote Hamlet
in wg
In other words, (ǫ) is true iﬀ every world of the product of the modal supposi-
tion that Shakespeare did not writeHamlet, against the actual world@ and assuming
some fairly commonsensical physical laws @l, is a world in which someone other
than Shakespeare wrote Hamlet.
In the case of (Ǭ), things are unsurprisingly similar. Assuming that (Ǭ) was
uttered to express its consequent on the amodal supposition of its antecedent against
a set of propositionsK and on the assumption that the logic of some descriptionKl
dictates the consistency ofK , the truth conditions of (Ǭ) may be derived as follows:
J(Ǭ)Kg;w = ǫ iﬀ JKg;w(JifKg;w)(JKg;w)(JKg;w)(JKg;w)
(JnotKg;w)(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)(JShakespeareKg;w)
(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)(Jsomeone elseKg;w) = ǫ
iﬀ p 2 Dhw;ti:[f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[fw : p(w) = ǫg  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]]]
(f:[s:[l:[p 2 Dhw;ti:[w:[w 2 fw0 : w0 2
f(p; s; l)g]]]]])(g())(g())(g())
(p 2 Dhw;ti:[w:[w /2 fw0 : p(w0) = ǫg]])
(x 2 D:[y 2 D:[y wrote x in w]])(Hamlet)
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(Shakespeare)(x 2 D:[y 2 D:[y wrote x in w]])
(Hamlet)(some x 2 De which is not Shakespeare) = ǫ
iﬀ . . .
iﬀ x 2 De:[N(w0:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet in w0];
K;Kl)  fw : w0:[y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w0]]
(w)(x) = ǫg](some x 2 De which is not Shakespeare) = ǫ
iﬀ . . .
iﬀ N(w0:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet in w0]; K;Kl) 
fw : some x 2 De which is not Shakespeare wrote Hamlet
in wg
In other words, (Ǭ) is true iﬀ every set of propositions of the product of the
amodal supposition that Shakespeare did not writeHamlet, against the set of propo-
sitionsK and assuming logicKl to dictate the consistency ofK, is a set which con-
tains the proposition ‘someone other than Shakespeare wrote Hamlet ’. We must,
of course, make the further assumption that worlds may be represented as sets of
propositions but that is a fairly innocent assumption in the context of our frame-
work.
We have thus seen that our framework allows us to derive the appropriate mean-
ing of (ǫ) and (Ǭ) compositionally. Although we have managed to give appropriate
compositional semantics for modal and amodal conditionals, our work is not en-
tirely over: we still have not addressed the issue of embedded conditionals.
ď.Ė.Ė Embedded Conditionals
We introduced the issue of embedded conditionals above.ǭǱ We made an obvious
distinction between left-side and right-side embedded conditionals: while left-side
embedded conditionals embed a further conditional in their antecedents, right-side
embedded conditionals embed a further conditional in their consequents.
To remind ourselves, the following conditional is an example of a left-side em-
bedded conditional is the following conditional:
ǭǱSee xǮ.Ǯ.
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(ǫǰ) If Fletcher would have written Hamlet if Shakespeare had not, then
Shakespeare could have spent his time doing something else.
Our framework deals neatly with with left-side embedded conditionals. Above, we
said that the structure of a singly left-side embedded conditional such as (ǫǰ) would
be as follows:ǭǲ
(ǫǰ) [CP[NPShakespeareǫ] [VPcould spent hisǫ time doing something else [AdvP
[CP if ǫ ǫ ǫ [TPwould Fletcher wrote Hamlet [AdvP[CP if  Ǭ Ǭ
Ǭ[TPnot Shakespeare wrote Hamlet]]]]]]]].
Without going into excruciating details, our framework predicts the following
truth conditions for (ǫǰ):
J(ǫǰ)Kg;w = ǫ iﬀ JKg;w(JifKg;w)(JǫKg;w)(JǫKg;w)(JǫKg;w)JKg;w(JifKg;w)(JǬKg;w)(JǬKg;w)(JǬKg;w)
(JShakespeare had not written HamletKg;w)
(JFletcher would have written HamletKg;w)
(Jcould have spent his time doing something elseKg;w)
(JShakespeareKg;w) = ǫ
iﬀ . . .
iﬀ g(ǫ)(w:[g(Ǭ)(w0:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet
in w0]; g(Ǭ); g(Ǭ))  fw00 : Fletcher wrote Hamlet
in w00g]; g(ǫ); g(ǫ))  fw : Shakespeare could have
spent his time doing something else in wg
Insofar as our intuitions carry any weight, those are the appropriate truth condi-
tions for (ǫǰ). e product of the g(ǫ) supposition, relative to g(ǫ) and g(ǫ),
that the product of the g(Ǭ) supposition, relative to g(Ǭ) and g(Ǭ), that Shake-
speare did not write Hamlet is comparable with Fletcher having written Hamlet,
is comparable with Shakespeare having be able to spend his time doing something
else. In slightly more familiar terms, all the worlds in which the supposition that all
ǭǲxǮ.Ǯ.
ĊęČ Suppositional Semantics
the suppositional worlds of ‘Shakespeare did not write Hamlet ’ are ‘Fletcher wrote
Hamlet ’ worlds, are themselves ‘Shakespeare could have spent his time doing some-
thing else’ worlds. We can therefore conclude that our account deals appropriately
with left-side embedded conditionals.
Right-side embedded conditional are more interesting. Recall that we said that
the following conditional is an example of a right-side embedded conditional:
(ǫǱ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then if Fletcher did not write Hamlet,
then someone else did.
Clearly, we can make quite good sense of this sort of conditional. And although we
rarely do so, we may in principle sensibly embed indeënitely on the right-side.
Now, for our intent and purposes, we may claim that the syntactic structure of
(ǫǱ) is somewhere vaguely along the following lines:ǭǳ
(ǫǱ) [CP[NPsomeone else] [VPwrote Hamlet [AdvP [CP if ǫ ǫ ǫ [TPnot
Shakespeare wrote Hamlet]]][AdvP [CP if Ǭ Ǭ Ǭ [TPnot Fletcher wrote
Hamlet]]]]].
However, that might seem to be bad news for us: given our current semantic clauses
and compositional principles, we soon run into peculiar issues in our derivation of
the truth conditions of (ǫǱ). e problem is certainly not as bad as a type clash
but one worth a worry nonetheless. Again, without going into minute details, our
framework predicts the following truth conditions:ǮǪ
J(ǫǱ)Kg;w = ǫ iﬀ JKg;w(JifKg;w)(JǫKg;w)(JǫKg;w)(JǫKg;w)
(JnotKg;w)(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)
(JShakespeareKg;w)JKg;w(JifKg;w)(JǬKg;w)(JǬKg;w)(JǬKg;w)
(JnotKg;w)(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)(JFletcherKg;w)
(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)(Jsomeone elseKg;w) = ǫ
ǭǳSee also xǮ.Ǯ.
ǮǪWe shall assume, quite naturally in the context, that Jsomeone elseKg;w = g(someone else)
= some x 2 De which is neither Shakespeare nor Fletcher.
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iﬀ . . .
iﬀ f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:
[g(ǫ)(w0:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet in w0];
g(ǫ); g(ǫ))  fw : f(w)(x) = ǫg]](x 2 De:
[g(Ǭ)(w0:[Fletcher did not write Hamlet in w0];
g(Ǭ); g(Ǭ))  fw : y 2 D:[y wrote Hamlet in w]
(x) = ǫg])(some x 2 De : : :) = ǫ
iﬀ . . .
iﬀ x 2 De:[g(ǫ)(w0:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet
in w0]; g(ǫ); g(ǫ))  fw : y 2 De:
[g(Ǭ)(w0:[Fletcher did not write Hamlet in w0]; g(Ǭ);
g(Ǭ))  fw : z 2 D:[z wrote Hamlet in w](y) = ǫg]
(x) = ǫg](some x 2 De : : :) = ǫ
iﬀ . . .
iﬀ g(ǫ)(w0:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet in w0];
g(ǫ); g(ǫ))  fw : g(Ǭ)(w0:[Fletcher did not write
Hamlet in w0]; g(Ǭ); g(Ǭ))  fw : some x 2 De
which is neither Shakespeare nor Fletcher wrote Hamlet
in wgg
Depending on whether the product of the g(Ǭ) supposition that Fletcher did not
write Hamlet, relative to g(Ǭ) and g(Ǭ), is such that someone other than Shake-
speare or Fletcher wroteHamlet, the set on the right will either contain every world
or else be empty. In the former case, the product of the g(ǫ) supposition that
Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, relative to g(ǫ) and g(ǫ), will trivially be its
subset and (ǫǱ) will thus be true. In the latter case, trivially not so and (ǫǱ) will
thus be false.
Although the truth conditions are correct in this case, something seems terribly
amiss: the outer supposition is, as it were, completely idle. Indeed, the truth of (ǫǱ)
depends entirely on the inner supposition. And surely, that cannot be correct. On
brief reìection, we realise that the correctness of the truth conditions of (ǫǱ) above is
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only a epiphenomenon of the particular case. Had we chosen a diﬀerent embedded
conditional, we would probably have noticed discrepancy. For an instance, the
following conditional, insofar as its ǫ and Ǭ denote the same world or proposition
set, is bound to come out as false:
(Ǭǫ) If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then if no one else wrote Hamlet, then
no one did.
For this conditionals, our framework predicts the following truth conditions:
J(Ǭǫ)Kg;w = ǫ iﬀ JKg;w(JifKg;w)(JǫKg;w)(JǫKg;w)(JǫKg;w)
(JnotKg;w)(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)
(JShakespeareKg;w)JKg;w(JifKg;w)(JǬKg;w)(JǬKg;w)(JǬKg;w)
(JnotKg;w)(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)
(Jsomeone elseKg;w)
(JnotKg;w)(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)
(JsomeoneKg;w) = ǫ
iﬀ . . .
iﬀ g(ǫ)(w0:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet in w0];
g(ǫ); g(ǫ))  fw : g(Ǭ)(w0:[no x 2 De which
is not Shakespeare wrote Hamlet in w0]; g(Ǭ); g(Ǭ))
 fw : no x 2 De wrote Hamlet in wgg
Since the g(Ǭ) supposition that no one who is not Shakespeare wrote Hamlet will
in most context yield either worlds or sets of proposition where someone, namely
Shakespeare, wrote Hamlet, the right-side set will be empty and (Ǭǫ) thus false.
However, we must agree that (Ǭǫ) must be true in all normal contexts. And thus,
we might conclude, something must be quite wrong.
So, what can we do? We have at least three options available. First, we can claim
that there are no contexts in which ǫ and Ǭ (and any subsequent s) denote the
same world: rather, the value of g(i+ǫ) is some function of the value of g(i).
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Second, we may devise a new compositional principle in order to deal with right-
side embedded conditional clauses. And third, wemay revise our current denotation
of adverbial phrases in order to ensure a correct match. Although the third option
does not seem desirable within our current framework due its complexity, the ërst
two seem auspicious.
On the one hand, were we to place a restriction on the denotation of the s of
embedded conditionals, such that for any i, g(i) inìuences the value of g(i+ǫ)
in the syntactic structure. In particular, the worlds or proposition sets available to
subsequent suppositions, must be such that the content of earlier suppositions are
already there. In a sense then, we accumulate our suppositions into the inner most
conditional and the value of g(n) would then be a world or set of propositions
where all previous suppositions have been t. Intuitively, that does make some sense:
when dealing with an embedded conditional, we seem to be stacking suppositions
on top of each other in some manner or another.
On the other hand, we may introduce a new compositional principle which
allows us import all subsequent conditional clauses into the ërst conditional clause.
e rule might be expressed somehow along the following lines:
Conditional Clause Modiícation
If  is a branching node and f; g the set of its daughters, then, for
any world w and assignment g: if JKg;w is a function of the form
f 2 Dhw;he;tii:[x 2 De:[ ('; f(x))]] and JKg;w a function of
the form x 2 De:[ (; (x))], then JKg;w = x 2 De:[ (' ^
; (x))].
Without going into details, with a rule like that in place, we would derive the
following truth conditions for (Ǭǫ):
J(Ǭǫ)Kg;w = ǫ iﬀ JKg;w(JifKg;w)(JǫKg;w)(JǫKg;w)(JǫKg;w)
(JnotKg;w)(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)
(JShakespeareKg;w)JKg;w(JifKg;w)(JǬKg;w)(JǬKg;w)(JǬKg;w)
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(JnotKg;w)(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)
(Jsomeone elseKg;w)
(JnotKg;w)(JwroteKg;w)(JHamletKg;w)
(JsomeoneKg;w) = ǫ
iﬀ . . .
iﬀ g(ǫ)(w0:[Shakespeare did not write Hamlet in w0];
g(ǫ); g(ǫ)) \ g(Ǭ)(w0:[no x 2 De which
is not Shakespeare wrote Hamlet in w0]; g(Ǭ); g(Ǭ)) 
fw : no x 2 De wrote Hamlet in wg
Either way, it seems then, we can account for right-side embedded conditionals.
True, both implementations require more heavy machinery. But then again, no one
ever claimed that natural languages were easy.
ď.ė Conclusion: Giving Meaning to Conditionals
We set oﬀ by exploring the nature of modal and amodal suppositions. Conse-
quently, we argued that conditionals in natural languages express their consequents
on the modal or amodal supposition of their antecedents. We concluded that
the modal/amodal distinction is essential for understanding conditionals. More-
over, the uncertain indicative/subjunctive distinction should be substituted by our
modal/amodal one as the fundamental semantic distinction for conditionals. Next,
we examined the syntactic structure of conditionals in English. And ënally, we
oﬀered compositional semantics for English conditionals in generative grammar.
Our ënal conclusion is that themodal/amodal distinction of conditionals allows
us to give appropriate semantics for conditional sentences in natural languages.
ǯ Saving Modus Ponens
is chapter oﬀers a solution to McGee’s counterexamples to Modus Po-
nens. e chapter opens with a brief introduction to McGee’s counterex-
amples and a short subchapter that emphasises their signiícance. In par-
ticular, a strong paradoxical îavour is attributed to the counterexamples
which the semanticist of natural language conditionals must arguably ad-
dress. Subsequently, solutions oﬀered to the counterexamples hitherto are
all argued to be inadequate and, moreover, McGee’s own reaction to the
conundrum is maintained to be of little avail. After a couple of observa-
tions on the counterexamples’ nature, a solution is oﬀered. e solution
suggests that that the semantics of embedded natural language condition-
als is more sophisticated than their surface syntax indicates. An important
part of the solution therefore lies in a translation function from the surface
form of natural language conditionals to their logical form.
Ė.Ċ Preamble: McGee’s Counterexamples
To our astonishment, McGee conjured up apparent counterexamples to Modus
(Ponendo) Ponens ().ǫ Of McGee’s counterexamples, the following is the best
known:
ǫMcGee (ǫǳǲǯ) and (ǫǳǲǳ, pp. ǯǫǫ–ǯǫǬ). According to Edgington (ǫǳǳǯ, p. ǬǲǬ) and Bennett
(ǬǪǪǭ, p. ǫǮǲ), McGee’s examples are in fact inspired by comments from Adams (ǫǳǱǯ, p. ǭǭ). For
an extensive overview of McGee’s counterexamples and their responses, see Djordjevic (ǬǪǪǪ).
ǫǲǱ
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Opinion polls taken just before the ǫǳǲǪ election showed the Republican
Ronald Reagan decisively ahead of the Democrat Jimmy Carter, with the
other Republican in the race, John Anderson, a distant third. ose apprised
of the poll results believed, with good reason:
If a Republican wins the elections, then if it’s not Reagan who wins it will
be Anderson.
A Republican will win the election.
Yet they did not have reason to believe
If it’s not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson.Ǭ
For our future reference, let us label these sentences as (ǫ), (Ǭ) and (ǭ) respectively.
McGee’s other counterexamples share the same form and likewise reveal an apparent
failure of  for natural language conditionals: where, as above, an inference by
 from (ǫ) and (Ǭ) leads us to the unacceptable conclusion of (ǭ).
Ė.Č Appreciating the Ado
Let us begin by gaining some understanding as to why examples of this particular
kind pose a threat to . As if we do not already know,  is the following rule
of implication:ǭ
Modus Ponendo Ponens
Any conditional, pif ', then q, together with its antecedent, ', im-
plies its consequent, .
is is a schema for which we have distinct instantiations for diﬀerent sorts of condi-
tionals: for instance, the material implication and so-called natural language indica-
tive and subjunctives conditionals. For those diﬀerent sorts of , let us reserve
ǬMcGee (ǫǳǲǯ, p. ǮǰǬ).
ǭIn what follows, we will regard  as a rule of implication rather that a rule of inference
following Harman’s distinction; see, for instance, Harman (ǫǳǲǰ).
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‘’, ‘!’, and ‘’ respectively. Furthermore, since we will be very in-
terested in natural language conditionals in general, let us reserve ‘ ’ to denote
 for all natural language conditionals.Ǯ
Above, McGee’s counterexample described a situation where (ǫ) obtains. At the
propositional level, (ǫ) is an instance of the following form:ǯ
'! (!  ).
Moreover, given McGee’s example, it seems that (Ǭ) does indeed obtain. (Ǭ) is an
instance of the following form:
'.
From those premisses combined, it does seem legitimate for us to draw the conclu-
sion by  that (ǭ). Importantly, (ǭ) is an instance of the following form:
!  .
Nevertheless, in the context of McGee’s examples, the conclusion is absurd. at is
to say, McGee depicts a situation in which an inference by ! from seemingly
true premises, (ǫ) and (Ǭ), leads us to false conclusion, (ǭ). Or in other words,
the examples appear to reveal ! as an invalid rule of implication. Moreover,
since McGee’s counterexamples can be phrased in terms of indicative and subjunc-
tive conditionals alike, we have reason to suspect that  fails too. erefore,
supposing that indicative and subjunctive conditionals are all that there is to nat-
ural language conditionals, McGee’s counterexamples reveal an apparent failure of
 .
McGee’s counterexamples have a peculiar feature: at ërst sight, they do not
seem so paradoxical. For that reason, some are inclined to brush them oﬀ or treat
ǮIn this paper, ‘’ will be used to denote the material implication and ‘!’ and ‘’ to denote
the so-called indicative and subjunctive conditionals respectively; furthermore, ‘ ’ will denote any
natural language conditional structure, whether indicative, subjunctive or possibly something else.
ǯWhere, obviously, ‘A Republican wins the elections’ substitutes ', ‘Reagan does not win the
elections’ , and ‘Anderson wins the elections’  . For the mere sake of simplicity,  subsumes the
negation.
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lightly. Indeed, to some the most intuitive response to McGee’s counterexamples
is to reply along those lines: since we have already assumed that a Republican will
win, how can it possibly be false that if it will not be the ërst one, it will be the
other? After all, a republican will win! Indeed, assuming both (ǫ) and (Ǭ), it does
seem obvious that (ǭ) follows. So, at ërst blush, it seems easy to conclude that this
is all there is to McGee’s counterexamples. If only things were so simple.
In order to realise the seriousness of McGee’s counterexamples, we may be
forced to recast them in slightly diﬀerent terms. One way to emphasise their threat
is as follows.ǰ If we hold ëxed the details of McGee’s example, it certainly seems
true to say that:
(ǫ0) If Carter does not win the election, then if Reagan does not win, Anderson
will.
is, just as (ǫ), in fact seems close to a conceptual truth, given the set-up of the
elections, the number of candidates, and so on. Also, given the indication of the
poll, it seems true too that:
(Ǭ0) Carter does not win the election.
Furthermore, McGee’s example seems to depict a situation where it is the case that
if Reagan does not win, Carter will. After all, given the predicted distribution of
votes, it seems obvious that should Reagan not win, the runner-up will. And since
Carter is by a wide margin the runner-up, we have that:
(*) If Reagan does not win the election, Carter will.
However, if we take the conditional in question to be something somewhat stronger
than material implication—which our natural language understanding suggests to
us—(*) will be incompatible with:
(ǭ0) If Reagan does not win the election, Anderson will.
ǰI owe this suggestion to Elia Zardini.
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Which, as we should know by now, ! allows us to infer.
Some might still resist the counterexample by appealing to the fact that we do
assume (Ǭ0) to be true. at, however, should not matter. Indeed, that if the most
likely winner does not win, the runner-up will, does not seem to be incompatible
with the thought that the winner will actually win and the runner-up will actually
not. After all, we often accept claims of this sort, even when we are absolutely
certain that someone will win. We may know full well that someone will win but
that fact is not incompatible with the fact that if the actual winner should not win,
someone else will. And for that reason, McGee’s counterexamples pose a real threat
to  .
Although  thus appears to fail for natural language conditionals, that is not
to say that  fails in general: diﬀerent instantiations may very well hold. For
instance,  is a valid rule of implication in classical logic. erefore, needless
to say, if we equate the natural language indicative conditional at play in (ǫ) and
(ǭ) with material implication, the inference from p' ! ( !  )q and ' to
p !  q is valid.Ǳ (at is to say, p'  (   )q, ' ` p   q holds in
classical logic.)
Furthermore, according to most mainstream semantic accounts for natural lan-
guage conditionals, the move from (ǫ) and (Ǭ) to (ǭ) is valid.ǲ Notice therefore that
McGee’s counterexamples cannot be simply fended oﬀ by showing that some logic
or other does indeed validate the implication from the premisses to the conclusion
in spite of our intuitions to the contrary. Rather, McGee’s very point is that  
fails, since there are cases such as his own, where an intuitively false conclusion fol-
lows from true premisses. More importantly, any semantics that deem  as
universally valid are thereby worse oﬀ.
Now, since  is among our most beloved and cherished rules of implication,
any counterexamples to its validity are not to be taken lightly. Indeed, even the
ǱNotice that McGee’s counterexamples also provide an argument against any material impli-
cation theories of natural language conditionals. McGee’s counterexamples thus leave two notable
material implication theories of natural language conditionals espoused by Grice (ǫǳǱǯ/ǫǳǲǳ) and
Jackson (ǫǳǲǱ) in dire need of some account or another.
ǲFor instance, both Stalnaker’s (ǫǳǰǲ/ǫǳǳǫ) and Lewis’ semantics (ǫǳǱǭ) validate the inference.
ĊĚČ Saving Modus Ponens
most deviant logicians among us are reluctant to give up  without reservations.
(ere are, of course, various logics in which  fails for some kind of conditionals.
More on that point later.) We are therefore inclined to ënd solutions of some sort
to McGee’s counterexamples rather than to abandon . It follows without saying
that there has been a vast number of proposed strategies to alleviate the suﬀering
brought on by McGee’s counterexamples.ǳ However, before proposing yet another
solution of our own to McGee’s conundrum, let us ërst come to appreciate that
there still remains a demand for one.
Ė.č Failed Rescue Attempts
ere are numerous ways in which we may respond to McGee’s counterexamples.
Sadly, however, most of those attempts fail for one reason or another. Above we
already considered an intuitive response which unbeëttingly made light of McGee’s
counterexamples. Most other responses, however, acknowledge the seriousness of
our predicament to some degree. To appreciate the seriousness of McGee’s coun-
terexamples, let us now consider some possible responses and why they each go
wrong.
Ė.č.Ċ Reasonable Beliefs& Assumptions
We might emphasise the fact that McGee does frame his counterexamples in terms
of what is reasonable to believe and probable rather than in terms of truth or as-
sumptions thereof, in particular, since  is an alleged principle of the latter
rather than the former. To illustrate, McGee’s election case is infused with locu-
tions such as ‘believed, with a good reason’ and ‘they did not have reason to believe
ǳSee, for instance, Sinnott-Armstrong, Moor, and Fogelin (ǫǳǲǰ), Over (ǫǳǲǱ), Lowe (ǫǳǲǱ),
Sorensen (ǫǳǲǲ, pp. ǮǮǳ–Ǯǯǫ), Kornblith (ǫǳǳǮ), Katz (ǫǳǳǳ), Djordjevic (ǬǪǪǪ), and Bennett
(ǬǪǪǭ, pp. ǫǮǲ–ǫǮǳ). e only sincere defender of McGee’s counterexamples, beside McGee him-
self, is Lycan, see Lycan (ǫǳǳǭ, pp. ǮǬǬ–ǮǬǯ), Lycan (ǫǳǳǮ, pp. Ǭǭǯ–Ǭǭǰ), and Lycan (ǬǪǪǫ, pp.
ǰǰ–ǰǳ).
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that’.ǫǪ We might, for that reason, even suggest that McGee does in fact give coun-
terexamples to a diﬀerent principle altogether which has no relevance to  ’s
status.ǫǫ
We may agree that it is unfortunate that McGee did not state his examples in
such terms. However, we must refuse to acknowledge the signiëcance of this point
since McGee’s examples can be expressed in terms of truth just as well as reasonable
beliefs or probability.ǫǬ Even if we assume (ǫ), that it is the case that if a Republican
wins the elections, then if it’s not Reagan who wins it will be Anderson, and (Ǭ), that
a Republican will win the election, it still seems plainly incorrect to infer (ǭ), that
if it’s not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson is the case because, just as before,
it must be Carter.
In fact, this response is closely related to our initial response to McGee’s coun-
terexamples. In order to realise why this response fails, we must acknowledge that
it can both be the case that someone will win and yet, if that someone does not win,
the runner-up will. So much for this plan of action.
Ė.č.Č Challenging the Examples’ Structure
Another stratagem would be to attack the hitherto supposed structure of the ex-
amples and claim that McGee does in fact fail to give counterexamples to  .
One way to go about this would be to argue that (ǫ) instantiates the form p' !
(   )q rather than p' ! ( !  )q. Were that the case, McGee’s coun-
terexamples would only invalidate the implication from p' ! (   )q and '
to p !  q. And since any such implication is clearly not an instance of  ,
the examples cease to threaten.ǫǭ (Notice that merely saying that (ǭ) has the form
p   q would then not be enough to bring back the counterexamples since (ǭ)
would be true.) e motivation for believing that the consequent of (ǫ) expresses
ǫǪMcGee (ǫǳǲǯ, p. ǮǰǬ).
ǫǫis point is made, in one form or another, by Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (ǫǳǲǰ) and Over
(ǫǳǲǱ).
ǫǬSee however Djordjevic (ǬǪǪǪ, pp. ǬǱ–Ǭǳ) for an alternative—and presumably an over-
elaborate—response to the charge made by Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (ǫǳǲǰ) and Over (ǫǳǲǱ).
ǫǭis proposal is pursued by Lowe (ǫǳǲǱ); for a related attempt, see also Katz (ǫǳǳǳ).
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a material implication rather than an indicative conditional is the assumption that
(ǫ) expresses something equivalent to this: if a Republican wins the election, then
it will be either Reagan or Anderson who wins, whose form, p'! (:_  )q, is
classically equivalent to p'! (   )q.
ere are diﬀerent ways by which we can respond to this, but I believe that the
following is the most convincing.ǫǮ Recall that we said that McGee’s counterex-
amples seemed to apply to natural language indicative and subjunctive conditionals
alike. If we recast McGee’s example in terms of subjunctive conditionals rather than
indicative, it becomes more obvious that we do indeed mean something diﬀerent
from a mere disjunction. Suppose that after learning only of the three candidates
of the ǫǳǲǪ American presidential elections, I realise that
(Ǯ) If Carter had lost the election, then if Reagan had not won the elections,
Anderson would have.
In fact, I may make this judgement independently of knowing any of the details of
any polls or even the elections’ result, because given the elections’ arrangement and
an assumption that nothing funny will happen, (Ǯ) is fairly close to a conceptual
truth. You however, knowing a good deal more than me about this election, inform
me that it is the case that:
(ǯ) Carter lost the election.
Again, showing symptoms of sound mind on my better days, I might now infer by
 that:
(ǰ) If Reagan had not won the election, Anderson would have.
Now, to anyone in the know, my conclusion is absurd: given the actual outcome of
the elections—Reagan got ǯǪ.Ǳǝ of the votes, Carter Ǯǫǝ and Anderson ǰ.Ǳǝ—if
Reagan had not won the elections, Carter most certainly would have. Which is
merely to say that the implication from p'  (   )q and ' to p   q
is invalid. Note, just as in the indicative case, that even though Reagan actually
ǫǮFor alternative response, see for instance Djordjevic (ǬǪǪǪ, pp. ǫǯ–ǫǰ).
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won the elections, there is nothing incoherent about wondering what would have
happened had he not: indeed, if we were to engage ourselves in that sort of coun-
terfactual thought, our conclusion would precisely be that Carter would have won
if Reagan had not.
We must admit that, given McGee’s words, it might be tempting to confuse
the embedded indicative conditional in (ǫ) with a disjunction—for the simple fact
that indicative conditionals are usually syntactically indistinguishable from mate-
rial implications when expressed in natural language—but once we recast McGee’s
counterexample in terms of subjunctive conditionals, that temptation is lost. But
is that enough? No, not really, because, if one were so inclined, one could still
persist in the position that both (ǫ) and (Ǯ) do express a disjunction in their conse-
quent. So, in order to persuade someone that we do express something of the form
p' ! ( !  )q, rather than p' ! (   )q, by (ǫ), we will need to look
closer at their diﬀerence in truth conditions.
Indeed, as we know a material implication has truth conditions altogether dif-
ferent from natural language conditionals: in our two-valued gap- and glutless clas-
sical logic, p'  q is true iﬀ ' is false or  is true. However, when it comes
to natural language conditionals, it still remains a matter of heated debate whether
we have discovered the suﬃcient and necessary conditions for truth. Nevertheless,
that is not to say that we do not have an inkling: we are quite certain—in particular
in the subjunctive case—that the truth conditions of natural language conditionals
do not coincide with any truth-functional binary connectives such as the material
implication.
Moreover, we are quite conëdent that the natural language conditionals uni-
laterally imply material implication, in the sense that p' ! q entails p' 
q. Were we also to remind ourselves that p'  q is classically equivalent to
p:'_q, we would, more importantly, realise that p'! (!  )q does entail
p'! (:_ )q. In other words, on the supposition that (ǫ) is true, it would also
be true that if a Republican had won the elections, then either Reagan or Anderson
would have. e truth-conditions of those two sentences can however diﬀer when
the one of the form p' ! ( !  )q becomes false. Indeed, suppose we discov-
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ered that Carter had joined the Republican party only minutes before the results
of the elections became clear (such that the actual distribution of votes would still
have been correctly predicted by the poll). In that case, (ǫ) will turn out as false
because the Republican Carter will win if Reagan does not. However, because Rea-
gan will win, it remains true that if a Republican wins the elections, either Reagan
or Anderson will win.
is ënally brings us to the heart of the matter: we may reasonably distinguish
between two potential logical forms lying beneath the surface structure of (ǫ). While
one is p' ! ( !  )q, the other is p' ! (: _  )q. And while the former
entails the latter, the latter might be true while the former is not. at is merely
to say that McGee’s counterexamples are ambiguous as they could be understood
as expressing either of those two forms. Importantly, while one of those forms
renders the counterexamples impotent, the other does not. e crucial fact thus
remains: we can hold the belief that (ǫ), if a Republican wins the elections, then
if it is not Reagan, Anderson will, which we would abandon if we were to discover
that Carter had recently joined the Republican Party, and (Ǭ), that a Republican
won the elections, without so much as feeling tempted to believe (ǭ), that if it is
not Reagan who wins the elections, Anderson will. So much for that approach.
Ė.č.č Conditionals in Context
Another option would be to claim that McGee’s examples are not really counterex-
amples to  ’s validity because we evaluate (ǫ) and (Ǭ) as true in an altogether
diﬀerent context from that in which we evaluate (ǭ) as false.ǫǯ We all know that
context shifting cases whereby, say, one points at Carter and says ‘he is a Democrat’
and then concludes, now pointing at Reagan, that ‘he is a Democrat’, are not in
any relevant sense counterexamples to the entailment from ' to ', because the ërst
utterance is made in a context importantly diﬀerent from the second.
In such a fashion, we hope to be able to say the same about McGee’s counterex-
amples: in order to evaluate the premises true and the conclusion false, there must
ǫǯis move is made by Gauker (ǬǪǪǯ, p. ǲǰ); see also Gauker (ǫǳǲǱ).
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be a shift of context. Now, of course, to resort to a response of that kind we must
have a rich enough conception of logical validity whereby context comes to play an
important role: an argument is valid only if there is a context in which the premisses
are true and the conclusion false. We might thus attempt to argue that once we ëx a
context for McGee’s examples, they cease being counterexamples to  because
there is no context in which both (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are true and yet (ǭ) is false. However,
instead of arguing for that, let us consider the prospect of such response.
So, is this strategy viable against McGee’s counterexamples? No, it seems not.
Contexts in which (ǫ) and (Ǭ) are true while (ǭ) is false are easy enough to come up
with. In fact, upon themost natural reading, McGee’s counterexample could be said
to determine a set of contexts in which, among other things, the poll is very close to
infallible—telling us that Reagan will win, Carter will come second and Anderson
a distant third—and that Reagan, Carter and the Democrat Anderson are the only
candidates. Furthermore, since there are only two Republican candidates, it seems
obviously true that if some Republican will win, then if it will not be one, it will
be the other. at is, (ǫ) is true in our contexts. Also, since Reagan will win, it
follows, since Reagan is a Republican, that a Republican will win. (Ǭ) is therefore
likewise true in the contexts. Nonetheless, still within the bounds of our contexts,
it seems true that if Reagan will not win, it will be Carter and not Anderson, since
the poll so suggests. In other words, (ǭ) will turn out as false in the said contexts.
Importantly, it does not seem that there has been any shift of context in this case.
Might we not say that (ǫ) and (ǭ) have a context altogether diﬀerent from (Ǭ)?ǫǰ
Indeed, it might be said that (ǫ) and (ǭ) are evaluated from a context provided by
the poll while (Ǭ) is evaluated from some context of what will actually happen. In
other words, can we not claim that there is a shift in context from (ǫ) and (ǭ), on the
one hand, to (Ǭ), on the other? Perhaps we can but an important part of McGee’s
story is that the poll is close to infallible. Within such a context we do evaluate (Ǭ)
as true, just as we evaluate (ǫ) as true and (ǭ) as false. We must therefore conclude
that this strategy is not going help us to save  .
ǫǰI owe this observation to Stephen Read.
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Ė.č.ď Conditions of Assertion
ere are still other ways. One resort would be to question the assertibility of
McGee’s counterexamples.ǫǱ Indeed, this strategy promises to do McGee’s coun-
terexamples in by deeming some of the sentences involved unassertible, irrespective
of their truth values, and thus claim that the example fails to invalidate .
Let us consider this plan of defence further. is sort of response requires us
to take sentences as having not only truth conditions but also assertibility condi-
tions. A standard example illustrating such a diﬀerence is the sentence ‘she is poor
but honest’, which, although true in certain situations, may not be assertible since
‘but’ implies a certain contrast between the two conjuncts. e way we spell out
the conditions of assertibility do vary from one theory to the next, but following
Jackson, we may say that the assertibility of an indicative conditional, p' ! q,
is the conditional probability of  given ', Pr(j').
In that case, the assertibility of (ǫ) will be extremely high, since given the details
of McGee’s counterexample, Pr( j'^) is no less than ǫ. (According to Jackson,
p' ! ( !  )q has the same conditions of assertibility as p(' ^ ) !  q.)ǫǲ
e assertibility of (ǭ) is substantially lower, which again is only to be expected be-
cause we take (ǭ) to be false, and not something we should normally ënd an urge
to assert. Moreover, Jackson’s theory tells us that the sentence ‘if Reagan does not
win the elections, Carter will’, which is incompatible with (ǭ), has a high assertibil-
ity. at again does not surprise us, because we take that sentence to be true and
therefore something we would assert.
We might therefore respond to McGee’s counterexamples as follows: the infer-
ence from (ǫ) and (Ǭ) to (ǭ) strikes us as funny simply because (ǭ) has low assertibil-
ity although true. In other words, there is nothing wrong with the inference as an
inference, the assertion of the conclusion is merely inappropriate and misleading.
(Perhaps in a way similar to the inference from ‘she is honest’ and ‘she is poor’ to
‘she is poor but honest’.) But that will not do: the whole problem is that (ǭ) is not
ǫǱis kind of reply is inspired by Jackson’s treatment of indicative conditionals as material im-
plication with certain assertibility conditions(ǫǳǱǳ/ǫǳǳǫ, ǫǳǲǱ); see also Grice (ǫǳǲǳb, ǫǳǲǳa).
ǫǲJackson (ǫǳǲǱ, pp. ǫǬǳ–ǫǭǮ).
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a case of a true but misleading sentence; our problem is precisely that (ǭ) is false!
at, however, would be an unfair response and one which seems to beg the
very question. e claim is that (ǭ) is in fact true but we mistake it as false because
of its low assertibility. We must therefore seriously address the issue of whether
(ǭ) is true despite its feeble assertibility. Why are we so convinced that (ǭ) is false
irrespective of its assertibility? We have certainly been through that before and our
reason is simply that Carter is the runner-up by a vast margin: saying therefore that
Anderson will have won had Reagan not, is somewhat absurd without any further
justiëcation.
Jackson’s theory of conditionals and assertibility will therefore not be of any
help to us here. Nevertheless, we may still persist and change our strategy by claim-
ing that (Ǭ) lacks assertibility on the grounds that it is misleading. Since we know
for a fact that Reagan will win the elections, it is a misleading breach of the maxim
‘always assert the stronger’ to claim that a Republican—that is either Reagan or An-
derson—will win. We may then perhaps claim that McGee’s counterexample fails
because it involves, although true, a misleading and ill assertible sentence, namely
(Ǭ). But that will not do the trick either for two reasons. First, once we recast
McGee’s elections poll counterexample as (ǫ0), (Ǭ0) and (ǭ0), the minor premise
ceases to be misleading. Second, insofar as  is a principle of truth, the assert-
ibility conditions of any supposed counterexamples have no relevance to its validity.
And since we are concerned with a principle of truth and not assertibility, this sort
of response to McGee’s counterexamples is not likely to succeed.
Without further responses to McGee’s counterexamples at our disposal at present,
wemust acknowledge that the examples do pose a genuine threat to  . Needless
to say, McGee himself recognises the signiëcance of his own counterexamples and
has several words to add on the issue. Let us now see what he has to say.
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Ė.ď McGee’s Reaction
Ė.ď.Ċ Diagnosis: Clash of Two Principles
According to McGee, our problem lies in a conìict between  and the so-called
Law of Exportation (). In classical logic,  tells us that p(' ^ )   q entails
p'  (   )q. (Its converse, p'  (   )q ` p(' ^ )   q, is the so-
called Law of Importation ().) If we generalise  about all conditional structures,
like we did with  earlier, we end up with the following principle:
Law of Exportation
Any conditional of the form pif ('^), then  q implies pif ', then
(if , then  )q.
(And as we did for , we may now make distinctions between  for diﬀerent
sorts of conditionals: say, ,  , ! and .)
As we have already seen, McGee’s counterexamples rest on an embedded condi-
tional, p'! (!  )q as their major premise, which, assuming !, we ought
to believe whenever we believe that p(' ^ ) !  q. Without much of an argu-
ment, McGee tells us that both  and  are, as it were, indisputable features
of our natural languages.
Now, as far as these things go in philosophy, there is a near consensus that
natural language conditionals are somewhere between logical consequence and the
material implication, in the sense that ' `  implies both p'! q and p' 
q, which in turn both imply p'  q.ǫǳ However, McGee proves, if both 
and  hold for natural language conditionals, those conditionals become equivalent
to material implication.ǬǪ
Obviously, since such an equivalence is a rather intolerable result for the condi-
tional theorist, only two options seem available: either  or  must go. And
ǫǳUnrestricted, this assumption in turn entails the so-called Conditional Proof () for natural
language conditionals and the material implication, which to we may object for a couple of reasons:
suppose that  ; ' ` . Together with , this entails   ` p'  q. Substitute p'  q
for   and we have a reason to worry: p'  q ` p'  q! Luckily, McGee makes a weaker
assumption which entails only a restricted form of  where   = ?.
ǬǪMcGee (ǫǳǲǯ, pp. Ǯǰǯ–Ǯǰǰ).
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since  is an essential feature of natural languages according to McGee,  , at
the least in its unrestricted form, must yield.
But is  really asmuch of a feature of natural languages asMcGeemakes it out
to be? At ërst blush, it certainly looks as if it is: any true instances of p('^)  q
seem substitutable for the corresponding instance of p'  (   )q. If so,
Stalnaker’s semantics, in the case of both indicative and subjunctive conditionals,
and Lewis’ semantics, in the case of subjunctive conditionals, are severely mistaken
since both invalidate the inference.Ǭǫ Conversely, if McGee is wrong about ’s
importance in our natural language, the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics tell us that a
counter model to the inference looks like this (where R is the accessibility relation
determined by Stalnaker’s selection function f , wiR'wj iﬀ wj = f(';wi)): W =
fwǪ; wǫ; wǬ; wǭg, wǪR'^wǫ, wǪR'wǬ, wǬRwǭ, and vwǫ( ) = ǫ, vwǭ( ) =
Ǫ. We may also present the counterexample with the following diagram (where an
arrow represents an indexed accessibility relation and any formula boxed immedi-
ately underneath a world name is true at that particular world):
wǫ
 , . . .
wǪ
:', . . .
R'^
<<xxxxxxxx
R'
""F
FF
FF
FF
FF
wǬ
:, . . .
R //
wǭ
: , . . .
ǬǫSee Stalnaker (ǫǳǰǲ/ǫǳǳǫ) and Lewis (ǫǳǱǭ).
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Ė.ď.Č Remedies
If McGee is right, which we shall assume for the time being, our most prominent
theories of conditionals are mistaken in an important aspect by failing to validate 
at the cost of validating . McGee proposes two strategies by which to amend our
theories which both share the same fundamental feature of replacing any instances
of the form p'  (   )q with p(' ^ )   q in order to disarm the
counterexamples.
Ė.ď.Č.Ċ Expelling the Form p' (  )q
e ërst strategy is to ëx our semantics such that for all natural language condi-
tionals, p'  (   )q and p(' ^ )   q have the same truth conditions:
namely those of p(' ^ )   q in Stalnaker-Lewis semantics. For the project,
McGee provides us with a translation manual of sorts for propositional logic by
which the truth conditions of conditionals with conditional consequent are forced
to concur with those of the imported version of the conditional: any formula of the
form p' (  )q is thus to be replaced by p(' ^ )  q.ǬǬ
Strictly speaking, by this strategy,  is no longer valid for nested natural lan-
guage conditionals of the said kind although the rule applies as before to any con-
ditionals without a conditional consequent. However, once we are through with
such a translation there will be no natural language conditionals with conditional
consequents and  may be said to apply unrestrictedly. Although this strategy
appears to deliver its promises, we must admit that this solution is uncomfortably
ad hoc. In fact, in spite of its elegance, the only motivation we have for this solution
is to hold on to the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics, even by quite artiëcial means. We
must be able to do better than this.
Ė.ď.Č.Č Interpreting Our Natural Languages Otherwise
e other strategy McGee proposes, which also leaves  untouched, is to change
our ways of translating from our natural language into the formal ones, such that
ǬǬMcGee (ǫǳǲǯ, pp. Ǯǰǳ–ǮǱǪ).
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occurrences of pif ', then if , then  q in our natural language simply translate
to p(' ^ )   q. In a word, this strategy serves to ostracise from our formal
language the syntax p'  (   )q for any natural language conditionals.
Although somewhat ad hoc, this proposal is by far better motivated than the ërst
one. And not only does McGee advocate the view, Jackson, for instance, proposes
the same reading for conditionals with conditionals as consequents.Ǭǭ
Ė.ď.č Issues: Adhocery& Deeply Embedded Conditionals
As McGee gallantly admits, the ërst strategy has a strong ad hoc ìavour to it:ǬǮ our
only reason to accept the proposal is to hold onto our present conditional logics. On
that ground alone, we must conclude that we may reasonably discard that proposal.
Although being more insightful, the second strategy seems to have problems of its
own: there appear to be cases where the second strategy fails. Which is to say,
despite imposing the said restrictions on translation from natural languages to our
formal languages, we will be able to fortify McGee’s counterexamples such that they
continue to pose a threat.
emost simple way to go about it is to embed the natural language conditional
in the consequent of (ǫ) within a more complex formula, say, merely by negating the
consequent conditional. at way, McGee’s second proposal is rendered impotent.
Let us therefore try to construct such an example. Supposing the details depicted
by McGee’s counterexamples, it will seem reasonable to anyone who apprised the
poll to believe that:
(Ǳ) If a Republican wins the elections, then it is not the case that if Reagan does
not win, Carter will,
since, obviously, if a Republican wins and the winner is not Reagan, then our winner
must be Anderson. Just as before, it likewise remains reasonable to believe that:
(ǲ) A Republican will win the election.
ǬǭSee, for instance, Bennett (ǬǪǪǭ, pp. ǳǲ–ǫǪǬ) and Jackson (ǫǳǲǱ, pp. ǫǬǳ–ǫǭǮ).
ǬǮMcGee (ǫǳǲǯ, p. ǮǱǫ).
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But yet, just as before, no one will then reasonably believe that:
(ǳ) It is not the case that if Reagan does not win, Carter will,
because if it is not Reagan who wins, it will be Carter. In this example, the major
premise for  has the form p' :(  )q, in which case neither  nor
McGee’s revised rule of translation will be of any help to us. Indeed, in this case the
conditional in the consequent is embedded within negation, yieldingMcGee’s strat-
egy impotent. (Notice that although we used negation, the same can presumably
be done for the other logical constants too.)
Yet, this objection does not do the trick as we expected. As the connoisseur
of conditionals will realise, negated natural language conditionals, p:('  )q,
are sometimes substitutable with the negated conditional with negated consequent,
p'  :q. And in the case of our example, this may indeed be done, such that
our major premise simply becomes:
(ǫǪ) If a Republican wins the elections, then if Reagan does not win, Carter will
not win.
In this form, McGee’s second strategy does work as he promised.
However, we can conjure a substantially better objection. Indeed, let us keep in
mind Lewis’ keen observation on the nature of the so-called Law of Conditional Ex-
cluded Middle:Ǭǯ although the inference p'  q ` p:('  :)q seems
valid for natural language conditionals,Ǭǰ the inference from p:('  )q to
p'  :q is invalid. (To understand why, suppose ' is irrelevant to , such
that both p'  q and p'  :q may be false and both p:('  )q and
p:(' :)q are therefore true.)ǬǱ erefore, if we can restate our example such
that the move from p:(' )q to p' :q becomes blocked, we have shown
that McGee’s second strategy fails.
ǬǯLewis (ǫǳǱǭ, pp. Ǳǳ-ǲǭ).
Ǭǰis requires a reservation: insofar as indicative and subjunctive conditionals are all there is to
natural language conditionals, the inference seems to hold. If, however, there are some conditional
structures in natural language which behave just as the material implication, the inference does not
hold.
ǬǱFor illustration, Lewis’ Bizet-Verdi example will do ëne; see Lewis (ǫǳǱǭ, p. ǲǪ).
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Let us try to conjure up an example of this kind. Still working from the details
of McGee’s original example, let us now furthermore suppose that we have reli-
able grounds to correctly suspect that a foul election scam orchestrated from within
Watergate is about to be exposed.
Irrespectively of our suspicions, it is reasonable to believe that were an election
scam to be exposed, there is no telling whether whichever candidate got the most
votes will become president or not: in some cases he might and in some cases he
might not, entirely depending on the nature of the exposed scam. For that reason,
it does seem quite reasonable to believe that:
(ǫǫ) If an election scam is exposed, then it is not the case that if Reagan wins the
elections, he will become president.
If a scam is exposed, we have no reason to believe that the winner will become
president or that he will not; for all we know, the winner might be involved in this
foul play or he might not. Indeed, the exposed scam is perhaps only a lame one by
Carter, which only managed to get him up to second place, or an extremely poor
one by Anderson, or one innocent enough by Reagan for anyone to care, or . . . ,
in which case Reagan would still become president were he to get the most votes;
alternatively, should we discover that Reagan won the election by cheating, new
elections would clearly be called for.
Moreover, since we have reliable grounds to correctly suspect that a Democratic
election scam will be exposed, it is reasonable to believe that:
(ǫǬ) An election scam will be exposed.
And yet, it will entirely be unreasonable to believe that:
(ǫǭ) It is not the case that if Reagan wins the elections, he will become president.
Indeed, as far as we know, Reagan is not involved in any sort of foul play: we
therefore have every reason to believe that were he to win the elections, he would
become president.
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e crucial feature of this example is that although the major premise has the
form p' ! :( !  )q, we cannot infer the form p' ! ( ! : )q, which
we need to move onto p('^) ! : q. Remember that it is a well-documented
fact that winners of presidential elections, ceteris paribus, become presidents. How-
ever—and for that very reason our example works—the relation between winning
elections and becoming a president is severed once a scam is exposed. In other
words, if a scam is exposed, Reagan might or might not become president, all de-
pending on whose scam gets discovered. at is to say, should a scam be discovered,
it is neither the case that if Reagan gets the most votes, he will become president,
nor that if he gets the most votes, he will not become president.
Since McGee’s second strategy seems impotent against counterexamples involv-
ing sentences of the form p' :(  )q whose consequent we cannot trans-
late into p  : q, we are faced by a new problem. Indeed, we have given
a counterexample to  which cannot be alleviated by McGee’s strategy. We
must, therefore, conclude that both of McGee’s strategies have failed. at, how-
ever, does not imply that we should give the latter strategy up entirely. Indeed, we
might be able to expand McGee’s second strategy to cope better with the data.
Ė.Ė Expanding McGee’s Strategy
Ė.Ė.Ċ Fumbling for a Solution
Indeed, although McGee’s second strategy failed for more complex formulae, we
should hang on to the idea for a while longer and try to make the best of it for there
is something quite attractive about McGee’s proposal. ere seems to be something
intuitive about claiming that when we say something of the form pif ', then if ,
then q, it seems as if our claim is equivalent to pif' and, then q. And not only
does McGee share that feeling with us, the intuition has been defended in diﬀerent
ways in diﬀerent places.Ǭǲ Let us therefore dwell on the suggestion for a while in
ǬǲSee for instance Bennett (ǬǪǪǭ, pp. ǳǲ–ǫǪǬ) and Jackson (ǫǳǲǱ, pp. ǫǬǳ–ǫǭǮ).
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the hope that we can perhaps work around the problems we have just discovered.
As the observant reader might remember, with sentences such as (ǫǫ), we es-
tablished that there are forms other than p'  (   )q alone which haunt
us. Indeed, something must be said about the form p'  :(   )q too,
and presumably countless others which encapsulate natural language conditionals
deep inside their consequent, by which we can regenerate McGee’s counterexam-
ples. How do we intend to deal with those? Without a doubt, there remains a story
to be told here but to begin with, we can claim that the logical form of (ǫǫ) is in
fact p:((' ^ )  )q.
at alone will not do. What about, for instance, the form p'  ((  
 ) ^ (  ))q or p'  ((   ) _ (  ))q? We may propose p('  
(   )) ^ ('  (  ))q and p('  (   )) _ ('  (  ))q
respectively, which again have the logical form p(('^)  )^(('^) )q
and p((' ^ )  ) _ ((' ^ ) )q. And so on . . .
In fact, seeking inspiration from McGee’s ërst strategy,Ǭǳ we may propose the
following translation N from natural language into its logical form in ërst-order
logic supplemented with a conditional, whose operation on'we indicate by p'Nq,
given by a deënition from a base case by induction on the depth of formulae. First,
for formulae whose main connective is not natural language conditional, we have
the rather trivial translation:
'N := ', where ' is atomic
(:')N := :'N
(' ^ )N := 'N ^ N
(' _ )N := 'N _ N
('  )N := 'N  N
(9x('(x)))N := 9x(('(x))N)
(8x('(x)))N := 8x(('(x))N)
ǬǳMcGee (ǫǳǲǯ, pp. Ǯǰǳ–ǮǱǪ).
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Second, for any formulae whose main connective is a natural language conditional,
we have:
(' )N := 'N  N , where  is any -free formula
(' :)N := :(' )N
(' ( ^  ))N := (' )N ^ ('  )N
(' ( _  ))N := (' )N _ ('  )N
(' (   ))N := (' )N  ('  )N
(' 9x((x)))N := 9x(' (x))N , where x does not occur free in '
(' 8x((x)))N := 8x(' (x))N , where x does not occur free in '
(' (  ))N := ((' ^ )  )N
(Very roughly speaking, any formula within the scope of anN , p'Nq, is in natural
language. Once it has been translated such that nothing is left within an N , we
may say it has reached its logical form.)
e ërst seven clauses are much as one would expect, dictating a roughly di-
rect translation from the surface form of natural language sentences into their log-
ical form. e remaining clauses are concerned with translations of formulae with
natural language conditional as their main connective. For any natural language
conditional which does not include some natural language conditionals in its con-
sequent, we have a clause, p('  )Nq := p'  q, telling us that the logical
form of the natural conditional is simply that of the surface form of the conditional.
Furthermore, for all other natural language conditionals, the proposed translation
manual tells us recursively how to give their logical form. is proposal does extend
McGee’s second proposal in the sense that our last clause, p((' ^ )  )Nq :=
p('  (   ))Nq, resembles McGee’s proposal for translation from natural
language sentences of the (surface) form pif ', then if , then  q, into their logical
form as p(' ^ )  q.ǭǪ
ǭǪMcGee (ǫǳǲǯ, p. ǮǱǪ).
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Following this proposal, we can now deal with (ǫǫ), (ǫǬ) and (ǫǭ) in the fol-
lowing way. (ǫǫ), ‘if an election scam is exposed, then it is not the case that if it
is Reagan who gets the most votes, he will become president’, we translate into its
logical form as follows:
(i) (' :(  ))N )
(ii) :(' (  ))N )
(iii) :((' ^ )  )N )
(iv) :((' ^ )N   N) )
(v) :(('N ^ N)  ) )
(vi) :((' ^ )  )
Since p:((' ^ )  )q together with ' does not warrant us to infer p:( 
 )q, it does seem as if we have averted the threat to  in this case.
For the sake of further illustration, let us try something slightly more challeng-
ing. Still working from McGee’s example, replace (ǫ) with:
(ǫǮ) If a Republican wins, then if it is not Reagan who wins, then if anyone has
a strong opposition to Anderson’s presidency, that very person will either
have to put up with Anderson for four years or else revolt.
(Whose surface form appears arguably to be p'  (  8x( (x)  ((x) _
(x))))q.) Supposing we still have our minor premise, (Ǭ), ‘a Republican will win’,
 allows us to detach the consequent and infer:
(ǫǯ) If it is not Reagan who wins, then if anyone strongly opposes Anderson’s
presidency, that very person will either have to put up with Anderson for
four years or else revolt.
(Whose surface form appears to be p  8x( (x)  ((x) _ (x)))q.) at
seems absurd, because as before, should Reagan not win, Carter will become the
president, in which case there is no putting up to be done with Anderson, let alone
revolting against. In other words, yet again we seem to have a counterexample to
 , only this time slightly more complex than before.
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However, according to our proposal, the logical form of (ǫǮ) is arrived at as
follows:
(i) (' ( 8x( (x) ((x) _ (x)))))N )
(ii) ((' ^ ) 8x( (x) ((x) _ (x))))N )
(iii) 8x((' ^ ) ( (x) ((x) _ (x))))N )
(iv) 8x((' ^  ^  (x)) ((x) _ (x)))N )
(v) 8x(((' ^  ^  (x)) (x))N _ ((' ^  ^  (x)) (x))N) )
(vi) 8x(((' ^  ^  (x))N  ((x))N)_
((' ^  ^  (x))N  ((x))N)) )
: : :)
(vii) 8x(((' ^  ^  (x)) (x)) _ ((' ^  ^  (x)) (x)))
(Where the ellipsis between the sixth and seventh line merely indicates an iterated
application of the -free clauses.) In the same manner, we take the logical form of
(ǫǯ) to be p8x((( ^  (x)) (x)) _ (( ^  (x)) (x)))q. at move,
again, is suﬃcient for saving  as the move from (ǫǮ), p8x((('^^ (x)) 
(x)) _ ((' ^  ^  (x))  (x)))q, and ' to (ǫǯ), p8x((( ^  (x))  
(x)) _ (( ^  (x))  (x)))q, is no longer warranted by  . In other
words, supposing this sort of reading of natural language conditionals, it seems as
if McGee’s counterexamples cease to be such.
Ė.Ė.Č Sinking Feelings: Four Worries
We are still not home free. ere are at least four reasons to doubt the proposal we
have just given.
Ė.Ė.Č.Ċ Existentially Quantiíed Conditionals
e ërst worry has to do with the clause for existentially quantiëed conditionals:
p(' 9x((x)))Nq := p9x(' (x))Nq. For instance, let us assume that it
is true that:
(ǫǰ) If Anderson were to become president, there will be a revolution.
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(Whose surface form is, arguably, pPa  9xRx)q, where a denotes Anderson,
P denotes the presidential property and R denotes the property of being a revo-
lution against Anderson’s presidency, or something along similar lines.) Now, our
suggested translation tells us that the logical form of (ǫǰ) is p9x(Pa Rx)q, but
surely that is absurd: we do not want to say that there is some thing which exists
independently of Anderson’s presidency, awaiting to become a revolution should
the opportunity arise. Certainly not generally, at least. Presumably, we only want
to say that should Anderson become president, then a revolution will come into
existence.
Ė.Ė.Č.Č Disjunctive Consequents
is was not really fair to Anderson: for all we know, he might have made a wonder-
ful president. is brings us to the second worry. at worry has to with the clause
for natural language conditionals with disjunction, embedding further condition-
als, in their consequent: p('  ( _  ))Nq := p('  )N _ ('   )Nq. If
we want to be absolutely fair, we must admit that it is true that:
(ǫǱ) If Anderson were to become president, he will either be successful or not.
(Whose surface form is pPa  (Sa _ :Sa)q, where P denotes the presidential
property and S denotes the property of being successful, or something along those
lines.)
Again, our translation gets us into trouble, telling us that the logical form of (ǫǱ)
is p(Pa  Sa) _ (Pa  :Sa)q, which in turn is quite absurd since neither
disjunct is presumably true. Indeed, although we have every reason to believe (ǫǱ),
we have no good reason to suspect that it is either the case that ‘if Anderson were
to become president, he will either be successful’ or ‘If Anderson were to become
president, he will not be successful’.
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Ė.Ė.Č.č Conditional Excluded Middle
Our third worry has loomed awhile. Recall that we said above that the inference
from p:('  )q to p'  :q is invalid.ǭǫ at is merely to say that there
are instances of ' and  which make the form p:('  )q true and p:('  
)q false. For that reason, it does seem dubious to expect the translation clause
p('  :)Nq := p:('  )Nq to do the job for us. More accurately, there
will inevitably be some false natural language conditionals of the surface form p' 
:q whose translation into logical form, p:(' )q, will be true.
at will clearly not do. If we want to give a solution along the above lines, we
must therefore revise the translation clause for natural language conditionals with
negated consequent. e real problem, however, is that ënding a replacement clause
for p('  :)Nq := p:('  )Nq is quite far from obvious. It would be too
hasty to conclude that one cannot be found. Let it suﬃce for now to acknowledge
the fact that a new clause is desperately needed, were we to aim for a solution to
this problem.
Ė.Ė.Č.ď Importation and Exportation
Our fourth worry—and perhaps the most serious—is that we still have not seen any
serious argument for the validity of  and  for natural language conditionals. Of
course, no one denies that these laws hold in classical logic for material implication.
However, we are dealing with something diﬀerent here. If those laws do not hold
for natural language conditionals, we have no serious grounds on which to base our
proposal.
We remarked before that intuitively it seems that whenever we say something of
the form pif', then if , then q, we have not said anything above or beyond pif'
and , then  q. Now, since, according to our translation, p(  ('   ))Nq
and p((^')  )Nq have the same truth conditions, we need something more
ërm than a mere intuition to justify our translation. Indeed, we need a good argu-
ment to the eﬀect that  and  do indeed hold for natural language conditionals.
ǭǫSee, again, Lewis (ǫǳǱǭ, pp. Ǳǳ-ǲǭ).
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In light of those the previously highlighted objections, I believe we must, at
least for the time being, abandon the proposal.
Where does that leave us? Without notable success we have tried halfheartedly to
ignore the problem of McGee’s counterexamples. To no avail, we have considered
numerous ways in which to respond to the counterexamples. Moreover, we have also
seen that McGee’s reaction to his own counterexamples is impotent. And ënally,
despite the seemingly promising prospect, we have discovered that an extension to
McGee’s solution gets us nowhere. What remains? Of course, we might simply give
up and reject the unrestricted form of . However, let us digress for a minute to
consider the link between  and natural language conditionals.
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We now have good reason to believe that McGee’s counterexamples are a genuine
threat to  . We therefore face the following problem: insofar as our logics are
intended to model the best of our reasoning in natural languages, our conditional
logics have failed by validating  . Furthermore, we have seen that the attempts
to patch up our existing logics, as proposed and inspired by McGee, fail to deliver.
What are the remaining options?
As we hinted at above in a parenthetical remark, there are various logics in
which  fails for some conditional or another. For example, there are some non-
reìexive modal logics—such asK ,D, and any extensions ofK which are without
the so-called  frame restriction—where  fails for the strict implication: p' J
q; ' 2K ; p' J q; ' 2D ; . . . . Also, there is the three-valued logic LP ,
which invalidates  for what may arguably be said to be the material implication,
p'  q; ' 2LP .ǭǬ Furthermore, there is FDE augmented with material
implication, for which  fails. More generally,  fails for most relevant
ǭǬSee Priest (ǫǳǱǳ).
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logics. Moreover, there are various logics with non-normal world semantics, which
may invalidate anything at their non-normal worlds. And ënally, there are variants
of the fuzzy logic Ł@ and the fuzzy relevant logic FR.ǭǭ Nonetheless, although all
those logics invalidate  for some conditional or another, they do not in general
invalidate  for whichever conditional that is assumed to be the real conditional.
In light of our experience with McGee’s counterexamples, we might propose to take
the further step and reject  for natural language conditionals. However, do we
really dare to venture on a project of that nature?
Let us admit that there persists a strong intuition and sturdy conviction that
conditionals of any sort and  are somehow intimately related. e fact that
classical logic, along with numerous other logics, including both Stalnaker’s and
Lewis’ conditional logics, validate  indicates as much. And to the extent that
we believe that either introduction or elimination rules confer meaning to logical
connectives, the fact that  dictates the elimination of conditionals in various
proof systems further betrays our inclinations. In fact, considering that  has a
quite long and successful history as far as these things go,ǭǮ it is small wonder that
the principle has found a place quite close to our hearts.
e exact nature of this intuition might be hard to tease out. However, it seems
that the gist of it is something along the lines that we cannot consistently claim
that pif ', then q, and yet reject that , without retracting pif ', then q, when
' turns out to be the case. Should anyone do so, we would be inclined to doubt
that person’s language or logic competency, or assume otherwise confused, or even
dismiss the person as a liar.ǭǯ In other words, our intuition is that an assertion of a
ǭǭFor more detail about those logics and their failure to validate mpp, see Priest (ǬǪǪǫ).
ǭǮFor an interesting overview of ’s early history and development in antiquity, see Bobzien
(ǬǪǪǬ).
ǭǯDespite appearances, even so-called Dutchman Conditionals—say, ‘if Anderson wins the elec-
tions, I am a Dutchman’—do seem to behave in this way: although an expression of that sort does
arguably serve as a mere idiom to convey (subjective) improbability, we would expect the utterer to
retract the conditional if the antecedent were to turn out true. Keeping Harman’s distinction (cf.
footnote ǭ) in mind, those absurd conditionals are still intended to implicate their consequents given
their antecedents: that is how they get their point across. However, to infer the consequent upon
learning the antecedent would be a mistake.
at said, however, it is worth noting that there do seem to be non-conditional uses of ‘if ’ in
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conditional is a commitment to an assent of its consequent in light of its antecedent.
And to the extent that we share this intuition,  seems all the more appropriate.
For that very reason, McGee’s counterexamples disturb us horribly. However,
the real issue is whether McGee’s counterexamples do something more than shaking
our intuition about natural language conditionals and . DoMcGee’s counterex-
amples in fact reveal the intuition to be incorrect? In the history of philosophy, such
things have surely transpired before. And if so, all that remains is to ënd some way
or another to cope. As we have already noted, one option is to revise our conditional
logics accordingly. But since that option seem deeply counterintuitive, a revision is
only reasonable as a last resort.
Another option, which we have not yet considered, is a sort of Fifth-Columnist
approach: why not just accept McGee’s counterexamples and admit that  fails
for natural languages in some rare cases and let that be the end of it? We know full
well that  holds for the material implication in classical logic and for various
other conditionals in other logics. We might even claim that our natural languages
are confused and unsuited for proper reasoning, while our formal languages are
rigourous enough to be appropriate for the project. Indeed, we may just as well
divorce ourselves from those horrid natural languages and resort to conduct all our
reasoning in their formal counterparts—in which, by the way, we know that 
obtains and our intuition is cherished. On this sort of view, by feeling ourselves
compelled to respond to McGee’s counterexamples, we display nothing more than
a failure of nerve.
However, as we know, logic is not only fun and games. Indeed, insofar as our
logic is to model our ideal reasoning in our everyday natural languages, this sort of
response to McGee’s counterexamples would be a grim betrayal to our mission. But
the Fifth-Columnist might very well persist: our natural languages are ill-suited for
reasoning in the ërst place, why waste our time and eﬀorts by modelling them? is
English: uses of ‘if ’ as ‘although’ (‘Reagan was a fair president, if ërm’), ‘like’ (‘Carter acted as if
everything was all right’), expression of polite request (‘please, consider voting Carter, if you don’t
mind’) or oﬀer (‘Reagan has promised an economical reform, if you like’), implied reservation (‘An-
derson got few votes, if any’) and so on. Whether  has any relation to those uses is a moot point.
For more extensive discussion on this point, see xǭ.Ǯ.Ǭ
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might be a valid point, but we can still claim that natural languages may contain
many important structures which we should strive to incorporate into our formal
languages. Conjunction and negation are obvious examples, but others include,
for instance, quantiëers, and if we desire to reason about something more than
mere mathematics and alike, modal and tense operators, and—last but certainly
not least—conditionals.
Our natural language conditionals are linguistic structures by which we may
express very complex thoughts. Indeed, it seems that conditional thought is a fun-
damental feature of ourmental repertoire.ǭǰ And if we cannot reason properly about
something as fundamental, why bother to reason at all? In other words, the Fifth-
Columnist may say what he likes about natural languages but we still have a strong
need to incorporate natural language conditionals into some logic or another.
We are not free yet, our Fifth-Columnist might now vex us thus: although nat-
ural language conditionals have their place within logic, McGee’s counterexamples
merely reveal inappropriate use of them, not a failure of  . is is an inter-
esting response, and not one that we considered before. is response must still be
deemed as fundamentally mistaken because further analysis of McGee’s counterex-
amples, through which we have gone above, shows us beyond reasonable doubt that
(ǫ), (Ǭ) and (ǭ) all express clear and coherent thoughts. I believe we must therefore
abandon the Fifth-Columnist approach to natural language conditionals.
Another option is to have yet another look at McGee’s counterexamples in the
hopes of ënding some way or another to save .
ǭǰis opinion has been expressed a vast number of times in diﬀerent way by diﬀerent authors.
For instance, see Edgington (ǫǳǳǯ, p. Ǭǭǯ): ‘e ability to think conditional thoughts is a basic part
of our mental equipment. A view of the world would be an idle, ineﬀectual aﬀair without them.’
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Ė.Ę.Ċ Secondoughts on the Law of Exportation
According to McGee, recall,  is an essential feature of English.ǭǱ We did not
pay much heed to McGee’s claim above but let us have a closer look now. At ërst
blush, this claim seems quite a reasonable one. After all, usually when we claim
something of the form p(' ^ )   q it seems as if we may just as well make a
claim of the form p'  (   )q. To appreciate that, it is suﬃcient for us to
consider (ǫ) once again.
However, if we were to come up with a counterexample to  , we could safely
reject  and hold on instead to  without our natural language conditionals
collapsing into material implication.ǭǲ Although that does not address the coun-
terexamples directly, that would at the least be a ërst step to rescue  . What
we need therefore is an interpretation under which p(' ^ )   q is true and
p' (  )q false. Let us see what we can come up with.
I intuit that our best chance is to look for counterexamples where ' and  
coincide, such that p('^) 'q is true and p' ( ')q is false. Working
directly fromMcGee’s examples is not going to help us: that if a Republican wins the
elections and Reagan does not win, then a Republican wins the elections, p(' ^
) ! 'q, seems just as true as that if a Republican wins the elections, then if
Reagan does not win, then a Republican wins the elections, p'! (! ')q.
at will clearly not do. We might instead try our luck with apparently irrel-
evant sentences. ere are plenty to choose from, so restricting ourselves to events
which took place in that eventful November ǫǳǲǪ, it seems trivially true that if
Reagan won the elections and million of TV viewers discovered who shot J.R.,
then Reagan would win the elections, p(' ^ )  'q. However, it may be
false that if Reagan won the elections, then it would be the case that if millions
of TV viewers discovered who shot J.R., then Reagan would win the elections,
ǭǱMcGee (ǫǳǲǯ, p. Ǯǰǯ).
ǭǲRecall that McGee proves that in any reasonably well-behaved logic which validates both 
and  for some conditional, that very conditional will collapse into material implication; seeMcGee
(ǫǳǲǯ, pp. Ǯǰǯ–Ǯǰǰ).
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p'  (  ')q, because there is presumably no telling whether the em-
bedded conditional is true or not, even in light of the fact that Reagan wins the
elections.ǭǳ
Will this do? Well, we seem to be torn between conìicting intuitions here: on
the one hand, we are uncertain whether it is true that if millions discovered who shot
J.R., then Reagan would win the elections, and on the other, it seems most obvious
that if Reagan won the elections, then he would win no matter whether millions of
viewers discovered who shot J.R. or not. at is, if we consider the embedded con-
ditional in isolation, our intuition tells us that if millions discovered who shot J.R.,
then Reagan could win the elections; however, if we consider the embedded con-
ditional together with the embedding conditional’s antecedent, we feel compelled
to judge that the embedding conditional must be true, quite independently of how
we come to evaluate the embedded one in isolation.
Needless to say, we can make a McGee inspired move here, claiming that since
we may detach the false consequent ‘if millions of TV viewers discovered who shot
J.R., then Reagan would win the elections’, p(  ')q, given that ‘Reagan won
the elections’, ', the major premise, p'  (  ')q, must be false on pain of
contradiction. at way, it appears that we have proven the major premise false by
a reductio. However, since it is precisely the validity of  which is up for grabs,
that move would be rather dubious as we assume its very validity by detaching the
consequent. Unfortunately, we must conclude that this move will not be of any
help.
Let us not lose hope yet. Onemight conjecture that our failure to invalidate  
so far might have to do with the wrong sort of irrelevance of our atomic sentences.
As we noted above, funny things emerge when atomic sentences work against each
other in some ways: for instance, exposures of scams tend to aﬀect our acceptance
of elections’ results.ǮǪ Well, then, what do we want to say about the following
sentence?Ǯǫ
ǭǳIncidentally, Kristin Shepard, Sue Ellen’s sister, shot J.R.
ǮǪis again is closely related to the so-called failure of antecedent strengthening for natural
language conditionals, the failure to infer p(' ^  ) q from p' q.
ǮǫLet us assume that the predicate ‘is a president’ does not denote a unique property.
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(ǫǲ) If Reagan and Carter were presidents, then Reagan would be a president.
Of course, in order for (ǫǲ) to be true, our antecedent calls for a slightly peculiar
state of aﬀairs: namely, one such that there are two (or more) American presidents
in oﬃce concurrently—but that must surely be well within the bounds of our imag-
ination. Should that be the case, then clearly anyone who is one of the presidents
in oﬃce is a president in oﬃce.
Nonetheless, although we assume (ǫǲ) to be true, it still seems dubious that:
(ǫǳ) If Reagan was a president, then it would be the case that if Carter was a
president, then Reagan would be a president.
After all, if Reagan is a president, he might be the president, in which case the
same can presumably be said about Carter, he too might be the president, in which
case he, but not Reagan, is a president. (Even if Reagan was a president, he would
normally cease to be one as soon as someone else become a president.) In other
words, it seems as if the former sentence, which is of the form p(' ^ )   q,
is true, while the latter, which is of the form p'  (   )q, is false. Which is
merely to say that  fails.ǮǬ
Not without a good reason, our antagonist might now reply: wait a minute, if
Reagan is a president and Carter is a president, of course Carter, but not Reagan,
is a president. is kind of reply rests on the assumption that natural languages
conjunctions are not usually commutative. For instance, when reasoning in natural
language, it seems awkward to infer from ‘Reagan became the president and there
was a revolution’ that ‘there was a revolution and Reagan became the president’,
since these sentences may express two quite distinct thoughts; for instance, it is
believed that ‘Fulgencio Batista was a president and there was a revolution’ and
‘there was a revolution and Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado was president’ by anyone
familiar with Cuban history, while the commuted conjunctions seem incredible.Ǯǭ
ǮǬSee also Davis (ǫǳǱǳ, p. ǯǯǫ).
ǮǭPresident Fulgencio Batista was overthrown in the Cuban revolution, after which, following
a brief presidency of Anselmo Alliegro, Carlos Manuel Piedra and Manuel Urrutia Lleo, Osvaldo
Dorticos Torrado became a president until Fidel Castro’s succession in ǫǳǱǰ.
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is is a good and valid point. Nevertheless, there is also a reading of natural
language conjunctions where the order of its conjuncts has no eﬀect. Clearly, to
say that Reagan is a president and Carter is president can be said to imply that one
somehow led to the other, but we may cancel any such implicature simply by adding
something along the lines that wemight just as well have said that Carter and Reagan
are presidents, or by adding that they are in oﬃce concurrently. Either way, (ǫǲ)
will be true: if Reagan and Carter were presidents, Reagan would be a president.
After all, it does therefore seem that  fails for natural language conditionals.
Ė.Ę.Č Against the Law of Importation
As we already mentioned, the converse of  is the so-called Law of Importation ().
Once generalised,  is therefore the following principle:
Law of Importation
Any conditional of the form pif ', then (if , then  )q implies pif
(' ^ ), then  q.
And as before, we may distinguish diﬀerent instantiations of  for diﬀerent sorts of
conditionals. In classical logic,  thus tells us validly that p'  (   )q entails
p(' ^ )   q. Moreover, in the case of natural language conditionals,  tells
us that from p' (  )q we may infer p(' ^ )  q.
Just as for  , the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics tell us that  is invalid. A
counter model to the inference looks as follows (whereR is the accessibility relation
determined by Stalnaker’s selection function f , wiR'wj iﬀ wj = f(';wi)): W =
fwǪ; wǫ; wǬ; wǭg, wǪR'^wǫ, wǪR'wǬ, wǬRwǭ, and vwǫ( ) = Ǫ, vwǭ( ) =
ǫ. We may also present the counterexample with the following diagram (where an
arrow represents an indexed accessibility relation and any formula boxed immedi-
ately underneath a world name is true at that particular world):
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Moreover, as for  , McGee tells us without much of an argument that  is
valid.ǮǮ And just as for  , we have reason to suspect that McGee is wrong about
 .
Perhaps because our counterexample to  is still fresh in our mind, ënding
one to  is easy. Presumably, it is true that:
(ǬǪ) If Reagan was a president, then it would be the case that if Carter was a
president, then it would not be the case that an amendment must have been
made to the second article of the United States Constitution.
However, it is clearly false that:
(Ǭǫ) If Reagan and Carter were presidents, then it would not be the case that an
amendment must have been made to the second article of the United States
Constitution.
Indeed, in order for two (or more) presidents to be in oﬃce concurrently, there
must have been some sort of amendment made to the United States Constitution.
In other words, it seems as if the former sentence, which is of the form p'  
(  )q, is true, while the latter, which is of the form p('^ )  q, is false.
Which is merely to say that  fails.
ǮǮMcGee (ǫǳǲǯ, p. Ǯǰǯ).
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is must be a relief to anyone adhering to any sort of Stalnaker-Lewis seman-
tics. e failure of  and  is now not as embarrassing as McGee made them
out to be. Also, having established that both  and  fail for natural lan-
guage conditionals, we can conclude that any translation strategy similar to the one
we considered above—where an important clause is p('  (   ))Nq :=
p((' ^ )   )Nq—is not going to get us oﬀ the ground, because we do not
want to equate the truth conditions of p' (  )q and p(' ^ )  q.
Better yet, as we already remarked on above, we can reject  and hold on to
 without our natural language conditionals collapsing into material implica-
tion. With that on our side, let us now have yet another look at McGee’s coun-
terexamples. However, let us ërst make two important observations concerning the
counterexamples.
Ė.Ę.č Observations
Ė.Ę.č.Ċ First Observation: Accumulative and Non-Accumulative
Conditionals
So far, we have considered various cases of embedded natural language conditionals.
If not already apparent, our reading of each of these seems to fall into one of two
mutually exclusive semantic categories: accumulative and non-accumulative. While
our reading of (ǫ) is an example of the ërst, (ǬǪ) is of the second. Let us clarify
those concepts in turn.
We may deëne an accumulative embedded conditional as follows:
Accumulative Conditional
An embedded conditional, p'  (   )q, is accumulative iﬀ
we necessarily take its consequent p   q to be evaluated on the
supposition that ', such that we actually, albeit implicitly, take the
consequent to be of the form p(' ^ )  q.
is requires an example for clariëcation. In the case of (ǫ), we take the condi-
tional ‘if a Republican wins the election, then if it’s not Reagan who wins it will be
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Anderson’ as saying that ‘if a Republican wins the election, then if it’s not Reagan
who wins and a Republican wins, it will be Anderson’. In other words, upon the
most natural reading of (ǫ), we understand the sentence such that the supposition
of ' is still alive when we come to evaluate the conditional within the consequent,
p   q, and we in fact consider  upon the supposition of ' and . For that
reason we can say that the suppositions of each antecedent get accumulated for any
conditionals embedded within the consequent. In other words, this is what we
mean by ‘accumulative conditional’.
Conversely, we may deëne a non-accumulative embedded conditional as fol-
lows:
Non-Accumulative Conditional
An embedded conditional, p'  (   )q, is non-accumulative
iﬀ we do not necessarily take its consequent p  q to be evaluated
on the supposition that '. (In other words, an embedded conditional
is non-accumulative iﬀ it is not accumulative.)
For instance, in the case of (ǬǪ), we take the conditional ‘If Reagan was a pres-
ident, then it would be the case that if Carter was a president, then it would not
be the case that an amendment must have been made to the second article of the
United States Constitution’ as saying ‘If Reagan was a president, then it would be
the case that if Carter was a president and Reagan might or might not be a president
too, then it would not be the case that an amendment must have been made to the
second article of the United States Constitution’. As before, upon the most nat-
ural reading of (ǬǪ), we understand the sentence as saying that the supposition of
' is not alive anymore when we come to evaluate the conditional within the con-
sequent, p   q, such that we in fact consider  upon the supposition of 
and not necessarily '. In other words, this is what we mean by ‘non-accumulative
conditional’.
Notice that if we read (ǫ) as non-accumulative, it turns out as false, because if
Reagan does not win, and we are not forced to suppose that a Republican wins, then
Carter will win. Likewise, if we read (ǬǪ) as accumulative, it turns out as false, be-
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cause if Carter is a president, and we are supposing that Reagan is a president (too),
then obviously a change must have been made to the United States Constitution.
Notice also, there is no reason to believe that there cannot be an accumulative
embedded conditional that embeds a non-accumulative conditional nor conversely.
Albeit a cumbersome and clumsy conditional, ‘if a Republican wins the election,
then if it’s not Reagan who wins, then if a Democrat wins, . . . ’ seems a clear example
of a non-accumulative conditional within an accumulative conditional.
What determines our reading of an embedded conditional as either accumu-
lative or non-accumulative? at is quite hard to tell, although we may suggest
that the more unlikely ' is given , the more we are inclined to opt for a non-
accumulative reading of p'  (   )q. Obviously, however, despite that
one reading may seem to come more naturallly than the other for most embedded
conditionals, we can generally force our reading to its natural reading’s opposite.
Whether the probability of the coincidence of ' and  alone is enough to explain
the more natural reading in each case is far from clear. At best, if so, the exact prob-
ability will probably vary from one embedded conditional to the next. Likewise,
if so, we have reason to suspect that there are embedded conditionals whose most
natural reading will be indeterminate between accumulative and non-accumulative
readings.
Moreover, insofar as we can rephrase natural language conditionals such as pif
', thenq as p if'q, we seem to be able to disrupt accumulation in some—albeit
clearly not in all—cases.Ǯǯ On the one hand, we are inclined to evaluate the condi-
tional ‘if a Republican wins, then if Reagan does not win, then a Republican wins’
as true, because we accumulate the antecedents and consider the embedded conse-
quent, that a Republican wins, on the supposition that a Republican wins and that
Reagan does not win. On the other had, when it comes to ‘if a Republican wins,
then a Republican wins, if Reagan does not win’, we are less wont to accumulate
and therefore more willing to evaluate as false. In other words, we take the latter
conditional to be false because although it is true that a republican will win, it is not
ǮǯI owe this observation to Frank Jackson.
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true come what may; indeed, it might be true that a Republican wins only because
it is true that Reagan wins. So, what is going on here?
Several options seem available. One is to claim that this merely shows that the
move from pif ', then q to p if 'q is not a valid move in natural language.
is might be because, say, pif ', then q is not always substitutable for pif ',
q, although the latter would be substitutable for the same conditional with the
antecedent in a post-verbal position, p if 'q.Ǯǰ at is to say that ‘if Reagan
does not win, then a Republican wins’ is not equivalent in its truth conditions to
‘a Republican wins if Reagan does not win’. However, in this particular case the
discrepancy between truth conditions is very hard to spot.
Another option is to claim that although pif ', then q and p if 'q agree in
truth conditions, something happens at the pragmatic level which disrupts the accu-
mulation. For instance, we might say something along the lines that the post-verbal
positioning of the antecedent carries a (conversational) implicature to the eﬀect that
we tend to understand p if 'q as implying p even if 'q. In other words, when
we encounter ‘a Republican wins if Reagan does not win’ in the consequent of an
embedded conditional, we get thrown oﬀ balance and halt our accumulation. Per-
haps, in such cases, we are wont to stop our accumulation, say, because we do not
believe the antecedent of the embedding conditional, pif ', then ' if q, come
what may. On the other hand, when evaluating ‘if a Republican wins, then if Rea-
gan does not win, then a Republican wins’ we are, perhaps for the reason that there
is no such implicature, more willing to carry on with our accumulate reading.
Whatever the reason may be, there seems to be a good deal more to be said
about this distinction. However, since our current interest lies in McGee’s coun-
terexamples to , I suggest we leave those questions for another time.
How does all this relate to McGee’s counterexamples? Interestingly enough,
for each instance of McGee’s counterexamples we have considered until now, the
major premise is a conditional that begs for an accumulative reading. Moreover, our
counterexamples to  and  both seem to require non-accumulative readings.
ǮǰSee Davis (ǫǳǲǭ) and Geis (ǫǳǲǯ, p. ǫǮǲ).
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Let us keep this observation in mind for now, it will come in handy later.
Ė.Ę.č.Č Second Observation: Internal Tension
We have already noticed that the constituents of conditional sentences may have
funny eﬀects on one another. Are we confronted by something of that sort in the
case of McGee’s counterexamples? Well, it certainly seems that something of a
similar kind is the case. As we have noted before, the major premise in McGee’s
counterexamples has the form p' (  )q. What we have not remarked on
before now, however, is that there seems to be a certain tension between ' and .
Namely, it appears as if our very ground to believe ' is p:q.ǮǱ
To clarify, let us consider (ǫ) again: we believe that a Republican will win because
we believe that Reagan will win. After all, the poll tells us that Reagan will win,
p:q, and for that reason alone we believe that a Republicanwill win,'. erefore,
when we come to evaluate (ǫ), p'! (!  )q, we start oﬀ by entertaining the
possibility of a Republican victory which we take to be probable only because we
believe that Reagan will win. However, as we carry on with our evaluation of the
conditional and turn to the conditional within the consequent, p!  q, we face
a peculiar predicament: our initial supposition that a Republican would win,', was
made on the ground that Reagan would win, p:q, and yet the antecedent of the
embedded conditional demands that wemake the supposition that Reagan will win.
us, bymaking the supposition that Reagan will not win, we have undermined our
supposition that a Republican will win and that leaves us in a particular state. On
our journey through the space of possibilities, we must therefore, as it were, reverse
our course as we reach our ërst waypoint and discover ourselves to have been on the
wrong track.Ǯǲ In a way, then, when we evaluate (ǫ), we are forced oﬀ our initial
track, that of supposing Reagan’s victory, onto a new and altogether diﬀerent one.
ǮǱI owe this observation to Crispin Wright.
ǮǲPresumably, a similar story may be told about certain narratives psychologists are wont to
employ to expose our prejudices, for instance: ‘Both members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives accused the president of high treason. Upon those accusations, she pleaded innocent
and ridiculed the inculpation.’
Ė.Ę In Search of a Solution ČČĘ
What about McGee’s other counterexamples and all their variants we have con-
sidered hitherto? Unfortunately, the previously observed tension between ' and 
in p'  (   )q does not seem to be common to all the examples. At least,
for instance in the case of (ǫǫ), the tension seems to be absent: we do not ground
our supposition of an exposure of a scam, ', on Reagan not winning the elections,
p:q. Nonetheless, within (ǫǫ) there seems to be a certain tension as to the expo-
sure of a scam, ', is one that throws everything we take for granted about elections
up in the air, in particular the link between winning the elections, , and becoming
the president,  .
How important is this tension for the counterexamples? Clearly, the internal
tension alone is not suﬃcient to bring about a counterexample. For instance, the
sentence ‘If a Republican wins the elections, then if it’s not Reagan who wins and it’s
not Carter who wins, it will be Anderson’, which has the exact same tension as (ǫ),
does not give rise to a counterexample to  . To claim that the internal tension
is necessary to the counterexamples seems a more promising claim. At present, it
seems a hard one to argue for, but that might not be a problem we need to concern
ourselves with here. e importance of a characterisation of the counterexamples
is perhaps not fundamental to our project. Indeed, it seems that the observation
of this tension, whatever its exact signiëcance to the counterexamples, is enough to
guide us in an important direction.
So, what is the lesson to be learnt here? e observation of this tension seems
to indicate and emphasise the distinction we made above between accumulative
and non-accumulative embedded conditionals. Namely, in cases of accumulative
embedded conditionals, p'  (   )q, since we read them as if ' is still a
live supposition when we evaluate  on the supposition of , we must somehow
mirror that in the respective logical form. In other words, whenever we face an
accumulative natural language conditional, all conditionals embedded in its conse-
quent must take any antecedents we have supposed until then as a conjunction to
their own antecedents.
How are we best supposed to achieve that eﬀect? Well, perhaps surprisingly,
McGee was not all that far oﬀ target when he proposed  for the undertaking.
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(Indeed, although approached from quite a diﬀerent angle, McGee makes a similar
observation about the suppositional nature of conditionals.Ǯǳ) However, we have
seen that McGee’s proposal for a translation from natural languages into formal
language fails. Let us see whether we can do any better.
Ė.Ę.ď Towards a Solution
Here is a thought: in cases of accumulative embedded conditionals, why not carry
any suppositions to which we have already committed ourselves, over to the condi-
tional within the consequent? Instead ofMcGee’s proposal of using  as the heart
of our translation, why not rather say that the logical form of a natural language con-
ditional, p' (  )q, has in fact the logical form p' ((' ^ )  )q?
And instead of McGee’s proposal of translating all embedded natural language con-
ditionals in the proposed way, why not merely restrict our translation to accumu-
lative conditionals? We can, for the time being, say that the logical form of an
non-accumulative conditional is merely its surface form. at way, the failure of
 and  for non-accumulative conditionals need not worry us. Likewise, the
failure of the inference from p'  (   )q to p'  ((' ^ )   )q and
back, for non-accumulative conditionals, thus makes no diﬀerence to us.
Ė.Ę.ď.Ċ Interpreting Natural Language Conditionals
In fact, we may again propose a translation N from natural language into its log-
ical form in ërst order logic supplemented with a conditional, whose operation
we indicate by p'Nq, given by a deënition from a base case by induction on the
depth of formulae. A natural start is to begin as before with seven trivial clauses
for formulae with a main connective other than natural language conditionals. But
where do we go from there? As before, it might be tempting to give a clause such as
p(' )Nq := p'N  Nq for any formulae whosemain connective is a natural
language conditional and where  is any -free formula, p(' (  ))Nq :=
ǮǳMcGee (ǫǳǲǯ, p. Ǯǰǳ). See also Weatherson (ǬǪǪǱ), which makes an observation to a similar
eﬀect.
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p' (('^)  )Nq otherwise, and somehow deal with the other connectives
in a way that brings everything together.
Unfortunately, that will not do. e reason is that for every conditional within
the consequent, we need to add the antecedent of the embedded conditional. Using
recursive deënition clauses of the sort normally used is presumably possible by using
a clause of the form p('  (: : : (   ) : : :))Nq := p'  (: : : ((' ^ )  
 ) : : :)Nq, whereby we replace every occurrence of conditionals within the conse-
quent, p  q, for p(' ^ )  q recursively. at, however, if possible, will
become a rather messy aﬀair. A more elegant way is to build some sort of book-
keeping into our translation, such that we keep track of the suppositions already at
play. In other words, at every stage of our translation, we must be able to recall all
antecedents we have already encountered.
To do so, we might want to run our translation as follows. (Other options
are, of course, viable.) On the side, for a given translation, we keep track of all
suppositions (given by the respective antecedents) we have so far encountered in
our process of translation. Let us call this set of (sub) formulae our ‘supposition
set’.
Whenever we get to a point of translation where we have p('  )N(X)q,
we proceed as follows. First, we add the elements of the supposition set to the
antecedent, ', and make it subject for a new iteration of translation with an un-
changed supposition set. Two, we add ' to the supposition set and make the con-
sequent, , subject to that translation. Let us use the notation N(X) to denote
that the translation N has the (possibly empty) setX as its supposition set. Given
this extension, our main translation clause becomes:
(' )N(X) := ((
^
X)N(?) ^ 'N(X)) ()N(f'g[X)
Of course, given this translation, we must also modify our simple clauses. Trivially,
we may modify the simple clauses as follows:
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'N(X) := ', where ' is atomic
(:')N(X) := :'N(X)
(' ^ )N(X) := 'N(X) ^ N(X)
(' _ )N(X) := 'N(X) _ N(X)
('  )N(X) := 'N(X)  N(X)
(9x('(x)))N(X) := 9x(('(x))N(X))
(8x('(x)))N(X) := 8x(('(x))N(X))
Ė.Ę.ď.Č Applications of N
is sort of translation might perhaps strike one as somewhat obscure. As often,
the easiest way to understand things like these is by way of example. Let us try this
translation out on (ǫ), whose surface form, recall, we said to be p' (  )q:
(i) (' (  ))N(?) )
(ii) ((
V
?)N(?) ^ 'N(?)) (  )N(f'g) )
(iii) 'N(?)  (((
Vf'g)N(?) ^ N(f'g))  N(f';g)) )
(iv) ' (('N(?) ^ N(f'g))  )
(v) ' ((' ^ )  )
Needless to say, the translation gives us our desired result, p' ((' ^ ) 
 )q. When we take this to be the logical form of (ǫ), together with (Ǭ) we may
infer by  p(' ^ )   q. at conclusion says something along the lines
that ‘if a Republican wins the elections and Reagan does not win, then Anderson
will win’, which we do take to be true in the context of the example. So far, so good.
It is time to get slightly more ambitious. e translation above was not really
that impressive; we would like to see something somewhat more convoluted. Let
us try our luck with (ǫǮ), whose surface form we claimed to be something along
the lines of p' ( 8x( (x) ((x) _ (x))))q:
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(i) (' ( 8x( (x) ((x) _ (x)))))N(?) )
(ii) ((
V
?)N(?) ^ 'N(?)) 
( 8x( (x) ((x) _ (x))))N(f'g) )
(iii) 'N(?)  (((
Vf'gN(?) ^ N(f'g)) 
(8x( (x) ((x) _ (x))))N(f';g)) )
(iv) ' ((' ^ N(f'g)) 8x(( (x) ((x) _ (x)))N(f';g))) )
(v) ' ((' ^ ) 8x(((Vf'; gN(?) ^  (x)N(f';g)) 
((x) _ (x))N(f';; (x)g))) )
(vi) ' ((' ^ ) 8x(((' ^ )N(?) ^  (x)N(f';g)) 
(((x))N(f';; (x)g) _ ((x))N(f';; (x)g)))) )
(vii) ' ((' ^ ) 8x((' ^  ^  (x)) ((x) _ (x))))
at was perhaps somewhat less simple, but this translation shows, I believe,
the application of N quite well: for every embedded conditional, the antecedents
already encountered get added to their antecedents as we required. Moreover, taking
p' ((' ^ ) 8x((' ^  ^  (x)) ((x) _ (x))))q to be the logical
form of (ǫǮ), with (Ǭ) we may infer by  p('^) 8x(('^^ (x)) 
((x) _ (x)))q. at conclusion says something like ‘if a Republican wins and
Reagan does not win, then if a Republican wins and Reagan does not win and
anyone has strong opposition to Anderson’s presidency, then that very person must
either put up with Anderson for four years or else revolt’, which seems true in the
context of the example.
Obviously, the logical form may become quite cumbersome in cases such as
this one where antecedents get copied and recopied. at, however, is simply a
price that must be paid. No one ever said that natural languages were easy.
More interestingly, in both of the above cases, McGee’s paradox disappears as
we take the conclusion to be true. In other words, taking our translation proposal
seriously, we no more have reason to doubt the validity of  .
Before moving on, let us consider one more exercise of our translation. One
might suspect the occurrence of a conditional within the antecedent of a conditional
ČčČ Saving Modus Ponens
might pose problems forN .ǯǪ Already with sentences such as (ǫǮ), we are somewhat
stretching what people normally claim in natural languages. Arguably so, by placing
a conditional within the antecedent of a conditional, we are stretching things even
further. But be that as it may, considering how our translation fares with such cases
is interesting enough by itself. Without trying to come up with a concrete example,
let us merely suppose that we have a natural language conditional whose surface
form is p(' (  )) (  )q. On an accumulative reading, we expect
such conditional to have the logical form p('  ((' ^ )   ))  ((('  
((' ^ )  )) ^ ) )q.
According to our translation, such a conditional would translate as follows:
(i) ((' (  )) (  ))N(?) )
(ii) ((
V
?)N(?) ^ (' (  ))N(?)) (  )N(f' (  )g) )
(iii) (((
V
?)N(?) ^ 'N(?)) (  )N(f'g)) 
(((
Vf' (  )g)N(?) ^ N(f' (  )g)) 
N(f' (  );g)) )
(iv) ((' ((
Vf'gN(?)) ^ N(f'g))  N(f';g)) 
(((' (  ))N(?) ^ ) ) )
(v) (' ((' ^ )  )) 
((((
V
?)N(?) ^ 'N(?)  (  )N(f'g)) ^ ) ) )
(vi) (' ((' ^ )  )) 
(((' ((
Vf'g)N(?) ^ N(f'g))  N(f';g))) ^ ) ) )
(vii) (' ((' ^ )  )) (((' ((' ^ )  )) ^ ) )
e translation thus gives us the desired result.
Of course, this time around, we are not in the business of dissolving cases of
McGee’s counterexamples. However, if we were, it seems quite obvious that if a
conditional of the form p('  (   ))  (  )q could serve as a major
premiss in a counterexample, the translation would get us yet again away from the
awkward conclusion. In other words, by taking our translation proposal seriously,
we have no reason to doubt the validity of  anymore.
ǯǪI owe this observation to Greg Restall.
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Once again, we seem to be in position to claim that  is a valid rule of implication.
As there is something extremely unpleasant about rejecting , that must surely
come as a comfort to us. Even though we were only to reject  , there is still
something quite disturbing about that thought. Indeed, as we remarked above,
there seems to be a very intimate connection between natural language conditionals
and : an important part of the meaning of natural language conditionals seems
to be captured, as it were, by  . If we were so inclined, we might even claim
that  is among the rules which confer meaning on natural language conditionals.
Indeed, insofar as it is possible to talk about introduction and elimination rules in
proof-theoretic style for natural language expressions,  strikes us intuitively as
the most appropriate elimination rule for natural language conditionals.
Our result above is therefore more than mere idle procrastination. Indeed, our
results are comforting for the reason that we can hold onto  for natural lan-
guage conditionals. After all, if we buy into the solution we have developed above,
McGee’s ‘counterexamples’ to  show us nothing more than that there is more
to natural language than ërst meets the eye. Yes, if so, McGee’s ‘counterexamples’
merely serve to tell us that the logical form of sentences such as (ǫ) is more complex
than their surface form suggests.
So, what remains to be done? e task we set ourselves seems completed: we
have managed to save  from its alleged counterexamples. Is there anything
more to be done? Well, here is a bold conjecture: the backbone of our transla-
tion N may be used to deal with a host of context-dependent phenomena such
as restricted quantiëcation and deënite descriptions. How so? It does seem as if
some context-dependent phenomena behave a lot like accumulative conditionals.
For, say, both restricted quantiëcation and deënite descriptions, the universe of
discourse is determined by the very context in which those appear. Why not then
take the set of sentences contained in the context, as an antecedent to whichever
expressions made in that context? But we must leave that project for another day.

ǰ Conclusion
In this thesis’ introduction, we identiëed several pressing semantic issues pertaining
to natural language conditionals. In the preceding chapters, we have dealt with each
of them in turn. In order to bring our journey to an end, let us summarise brieìy
our main conclusions now.
Firstly, we dealt with the issue whether a certain class of natural language condi-
tionals were truth apt or not. In particular, our discussion was motivated by suasive
arguments involving so-called Gibbard Phenomemon cases to the eﬀect that indica-
tive conditionals cannot have truth conditions on pain of contradiction. However,
since that conclusion seems quite extraordinary from intuitive, logical and linguistic
points of view, we felt compelled to investigate the subject in detail. Upon a closer
look, we soon saw that the conditionals in question do in all likelihood demand
semantics of some sort in terms of the so-called Ramsey Test. However, we also
noticed that if we were to give indicative conditionals truth conditional semantics
Ǭǭǯ
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in terms of the Ramsey Test, Gibbard Phenomenon cases soon lead us to contradic-
tion. Since we were reluctant to give up truth conditions for indicative conditionals,
we considered several alternatives. We then ënally argued ourselves into a position
where we may well hold on to a contextualised counterpart of the Ramsey Test and
still successfully avoid the threats of the Gibbard Phenomenon.
Secondly, we addressed a fundamental issue concerning a widely recognised se-
mantic distinction among natural language conditionals. More precisely, we set
ourselves out to uncover the grounds of the so-called indicative/subjunctive dis-
tinction. We went through a series of intuitive proposals but found them all insuf-
ëcient on diﬀerent accounts. We then attempted to explain the distinction away
but eventually concluded that we could not do without it. After we had made sev-
eral helpful observations, we ënally suggested that the indicative/subjunctive line
should in fact be drawn with respect to the sorts of suppositions expressed by natu-
ral language conditionals. We then drew a distinction between modal and amodal
suppositions and argued that any interesting natural language conditional expresses
either of the two. Corresponding to modal and amodal suppositions, we presented
an outline of semantics for modal and amodal conditionals and suggested that the
indicative/subjunctive distinction should be understood in terms ourmodal/amodal
distinction.
irdly, we considered the issue of semantics proper and meta-semantics of nat-
ural language conditionals. In particular, we oﬀered a fully developed semantic the-
ory for conditionals in natural languages. We based our theory on themodal/amodal
distinction we presented in the previous chapter. We began by a close examination
and analysis of the so-called modal and amodal suppositions. Consequently, we
turned to the corresponding conditionals and ënally spelled out their truth con-
ditions in terms of modal and amodal suppositions. In order to provide us with
an input for more elaborate semantics, we then oﬀered a rudimentary syntactic ac-
count of conditional sentences in English. Eventually, we then presented a fully
compositional semantics for natural language conditionals in generative grammar.
Fourthly and ënally, we explored the issue of inference rules of natural language
conditionals. In particular, we questioned and eventually defended the validity of
Conclusion ČčĘ
Modus Ponens () despite McGee’s compelling counterexamples to the contrary.
, recall, is a rule of implication which tells us that a conditional together with
its antecedent imply its consequent. Intuitively, there is a very strong link between
natural language conditionals and : indeed,  strikes us an integral part of
the meaning of natural language conditionals. For that reason, we claimed, some
resolution of the counterexamples is all the more pressing. We began our journey
by presenting the most prominent responses the counterexamples currently in the
literature and we then argued that they were all inadequate in diﬀerent aspects. We
ënally motivated and presented our own solution which allows us to hold onto
 at the price of positing a more complex logical form of embedded conditionals
than their surface structure suggest. Moreover, we also oﬀered a translation function
from their surface form to their logical form in adherence with our solution to the
counterexamples.
Although this thesis has merely scratched the surface of a vast subject, I humbly and
sincerely hope that it has contributed something worthwhile to the topic of natural
language conditionals.
Guðmundur Andri Hjálmarsson
Arché, University of St Andrews
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